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Abstract 
A major goal of vision science is to understand how the visual system maintains behaviourally 
relevant perceptions given the level of uncertainty in the signals it receives. One proposed solution is 
that the visual system applies predictive coding to its inputs based on the integration of prior 
knowledge and current stimulus features. However, support for some vital aspects of predictive 
coding in the temporal domain is lacking and simpler accounts of temporal integration also exist. The 
aim of this thesis was to test two key attributes of predictive coding in time a) does the visual system 
apply adaptive weighting to prediction errors and b) can the visual system apply probalistic 
information learnt from stimulus sequences when making predictions. In chapters 3 & 4, we tested 
predictive coding’s ideas of how prediction errors are weighted under the theoretical guidance of a 
temporal integration model linked to predictive processing, called the Kalman filter. Here, both 
experiments supported predictive coding. We showed that, consistent with the Kalman filter, visual 
estimates and the way estimation errors were corrected, adapted to stimulus behaviour and viewing 
conditions. In chapter 5, we assessed the ability of the visual system to integrate conditional 
relationships present in sequences of stimuli when making predictions. To do this, we inserted a 
stimulus sequence that changed and omitted trials based on Markov transition probabilities that made 
some transitions more or less probable and assessed reaction times and omission trial responses. 
Reaction time data was consistent with predictive coding, in that more predictable changes elicited 
faster responses.  Omission trials data, was though, less clear. When faced with no stimulus, 
participants did not apply the conditional probabilities in their decisions optimally, instead applying 
non optimal decision strategies, inconsistent with predictive coding. In summary, this thesis supports 
the predictive coding of temporal integration but questions its application in all situations. 
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Chapter one. Vision and uncertainty: how to deal with a dynamic 
and noisy world. 
1. General Introduction  
1.1 Vision: a vital behavioural tool. 
Nervous systems have evolved under natural conditions to extract and compute behaviourally 
important information from the external world (Zeil, Boeddeker, & Hemmi, 2008). Of all parts of the 
nervous system that computes such information the visual system is perhaps the most important. The 
reason why vision is so important, is that we use vision in practically every behaviour we perform. 
Crucial tasks, such as navigating our environment, detecting danger, finding food, using tools and 
successfully interacting with others, all rely heavily on vision. However, despite our heavy reliance on 
vision, as we go about our busy daily lives, in most cases we seldom give thought to how important 
vision is or how it might actually work. One reason for this indifference is that in most situations 
vision seems remarkably easy. In fact, vision, unlike other cognitive processes such as solving a word 
puzzle or a mathematical problem seems remarkably straightforward. No effort at all is really needed 
to produce a solution. All we need do is open our eyes and the world is there before us instantly as a 
constant, accurate and stable perception of the outside world of sufficient resolution and speed to 
facilitate effective behaviours. Nonetheless, this apparent expertise in perceiving the world and the 
ease in which we can guide behaviours using vision belies a task of true complexity for the visual 
cortex.  
1.2. The central problem for vision. 
The crux of the problem facing the visual system is that the visual cortex, in which perception actually 
‘exists’, is firmly encased within the skull. This means that the visual cortex does not have direct 
access to stimuli of interest or events in the external world. Isolation from the world presents an 
inverse problem for the visual system in that it must reliably interpret and adapt to unknown events 
and objects in the environment based only on indirect information (Pizlo, 2001). The source of this 
indirect information is light that reflects or emits from stimuli in the world forming information 
bearing patterns on the retinal surface (Hubel, 1988). Relying on external light signals and the patterns 
they form on the retina to internally interpret the world opens up a myriad of problems for the visual 
cortex which combine to make visual information uncertain (Gregory, 1970; Gordon et al, 2017; Knill 
& Pouget, 2011.; Kwon, Tadin, & Knill, 2015; Levi, Klein, & Chen, 2005; Parr, Rees, & Friston, 
2018; Wei, Wert, & Körding, 2010). The notion of uncertainty is prominent in vision science, thanks 
in no small part to the influence of Swets & Green (1967) and their signal detection theory, plus a 
large body of prominent work into the way sensory systems reconcile noisy and ambiguous visual 
information (Beierholm, Quartz, & Shams, 2009; Casini, Mckay Illari, Russo, & Williamson, 2011; 
Gia Thu & Loc Hung, 2003; Knill, 2007; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Seth, 2014; Yuille & Kersten, 2006) 
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to name but a few. However, despite the widespread nature of research into how the visual cortex 
resolves uncertainty and the use of the term, exactly why visual information is uncertain is often not 
fully explained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Uncertainty in visual information: variability in visual inputs. 
One way of understanding why visual information is uncertain is to think about the flow of 
information the cortex receives from the retina as carrying statistics adapted to the external world in 
some way (Barlow, 1961; Berry, Warland, & Meister, 1997; Ly & Doiron, 2017) and perception as an 
interpretation of this information. The problem for the visual cortex is that like any system applying 
statistical interpretations to indirect signals from the outside world, the interpretation of signals arising 
from stimuli in the world is never entirely certain (Gregory, 1970; Yuille & Kersten, 2006). This is 
because all sensory information provided to the cortex from retinal measurements of the external 
world and early visual systems is to some extent variable (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Wolpert, 
Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; Wolpert, 2007). In the same way that increased variability in 
experimental measurements makes interpretation less certain (Taylor, 1997) (see figure 2 below), it 
also makes the interpretation of information from stimuli in the world more uncertain (Knill, 2007; 
Kwon et al., 2015). Due to the complexity and behaviour of the world and the way the retina and early 
visual systems behave there are a number of sources of variability present in visual information 
received at the cortex.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the position of the isolated occipital cortex at the posterior of the 
brain source and the internal structure of the retina which provides visual information to the 
cortex (Figures A & B adapted from Hubel (1988)).  
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1.4. Sources of variability in visual information. 
The combination of the behaviour of the external natural world and the workings of human anatomy 
means that there are a number of sources of variability present in the visual information that is 
interpreted by the brain (Burge, Ernst, & Banks, 2008; Melcher, 2011; Wei et al., 2010). Importantly, 
the nature of these sources of variability mean that they have different implications for perception 
which can be quite subtle (Burge et al., 2008; Burge, Girshick, & Banks, 2010). To help simplify the 
sources of variability and their significance for perception, we split them into two groups. These are 
external sources of variability from events and stimuli outside of the brain and sources of internal 
variability that comes from the workings of the brain itself.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The general relationship between variability and uncertainty. Uncertainty simply means that we 
do not know the value of some quantity or outcome of an event, for example the current state of a changing 
stimulus based on an indirect noisy retinal image. The level of variability refers to the relative stability of 
values that we have recorded about the stimulus we are interested in. If we make lots of recordings that are 
around the same value then the variance in these recordings is low. In this case, if we plot the distribution of 
the data points we will have a narrow distribution (see the blue distribution) and we can attach a good level of 
certainty that the current recording of our stimulus if it falls within this distribution. Alternatively, if we make 
recordings that change considerably over time our recordings will carry a higher level of variability and our 
distribution will be broader (red distribution). This means that we can have less confidence that our current 
recording of our stimulus value is accurate. 
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1.5. External variability 
The first type of external variability present in incoming signals is simple. This is variability caused 
by the behaviour of objects and events in the world. When our surroundings are stable, visual 
information pertaining to stimuli is less variable and when our surroundings are changing it is more 
variable. This means that the amount of variability present in visual information can potentially 
provide important cues about what is happening in the external world. In an ideal world, the signals 
produced by stimuli under both changing and stable conditions would be easy to interpret. Small 
levels of variability should be taken to mean stability and high levels of variability would mean 
change has occurred and we should update our interpretation and perceptions accordingly (Denève, 
Duhamel, & Pouget, 2007; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). However, in the stream of visual information 
from the world there are other sources of external variance that do not arise from stimuli and their 
behaviours and add unwanted variability to the incoming stimulus information that we receive.  
External variability can often arise from the environmental conditions in which we view the world. 
For example, the local atmospheric conditions through which light signals pass through on the way to 
the retina (See Saleh & Teich (2001) for a comprehensive account of the behaviour of light in 
different atmospheric conditions). If the weather is clear, then light signals and the information they 
contain travel to the retina largely intact (Jägerbrand & Sjöbergh, 2016). In this situation, extraction 
and interpretation of the part of the signal relating the behaviour of the stimuli of interest is more 
straightforward. However, the weather is not always clear. In situations such as fog or rain, the level 
of variability in light signals can be increased or the part of the signal carrying stimulus information 
degraded or lost. This is because light changes its behaviour as it travels between lighter and denser 
mediums such as air and water. When light carrying stimulus information from a car or road sign 
passes thorough a water droplet in a rain shower or low cloud formation (see figure 3 below) only a 
portion of the light from the sign passes through to the retina while the rest scatters. Weather 
conditions can therefore block or deflect some of the information from stimulus in the world and 
prevents the cortex from accessing as much stimulus information that would otherwise be available. 
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Visual information can also become more variable due to light changes during different phases of the 
diurnal cycle. While artificial light is relatively abundant in today’s society the vast majority of the 
basis for signals from external stimuli still comes from direct or indirect light from the sun. As the 
suns elevation declines from it midday peak (60-90°) to the horizon (0°) at sunset, light intensity 
declines approximately 100 fold with the majority of this drop occurring rapidly in the final 5° of 
decline (Warrant & Johnsen, 2013) The effect of reduced light is to produce a gradient decline in the 
intensity of the light carrying stimulus information measured at the retina as the amount of light in the 
environment declines (Jägerbrand & Sjöbergh, 2016). The decline in light has an inverse relationship 
with variability in retinal measurements because as when light levels go down, variability in the 
measurement at the cortex goes up (Cordani et al., 2018) and because the sun sets and rises every day 
represents a twice daily source of additional variability in visual information from stimuli in the world 
(see figure 4 below).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Effects of poor weather on viewing conditions. Here we see the how the effects of poor weather 
degrade the quality of signals carrying task relevant information. When driving we need to know about the 
behaviour of other cars on the road. However, here water in the atmosphere has blocked some of the light to 
while diffused other parts of the light carrying important signals (image is my own).  
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External variability is also caused by the workings of human anatomy. One such anatomically related 
source of variance is indirectly caused by the structure and organisation of photoreceptors in the 
retina. The retina contains two types of two types of photoreceptors. Namely, Rods and Cones. Rods 
are more numerous, some 120 million, while there are only 6 million cones (see Solomon & Lennie, 
(2007) for a descriptive account of the structure and function of retinal photoreceptors). However, 
while cones are less numerous, they are more tightly packed together in the central fovea of the retina. 
In much the same way increased pixel density provides higher resolution in a television images, the 
high density of cones also promotes high resolution spatial and colour vision in the centre of our 
visual field (Hubel, 1988). The balance between rods and cones and their respective positions and 
densities has proven effective in general terms but it has not come without some cost. Specifically, 
that in order to focus our high resolution spatial and colour central vision on task relevant stimuli, we 
need to constantly move our eyes, head and body to some extent. This means that even during fixation 
our eyes are in motion. Almost constant anatomical motion means that retinal patterns are rarely 
stable on the photoreceptors of the eye (Arathorn et al, 2013; Melcher, 2011). The upshot of 
instability in information bearing patterns on the retina is to introduce motion related variability into 
the image of stimuli in the world and is an almost constant source of uncertainty in visual information.  
 
Figure 4. Effects of reduced light on viewing conditions. Here we can observe a degraded image 
due to failing light. In this case we have a driving in twilight example. We see clear reduction in 
object contrast and spatial frequency due to the decreased light (image is my own). 
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A further source of anatomically related external variability is caused by the need to maintain a 
moving eye. A large part of this maintenance is performed by blinks. Blinks are an essential function 
of the eye that help spread tears across and remove irritants from the surface of the cornea and 
conjunctiva (Hall, 1945). Of course blinks are vital but there is some trade-off between the 
maintenance of the eye and the flow of visual information to the brain. A good way to understand this 
trade-off is to think of blinks as an on and off switch in the flow of stimulus information to the cortex. 
When our eyes are blink free the flow is ‘on’ and during a blink the flow is ‘off’. Clearly, blinks are 
short in duration but they occur very frequently at a rate of approximately 15 times every waking 
minute (Burr, 2005). Due to this frequency, blinks are a very common source of variability in 
information received by the visual cortex as they produce almost constant gaps in the flow of visual 
information.  
1.6. Internal variability. 
Internally produced variability comes from the workings of the brain in the form of neural noise 
(Stein, 2005). Neural noise is perhaps the most intriguing of all of the sources of variability present in 
visual information received at the cortex. This is due to the controversy over whether such variability 
should be considered as noise in the negative sense of the term (Averbeck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006). 
Neural noise is caused by the random electrical firings and fluctuations of neurons in the brain that do 
not appear to be related with encoding an external stimulus directly (Swain & Longtin, 2006). 
Previously, it was thought that neural noise served no benefit and was detrimental to sensory 
processing (Strong et al, 1998). More recently, it has been proposed that neural noise is actually 
beneficial to the computations the brain applies to interpreting uncertain inputs. One idea forwarded 
by proponents of Bayesian brain theories relates to the idea that the brain represents temporal 
information from the world as Poisson probability distributions (Averbeck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006). 
Bayesian computing is done most efficiently when both past information and current information 
carries the same type of probability distributions. It is proposed, that by adding noise to sensory 
information, neurons are trying to make incoming visual information as ‘Poisson’ as possible to match 
the internal representation of past information and thus maximise information transfer (Zylberberg et 
al, 2017). While this idea may or not be correct, we nonetheless include neural noise as a source of 
variability in visual information as it does add variability to information received at the cortex 
regardless of its function. 
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Figure 5. Variability, noise and stimulus information. Here using an example of radio signals we show the 
effects of factors such as the weather and neural noise might have on ‘clean’ stimulus information. Radio signals 
are an apt simile to visual signals as they are much the same as light signals. The only difference in the 
wavelength of the waves which are subject to many of the same sources of noise and variability. In the upper 
panel is a ‘clean’ radio signal. The variability in the frequency of this signal carries information about the 
content of the information transmitted by the sender. On its own interpretation of the clean signal is 
straightforward as the signal carries only variability about the signal of interest. In the middle panel we have 
only noise. Noise is unrelated to the radio signal carrying stimulus information. In radio waves, like light waves, 
noise can arise from atmospheric conditions or noise from other task irrelevant signals such as from other radio 
waves transmitting in a similar channel. It can also arise from components in the radio such as the flow of 
charges in the radio device (much like neural noise). The lower panel illustrates the sum total of signal and noise 
which must be interpreted by the receiving device. As we can see the addition of noise makes the radio signals 
of interest much more variable, which makes the true signal more uncertain and harder to interpret (figure 
adapted from signal and noise https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/mlc-
downloads/downloads/submissions/9554/versions/5/previews/numerical-
tour/denoising_noise_models/index.html accessed 1/10/16). 
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1.7. Variability in signals and measurements produces little effect on perception and behaviour: 
application of prior knowledge. 
The internal and external sources of variability we have presented are certainly not trivial. It is 
apparent that the information that reaches the cortex about stimuli in the world is very often or most 
likely always variable making interpretation of important stimulus information constantly uncertain to 
some degree. Given the nature of the factors which produce uncertainty in visual information we 
might logically expect certain effects of different sources of variability to be present in perception. 
Because we constantly need to blink we might conclude that they would seriously interrupt our flow 
of visual consciousness. In addition, we might also expect our perception of objects in the world to be 
unstable nearly all of the time due to constant retinal instability or perception in bad weather or poor 
light to be worse than it actually is. Furthermore, we might think that neural noise would lead to 
confusion in the interpretation of incoming signals as it adds random fluctuations to the incoming 
information. However, in reality both internal and external variability appear to exert little effect on 
perception and behaviour in normal circumstances. We barely notice blinks despite occurring almost 
constantly, perception is remarkably stable at all times and our perception in bad weather and poor 
light although somewhat decreased in acuity is still normally reliable enough to perceive relevant 
stimuli and respond accordingly. Therefore, the contrast between the variable nature of visual 
information received at the cortex and our subjective visual and behavioural experience raises an 
important and currently unanswered question. Specifically, what computational processing strategies 
is the visual cortex applying to its inputs to extract relevant stimulus information from the mass of 
uncertain visual information emitting from world and turn this information into the high grade 
perceptions we are familiar with.  
Exactly how the brain reconciles uncertainty is not fully understood. However, one strategy the visual 
system does appear to employ is to apply prior knowledge to interpreting current visual inputs 
(Friston, 2010; Kok, & De Lange, 2016). Importantly, the application of previous experience to 
current visual inputs rests on certain rules and characteristics present in the physical world and the 
way stimuli behave (Chun, 2003; Turk-Browne, 2012). Events and the behaviour of stimuli in the 
natural world rarely evolve completely randomly. Usually, the way events unfold and the way stimuli 
behave exhibit temporal regularities and relationships which can potentially be learnt and applied 
when interpreting variable visual information (de Lange, Heilbron, & Kok, 2018). One aspect of 
temporal structures and regularities that is very important to emphasise, is that such structures and 
regularities exist at varying levels of complexity (Barlow, 2001; de Lange, Heilbron, & Kok, 2018; 
Turk-Browne et al, 2009) which effects how they might be utilised by the brain. 
1.8. Types of temporal regularity.  
A common type of temporal regularity present in the behaviour of stimuli and indeed the wider 
environment is that the world is remarkably temporally stable over time or when events do occur they 
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are often repeats of one another (Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Liberman, Fischer, & Whitney, 2014; 
Liberman, Zhang, & Whitney, 2016). While we may not really think much about temporal stability as 
objects that are stable tend not to be behaviourally pressing, stability is nonetheless extremely 
prevalent. Examples of environmental stability are practically everywhere. If you look around your 
office or place of work right now, it is highly likely that very little is changing. Walls and windows 
remain in the same place, your desk does not suddenly appear in another part of the room and a book 
left on a shelf remains in the same location unless moved. Temporal stability can also occur in the 
behaviour of many stimuli in which the actions are simple repeats of themselves. The way people 
walk follows a similar pattern and the way a key goes into a lock and almost always turns clockwise 
provides past information that can be used to help minimize uncertainty. A commonly stable 
environment and repeated common behaviours means that in some instances a good estimate of a 
stimulus value of interest within a stream of noisy visual information is that next value will be the 
same or similar to the current values, at least over a short to medium time span, or that an action or 
event we have just observed will be repeated again. 
In addition to an unchanging world or the simple repeats of behaviours a different type of temporal 
regularity are the conditional probabilities that exist between stimuli and events in the world (de 
Lange et al., 2018; Friston, 2010). For example, one simple type of conditional relationship are cues 
that signal a certain outcome. If you cook food in a microwave and the buzzer sounds we can make a 
judgment that as we have heard the buzzer our food is cooked. Importantly, more complex conditional 
relationships also exist within sequences of events that evolve over time. If you walk through a busy 
train station, you need to negotiate your way through lots of people many going in different directions 
heading to different exits to get onto your required train. Here, there are potentially many different 
paths people could take. One way to predict the position of other people and where they might be next 
might be by combining sequential information about how people will transition from the current to a 
future position based on the previous n-1, n-2, n-3, n-4… time points combined with knowledge of the 
exits and entrances of the station. By using conditional relationships provided by cues and sequences 
of events in our surroundings it is possible to decrease the level of uncertainty of sensory information 
which if judged on an independent basis might be subject to misinterpretation or errors (de Lange et 
al. 2018). 
Empirical support for the idea that the visual system integrates information about the statistical 
regularities of stimuli and the environment is strongest in an area of research termed visual serial 
effects. Serial effects is an umbrella term study of a group of visual phenomena that indicate that 
perception that is not only driven by the stimulus information impinging on the retina at the current 
moment but by what has been observed in the recent past (Barlow, 2001; Gregory, 1970). Research 
areas that comes under serial effects include some very well studied areas such as visual masking, 
priming of pop out, serial dependence and adaptation to name but a few. Studies into such phenomena 
11 
 
provide some excellent examples for the general idea of temporal integration in visual perception and 
also highlight some limitations in the understanding of the exact type of strategies by which the visual 
system exploits such regularities  
1.9 Broad evidence that the visual system integrates temporal structure when interpreting 
variable retinal measurements. 
An area of serial effects research that provides a good illustration of temporal integration comes from 
visual masking. Visual masking refers to the phenomena that the current perception of a target 
stimulus is reduced by the presence of another stimuli called a mask (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000). 
With respect to time three types of masking are usually tested; forward, backward, and simultaneous. 
In backward visual masking a target stimuli is presented for a short period of time and followed 
quickly by the “mask” (Kahneman, 1968). In suitable temporal conditions, the trailing mask can 
greatly reduce the perception of the target stimulus, even though the two visual events are separated in 
time (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; Kafaligonul, Breitmeyer, & Öğmen, 2015).The fact that the mask 
exerts an effect on the perception of the target even though the two events are distinct in time has been 
taken in support of the idea that the visual system retains a representation of the stimuli which it 
integrates in some way with the current retinal image (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000). Because the two 
images are combined the perception of the current image is less accurate as it also contains 
information from the previous measurement (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976; Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; 
Swift, 2013). 
Further support for the notion that the visual system integrates information from the recent past into 
current perceptions comes from temporal form part integration. Temporal form-part integration refers 
to the finding in which two different sets of stimuli, presented at different times, are perceived by the 
visual system as a single integrated percept (Brockmole, Wang, & Irwin, 1985; Di Lollo, Hogben, & 
Dixon, 1994) Frequently, temporal form part integration studies use the two field paradigm in which 
stimuli usually comprise two stimuli showing, for instance, small dots or two parts of a matrix of dots 
with one piece or section missing in each stimuli that alone make no sense but together form a 
coherent image (Bachmann, 1997).The separated images are then presented successively with the 
time gap between images varied over trials. The task of the participant is to perform a judgment of 
what structure of the two incomplete patterns represent when combined i.e. letters. Importantly, the 
successful interpretation of a two a two field paradigm presentation can only be performed by 
integrating the first and second incomplete sections of dots into a complete figure. The required 
stimulus information to form a whole image cannot be drawn from either half image alone and can 
only come from the integration of both image sections. Usually, participants respond correctly at 
higher than chance levels when the half images are presented in sequences up to intervals of 120 ms 
between images (Swift, 2013). This repeatedly reported result provides support that the visual system 
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integrates information from images observed in separate time windows to help create a coherent 
image of two uncertain half or interrupted images.  
An especially well studied phenomena studied under the umbrella of serial effects that illustrates the 
way past information can improve the effectiveness of behaviour is repetition priming. Repetition 
priming is a phenomena in which the behavioural response to a stimulus, usually measured in reaction 
times or accuracy, is improved by the repeated presentation of a stimulus (Kristjánsson, 2006; 
Yoshimoto et al., 2013). A number of priming of pop out tasks have provided strong and illustrative 
evidence for the contextualizing and performance enhancing input of previously observed stimuli. 
Commonly, in priming of pop out studies participants are asked to search for a stimulus of odd 
dimensions such as colour or shape relative to distractor stimuli of a similar but distinct nature that 
have another distinguishing feature such as a notch missing or an orientation marker (Becker, 2008; 
Goolsby & Suzuki, 2001; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Magnussen & Greenlee, 1999; Olivers & 
Meeter, 2008). Participants are then asked to state the nature of the distinguishing feature, i.e. is the 
notch to the right or the left or what orientation is the marker on the stimulus. Results normally report 
that if the target stimuli shares colour or shape with the previous target stimulus, even if the 
distinguishing feature that they are asked to report on is different, then reaction times are decreased or 
accuracy improved (Becker, 2008; Goolsby & Suzuki, 2001; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) 
Crucially, because the priming observed is separate to the task demands then it might be interpreted as 
participants interpreting potentially uncertain information based on an integration of the salient 
features in stimuli. 
Support from research into the various forms of serial effects strongly supports the idea that the visual 
system integrates information from the recent past into current perceptions. It is also highly likely that 
given the nature of such findings and our knowledge of the nature visual information received at the 
cortex that this is performed to aid the extraction and interpretation of uncertain task relevant stimulus 
information. However, there are a number of questions about such assumptions and findings due to 
the level of research serial effects operate at. All of the examples of serial effects literature we have 
presented operate at the empirical as opposed to the theoretical level. To elaborate on this distinction, 
the empirical level applies to observations about what happens under a certain set of experimental 
circumstances. On the other hand, the theoretical level attempts to explain findings from the empirical 
level and say how and why the findings occurred. For example, repetition priming gives an especially 
good illustration of the difference between the empirical and theoretical level research. The decrease 
in reaction times when stimuli are repeatedly presented is interesting but it is simply an observation. It 
is possible to speculate that under an assumption of a stable world that we might be tuned to expect 
what has been observed previously to be repeated and so be able to respond faster. This idea does not 
though say what happens to reaction times under more variable conditions or whether the reaction 
times might be due to the use of conditional relationships present in the sequences of stimuli as 
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opposed to simple repeats. Also, such empirical findings level studies do not touch on the underlying 
computations of integration or what the aim of integrating actually is. Is the aim of integration simply 
to increase signal to noise ratio or to actively reduce the amount of error in perception and responses 
which while appearing to be similar goals potentially arise from different computational strategies. 
Overall, on the basis of such research it could be valid to say that the visual system does integrate 
information over time but that it is also reasonable to say that such empirical research gives no 
theoretical explanation of the factors which mediate integration and the underlying computations that 
underpin integration or what the actual aim of integration might be. However, while much serial 
effects research does function at the empirical level there do exist ideas which do provide theoretical 
explanations of the how and why the brain integrates information over time.  
1.10 Two predictive integration strategies: assume stability and predict based on the average of 
values observed over time or learn the conditional relationships between stimuli and predict.  
Theoretical ideas about how and why the visual system integrates information about the statistical 
regularities of the environment have long concerned the thoughts of some of the most important 
figures in the history of cognitive science. These figures include including Helmholtz, Mach, Pearson, 
Craik, Attneave, Barlow and Gregory giving a clear indication of the level of such research. Due in no 
small part to the ideas of such crucial figures, an important idea has emerged within cognitive science. 
This idea, is that in order to help resolve uncertainty the brain makes forecasts or predictions about the 
content of its variable inputs based on past experience. Here though, it is important to raise an 
important point central to the current thesis. That is that the term prediction can be used in a number 
of ways and there is also more than one way to make a prediction. Over time a number of strategies 
about how the brain might predict the nature of its uncertain inputs have emerged and here we focus 
on two of them. Namely perceptual averaging (Corbett, Venuti, & Melcher, 2016) and perceptual 
inference derived mainly from the early works of Helmholtz (1867).  
1.11 Perceptual averaging and perceptual inference. 
Perceptual averaging is a simple way to make a prediction about variable measurements familiar to 
anyone who has worked with interpreting noisy signals that relies on a simple underlying assumption. 
This assumption is that there is some level of temporal stability in the stimulus under measurement 
but that measurements are also variable to some extent. Under this expectation a good way to predict 
a stimulus value is to base predictions on an average of values observed over time. Importantly, this 
type of prediction is while still a prediction more of a retrodictive type of prediction and relies on past 
information entirely. Perceptual inference on the other hand also involves a type of averaging to 
resolve uncertainty but in this case averaging also makes use of some of the more complex type of 
conditional sequential relationships present in the environment and is perhaps a more ‘true’ or 
prospective type of prediction. In perceptual inference, calculations can include basic regularities such 
as the repetitions or cues but can also factor in knowledge or beliefs about conditional relationships 
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present in more complex sequential information arising from the way stimuli behave or events occur 
in the world. Also, the time frames from which such learnt sequential and contextual knowledge can 
be applied to interpreting current sensory inputs can potentially be garnered from not only the 
previous seconds but potentially from much longer time frames. Crucially the ability to incorporate 
complex sequential relationships allows the construction of complex mental models that simulate 
future states of the environment based on how we expect the world to behave in the future in a more 
prospective manner (Friston, 2010). Examples which can help to distinguish the difference between 
perceptual averaging and perceptual inference can be observed in many day to day situations. 
Anyone who travels to work using any type of large transit system such as an underground subway or 
rail network will have observed people making both predictions based on stability in events in the 
world and those based on more complex sequential or contextual information. Normally, on such 
networks the platform can be on the right or the left of the stopping train depending on the design of 
the station. People who wish to alight at their appropriate stop and miss the rush of people alighting 
from the same carriage must make a prediction about what side the platform will be on before they 
reach their stop so they can position themselves more effectively. This is where we can propose a 
hypothetical situation can help differentiate the two strategies. Say on one line of the network, the 
platform stays on the right hand side for five stops and then on the sixth stop switches to the left. At 
the sixth stop, people unfamiliar with the network, say tourists, will nearly always stand facing the 
right. This is an entirely viable strategy as the previous stops have all had platforms on the right. In 
the same situation it is also possible to observe a more inferential or model based type of prediction. 
People who are familiar with the line, say those who use it for travelling to work are able to model the 
sequential regularities of the platforms on the line. This means that when the train reaches the sixth 
stop they know to face the left side. This example shows the benefits of being able to utilise the 
sequential regularities of events in the world when making predictions. When events are uncertain 
basing predictions solely on what has occurred previously may be a good idea when things are stable 
but this type of prediction is in essence a prediction about the past and as we described will become 
inaccurate when events change in sequence or order. The ability to make predictions based on 
sequential regularities means that we can make more general and flexible predictions to help 
minimize uncertainty that are more about the ‘future’ which in the above subway case led to a more 
successful behavioural outcome. While the examples we discuss relate more to decision making type 
of predictions these general predictive strategies form the basis of two theories of visual processing. 
One which is largely an implied model we term fixed rate perceptual averaging (Kiyonaga, Scimeca, 
Bliss, & Whitney, 2017; Liberman et al., 2016) and a more formal model termed predictive coding 
(Gordon, Koenig-Robert, Tsuchiya, van Boxtel, & Hohwy, 2017; Huang & Rao, 2011; Spratling, 
2008).  
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Fixed rate perceptual averaging is a term that can be applied to explain the finding that people’s 
perceptions of current stimuli appears to revert towards the mean values of previously observed 
stimuli (Albrecht & Scholl, 2010; Albrecht, Scholl, & Chun, 2012; Jones & Dekker, 2018). Mean 
reversion is a century old finding first recorded in an experiment which showed that participants 
frequently choose a probe card that was too large when the cue card was small compared to the other 
cards presented in the experiment and selected a probe card that was too small when the cue card was 
larger (Hollingworth, 1910). Current findings indicting similar averaging behaviours come from both 
the spatial domain, in which the perception of a stimulus ensemble appears to represent the mean of 
shapes and sizes of objects in the current field of view (Campbell & Robson, 1968; Corbett, 
Wurnitsch, Schwartz, & Whitney, 2012a; Parkes, Lund, Angelucci, Solomon, & Morgan, 2001) and 
in the temporal domain in perception appears to represent a reversion to the mean of stimulus values 
observed over time, a phenomena often termed serial dependence (Alais, Leung, & Van Der Burg, 
2017 ; Cicchini et al., 2014.; Corbett, Fischer, & Whitney, 2011; Kiyonaga et al., 2017; Liberman, 
Fischer, & Whitney, 2014; Liberman, Zhang, & Whitney, 2016; Moors, Stein, Wagemans, & Ee, 
2015).  
Serial dependence is defined as bias in participant’ judgments of a current stimulus value towards the 
mean of previous stimulus values (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). In serial dependence literature, mean 
reversion is interpreted under an internal assumption of a stable environment in which measurements 
at the retina are always uncertain to some extent (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). The general idea behind 
the function of serial dependence is that by representing perception as the fixed mean of values 
observed over time, variability in visual information from factors such as blinks and saccades are 
smoothed over allowing more accurate representations of the true values of stimuli of interest than 
those provided by a single uncertain measurement (Liberman et al., 2016; St. John-Saaltink et al., 
2016). However, like any method of averaging or indeed statistical interpretation the implied fixed 
weighted method has its disadvantages and there are additional problems in regard to the way the 
fixed average account of temporal integration is somewhat less than clearly described in the literature.  
There are two main issues with a fixed weighted averaging account of serial dependence. The first 
relates to the simplicity of the assumption of a stable world in which measurements are always 
uncertain. The second is a lack of an explicitly stated model for the fixed averaging perceptual 
integration strategy that is implied in serial dependence literature. The simplicity of applying a fixed 
average to all measurements is straightforward to understand. If you have a set of relatively stable 
statistical measurements from an experiment then averaging at a fixed rate would give a reasonable 
approximation of the underlying trends in the data. However, averaging at a fixed rate when values 
are highly variable but measurements clear leads to what might be considered unnecessary errors. 
This is because, as with any type of statistical averaging, some amount of past measurement values 
are always included in the current estimate. In visual terms, if the behaviour of stimuli is highly 
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variable then basing perceptions on a fixed average of past measurements means perceptions will not 
be indicative of the current state of signal as the perception is anchored on past measurements making 
them lagged in time to large changes in stimuli value. Also, the implied fixed average method of 
perceptual averaging suffers from a lack of an explicitly stated mathematical or computational model 
by which to guide experimental design and compare against other computational account of temporal 
integration. It appears that the general explanation of serial dependence is based on fixed weighted 
average models commonly used in signal processing but this is never actually stated. Without an 
explicitly stated computational account it is difficult to design experiments which test the fixed 
account of integration or compare against other accounts of temporal integration such as predictive 
coding which do have a more formalised if varied computational structure. 
1.12. Predictive coding account of temporal integration: basic ideas 
Predictive coding is a major theoretical movement within cognitive science and potentially represents 
a considerable paradigm shift in the way we think about vision (see Clark, 2013) for an overview of 
predictive coding theory). The general idea of some current and highly influential predictive coding 
models is that is that the visual system contains a series of hierarchical internal model(s) (Friston, 
2010; Spratling, 2015). Each layer of the hierarchy contains an increasingly complex (from lower to 
higher) representation of the statistical regularities of the spatial structure and temporal regularities of 
the world. Based on the general parameters of the internal models the visual system constantly 
extrapolates or predicts the origin and cause of its expected neural and sensory activity such that 
superior hierarchal levels make predictions about activity at inferior levels via top down signals. 
Differences between predictions and measurements produce error or ‘prediction error’ signals which 
are sent back up the hierarchy to update the internal model and the subsequent predictions according 
to the nature of the prediction error.  
In the literature, terms such as measurement and prediction can be used somewhat loosely so we 
define some important terminology. Here, we define prediction as an estimation of what the next 
sensory measurement will be. A measurement can be from the world as made by retinal ganglion cells 
as we have defined previously but in predictive coding also within early cortical regions (Friston, 
2010). The next estimation can be next in time or in space. However, one very important aspect of 
predictive coding to be aware of is that predictive coding is essentially a computational motif. The 
term predictive coding simply means a neural process involving prediction and prediction error 
(Aitchison & Lengyel, 2017) and there are certain aspects of predictive coding that could be 
performed in multiple ways. Indeed, in the literature there exist a number of models that all differ in 
their application and frameworks (see Spratling, 2015 for a good account of a number of predicive 
coding models). An excellent example of predictive coding’s general principles that provides an 
illustration of how spatial measurements, predictions and prediction errors are used to form 
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perceptions while at the same providing a ‘default model’ of predictive coding to highlight some of 
the differences between predictive coding models comes from Rao & Ballard (1999). 
1.13. Rao and Ballard (1999) predictive coding in sensory cortex model. 
Rao and Ballard’s (1999) computational framework provides a specific illustration of the nature of 
predictive coding’s hierarchical models and how the prediction, measurement, prediction error and 
update cycle function in the spatial prediction of image intensities. In Rao & Ballard’s (1999) 
hierarchal model, each level contains a representation of the spatial structures of an image intensities 
within an image. Each level in the hierarchy has an increase in receptive field size dealing with 
increasingly larger and complex areas of the image. In a three-level predictive coding model, level 0 
will consist of a group of modules which deal directly with the measurement. Level 2 receives input 
from all the modules of Level 1 and at the same time feeds level 1 with prediction signals based on 
the probability of surrounding pixel intensities, while level 3 receives input from level two and at the 
same time predicts activity at level two. This hierarchical system functions throughout Rao & Ballards 
(1999) framework, with the highest level having the potential to receive input from all areas of the 
visual field and predict the whole image for the lower levels. Importantly, this cycle of prediction, 
measurement, comparison and prediction error happens constantly and with each iteration prediction 
error is reduced and predictions refined as more and more predictions and measurements are 
compared. 
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Figure 6. Schematic illustration of Rao & Ballard’s (1999) predictive coding model.  
Another key concept of predictive coding that is covered in Rao & Ballard (1999) is how to weight 
prediction errors, a term they call optimization function. For prediction errors to be a useful basis by 
which to inform and update perceptions they must recognize the variable nature of the natural world. 
For instance, greater confidence should be assigned to prediction errors in broad daylight than errors 
in prediction at nightfall (Hohwy, 2012). In Rao & Ballard (1999), prediction errors are weighted 
based on the inverse variance of the squared error between the current prediction and the mean of past 
measurements, such that a low sum of squares indicates a reliable prediction error while a larger sum 
of squares indicates less reliable prediction errors. With a higher level of reliability, internal models 
update and alter subsequent predictions by a larger amount relative to the size of the prediction error 
and with lower reliability the internal model updates and alters subsequent predictions by a smaller 
amount relative to the size of the prediction error. Importantly, the way prediction errors are weighted, 
varies between predictive coding models but normally involves the weighting of variances in 
prediction errors or measurements in some way and is adaptive to the setting in which predictions are 
made.  
1.14 . Missing pieces of the predictive coding puzzle: temporal predictive coding model and 
explicit perceptual averaging model. 
 
One aspect to consider about predictive coding and a reason we use Rao & Ballards (1999) model to 
illustrate its general concepts is that there are a number of ways predictive coding could potentially be 
implemented. Rao & Ballard, (1999) is a computational model for simulating predictive coding in 
spatial image intensities only. The model is excellent for its purpose of explaining spatial predictive 
coding but like all computational predictive coding models it has its own take on the key aspects of 
predictive coding’s general ideas. Within predictive coding literature, various other predictive coding 
models exist that all differ in application and configuration which may have led to some vagueness in 
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some areas of areas of predictive coding and perhaps contributed to some areas of visual processing 
including our area of interest, predictive coding in time, missing a specific account of predictive 
coding altogether.  
In predictive coding literature, in addition to Rao & Ballard (1999), there exist models for predictive 
coding in the retina (Hoyosa & Meister, 2005), Spratling’s PC/BC-DIM model (Spratling, 2015) 
again for spatial predictive coding and more general predictive coding models such as Fristons’s free 
energy model (Friston, 2015) and linear predictive coding (Makhoul, 1975; O’Shaughnessy, 1988). 
Importantly, none of these models apply to the temporal domain directly. Also there are confusing 
accounts of the nature of the internal models probabilistic representation. The dominant predictive 
account is one of a hierarchical system based on conditional probabilities under Bayes optimal 
principles such that interpretation of activity at lower levels is conditioned by those above them 
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2011; Friston et al., 2002). Rao & Ballards (1999) model also involves a 
hierarchical system seemingly implying the use of conditional probabilities but is primarily a linear 
model with no real need for complex conditional relationships and indeed never actually mentions 
conditional probabilities. Furthermore, exactly how prediction errors are weighted is often ignored in 
studies examining predictive coding in time. Again Rao & Ballard (1999), provide one way of 
weighting prediction errors, based on the inverse variance of errors but their method is based only on 
computational simulations of a model for spatial predictive coding. Overall, conflicting accounts of 
how predictive coding might be realised combined with a lack of a specific model for predictive 
coding in time highlight missing pieces of the predictive coding ‘puzzle’.  
The lack of a specific model for predictive coding is an important piece of the predictive coding 
puzzle that is currently missing. While we have discussed other models of predictive coding in the 
spatial domain and more general models this is not intended so much as a critique but simply to 
highlight the idea that there are potentially a number of ways predictive coding might be implemented 
depending on the sensory domain in question. There is no doubt that models such as Rao & Ballard 
(1999) and those from Spratling (2015) and Friston (2010) are excellent accounts of predictive coding 
but by its very definition the term ‘prediction’ applies to time. Indeed, it is the easiest type of 
prediction to conceptualise. When most people think about prediction, they consider events in time 
and the ability to predict what will happen in the future is absolutely vital to behaviour. Therefore, 
establishing the existence and understanding the computations underlying predictions in time must be 
central to our understanding of predictive coding. However, although predictive coding should apply 
to the temporal domain it is ambiguous as to whether previous studies that have examined predictive 
coding have actually observed predictive coding in time or whether findings are attributable to the 
more simple fixed rate perceptual averaging type of integration outlined in serial dependence which 
itself lacks an explicit model and been can be subject to alternate explanations. 
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1.15. Lack of specific computational temporal models make the behavioural signatures of fixed 
weighted perceptual averaging and predictive coding difficult to identify in current literature 
Conceptually, predictive coding and fixed rate averaging appear markedly different. They each have 
contrasting aims, integrate different types of information and have different levels of complexity. 
However, due to a lack of clear and testable computational models by which to guide experimental 
designs it is open to question whether results interpreted under a fixed perceptual averaging in serial 
dependence literature have been correctly interpreted and also perhaps even more importantly whether 
predictive coding in time has been adequately distinguished (see table 1 below) . In order to illustrate 
the problems in experimental design caused by the lack of an explicit computational accounts of fixed 
perceptual averaging and the lack of an accepted model for predictive coding in time now we provide 
examples of current literature that highlights the nature of this problem.  
Table 1. Predictive coding versus fixed rate perceptual averaging 
Model signatures Predictive coding  Fixed rate perceptual 
averaging 
Fixed or blanket use of 
past information 
No (Friston, 2018) Yes (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) 
   
Adaptive use of past 
and current 
information 
 
Yes (Friston, 2018) No (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) 
Conditionally 
probabilistic internal 
models 
 
Yes (Spratling, 2017) No (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) 
Reduction of 
prediction error over 
time 
 
Yes (Friston, 2018) No (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) 
Passive estimate No (Spratling, 2017) Yes (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) 
 
 Active prediction Yes (Friston, 2018) No (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) 
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1.16. Fixed weighting of past and current measurements or not? Ambiguity in serial dependence 
research. 
Perceptual averaging in the temporal domain is often termed serial dependence. Presently, serial 
dependence is an increasingly popular area of vision science which examines the nature of the 
observed bias or dependence of current perceptions on past stimulus values. Within an influential 
section of serial dependence research, it has been implied that serial dependence functions as a form 
of a fixed weighted average model in which the weights applied to measurements of past and current 
stimulus values included in perceptual estimates always remain at a fixed level (Fischer & Whitney, 
2014; Liberman et al., 2014, 2016). If this idea is correct, a number of key identifying factors should 
exist in the current perceptual estimate of a stimulus value. One is that there should always be some 
influence of previous stimulus values in any current perception of a stimulus value. Another 
potentially identifiable hallmark, is that because the fixed account of serial dependence operates under 
a very simple assumption of a constantly stable but uncertain world the model does not include any 
concept of how the reliability in our perceptions of a stimulus or how the behaviour of a stimulus 
itself might affect integration and does not adapt perceptions to such situations. This means that the 
behaviour of a stimulus and how reliable the perception of a stimulus is does not affect serial 
dependence in any way. However, based on current serial dependence literature it appears that results 
from serial dependence studies may also be interpreted under at least the general principles of 
predictive coding which posits a more adaptive integration strategy.  
Fischer & Whitney (2014), examined serial dependence in the perception of orientation. Their task 
involved presenting a series of orientated Gabor stimuli for 500 ms and then asking participants to 
estimate the orientation of the Gabors they has just seen by moving an adjustment bar (see figure 7 for 
a more detailed illustration) Interestingly, Fischer & Whitney (2014) claimed findings consistent with 
a fixed account of temporal integration and observed a bias in the judgment of both fully random and 
more stable counterbalanced Gabor stimulus orientations. One caveat with this interpretation is that 
the level of dependence while always present to some extent does appear to have been influenced by 
the variability of orientations and the level of variability in the measurement of the stimulus. When 
Gabor orientations had radically different orientations from previous orientations judgments serial 
dependence decreased and when orientations were more similar serial dependence increased 
indicating a role for stimulus variability. Another interesting aspect of Fischer & Whitney (2014) 
experiment is that while Gabor stimuli had a relatively high contrast (25% Michelson), the stimulus 
also had a relatively low spatial frequency (0.33 cycles per degree). The effect of low spatial 
frequency was to make Gabor orientations blurred. Blur has been shown to make judgments of stimuli 
more variable, quite feasibly due to an increase in measurement variability at the cortex (Kayargadde 
et al, , 1996 ). Furthermore, the use of a noise mask in between stimuli and judgment trials and 
presenting stimuli to the left or right of fixation and outside of the foveal representation may also have 
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contributed to increased measurement variability. These factors are important because if the role of 
measurement variability is a factor in temporal integration as in predictive coding (Friston, 2010; 
Gordon et al., 2017), it may be possible that the weighting attached to any prediction errors caused by 
the change in the Gabors orientation did not carry enough weight to update the new prediction to its 
full amount. If the prediction was not updated to the full amount of the prediction error then it may 
appear that the perception lies somewhere between the past and current stimulus measurement and 
appears serially dependent. However, in order to test the role of stimulus variability and measurement 
variability a more rigorous experimental manipulation that takes into account these factors is required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Fischer & Whitney’s (2014) experimental design and task. Participants viewed a Gabor 
stimulus presented wither to the left or right of fixation interrupted by a noise mask and reported the 
perceived orientation of the Gabor by adjusting the orientation of a response bar.  
In Manassi et al (2018), participants were asked to move a position marker to the position of a 
changing target stimuli. In a similar fashion to Fischer & Whitney (2014) participant’s responses, in 
general, responses appeared to represent the average of the current and previous positions consistent 
with a fixed weighted average type integration. However, closer analysis of the data appears to 
support an alternative explanation consistent to some extent with predictive coding. Again, much like 
in Fischer & Whitney (2014) the level of serial dependence appeared to be modulated by both the 
similarity in position of the previous target stimuli and the presence of measurement variability which 
was caused by the use of an inter trial mask which is known to weaken the perceived contrast of the 
target (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976; Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; Breitmeyer, Rudd, & Dunn, 1981). 
23 
 
Results showed that when positions of the target stimuli were more similar to previous targets serial 
dependence increased and decreased when further apart. Also, when the inter trial mask was removed 
no serial dependence was observed. Manassi et al (2018) acknowledges this result and explains it 
under the idea that the time reduction of the inter trial interval, reduced by the removal of the mask, 
was the causal factor but offers no theoretical explanation why this may be the case. A potential 
predictive coding explanation why serial dependence dropped out, is that when the mask was removed 
the level of measurement uncertainty in the weighting of any prediction error between the previous 
and current stimulus positions was reduced, meaning any error in the prediction of the current 
positions is weighted as being more reliable. With a more certain prediction error, it is possible that 
the current perception was corrected to the full extent of the prediction error produced by the change 
in stimulus positions. With a total correction to the new measurement no influence of previous 
stimulus values would be detected in the response and thus no serial dependence. Again though, such 
an interpretation is speculative and because the paper does not actually state that averaging is always 
fixed and does not provide any explicit model of the type of averaging implied it is hard to critique the 
findings in terms of the fixed weighted average theory. 
A further interesting serial dependence study that could be subject to dual interpretations is Liberman, 
Zhang & Whitney (2016). This study examined the role that serial dependence has in interpreting 
partially occluded stimuli under the premise that integrating measurements over time helps to 
maintain a coherent perception when measurements are incomplete (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). 
Participants were tasked with judging the orientation of a partially occluded Gabor stimulus that was 
presented as either as continually moving or as a discontinuous series of orientations. Results again 
showed that serial dependence increased when orientations were more similar and decreased when 
further apart. Interestingly, and again providing contradictory evidence with a fixed weighted average 
account of serial dependence, in the discontinuous condition no serial dependence was observed. As 
no serial dependence was observed under more variable stimuli conditions this result could again be 
interpreted under a predictive coding or certainly adaptive accounts of integration in which the level 
of variability in measurements and stimulus behaviours play a role in updating predictions. 
Specifically, if a stimulus is highly variable then the new prediction should recognise this variability 
as a signal of change in the world and adapt to the new measurement value as quickly as possible. 
Once more though, while the role of stimulus variability appears to have played a role in the way 
measurements were integrated but without testing the modulating role of measurement noise in 
conjunction with stimulus variability in the way predictions update it may simply be the result of a 
bottom up driven process rather than a predictive coding type integration. 
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1.17. Predictive coding in time, or alternative explanations? 
In a similar fashion to the way the fixed account of serial dependence research has been subject to a 
lack of clear theoretical guidance when designing adequate experimental designs, predictive coding in 
the temporal domain can also be considered to be subject to a similar problem. Within temporal 
predictive coding literature to date no concrete computational model has been tested and compared to 
the behaviour of human participants. Due to a lack of a clear and testable theory by which to base 
experiments upon it is open to question whether key aspects of predictive coding such the adaptive 
weighting of prediction errors have been tested fully in purely visual term. Furthermore, and perhaps 
most importantly, there are also questions about the type of probabilistic representations and 
complexity of information used to make predictions. To illustrate the limitations related to a lack of a 
clear theoretical model for predictive coding in time we provide evidence from a number of predictive 
coding studies that have claimed to observe predictive coding in time and debate the interpretation of 
such findings. 
A neural phenomena that has been utilised to support the idea that predictive coding applies to the 
temporal domain is repetition suppression. Repetition suppression is defined as the diminished neural 
activation that results from the repeated presentation of a stimulus over time (Henson, 2003; Wiggs & 
Martin, 1998). Explanations for repetition suppression are keenly debated. The original explanation 
for repetition suppression was that reduced activity neural patterns could be explained by simple 
fatigue effects (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2003) . By this account, the attenuation of a neural 
response is hypothesized to be due to an overall reduction in a neuron's firing rate as the neurons 
expend their energy or neurotransmitters. An alternative explanation of repetition suppression 
advanced by supporters of predictive coding, is that overall neural activity at lower levels of 
predictive coding’s hierarchy is reduced by top down driven prediction signals when they are 
congruent with expected activity (Auksztulewicz & Friston, 2016; Grotheer, 2016a). Over time a 
number of studies have tested the predictive coding account of repetition suppression by manipulating 
the predictability of stimuli. 
Summerfield Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner (2008) aimed to test the modulatory effect of 
prediction or ‘expectations’ on repetition suppression as indexed by blood-oxygen-level dependent 
(BOLD) imaging (higher BOLD signal is assumed less repetition suppression and lower BOLD 
assumed more repetition suppression). The study presented two types of trial. One type, called a 
repetition trial which comprised of pairs of identical faces and the second an alternation trial which 
showed different faces. To manipulate the expectation of which trial was most likely to occur 
Summerfield et al (2008) presented trials in two blocks termed high probability and low probability. 
In the high probability block the probability of a trial being a repetition trial was 75% and in low 
probability blocks the probability of being presented with repetition trial was 25%. Within blocks all 
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face images were trial unique which ensured that the probability of a repetition and not the repetition 
of a particular face was manipulated. As an incidental task was while observing trials, participants 
were asked to respond to occasional inverted faces the aim of which appears to have been to keep 
participants ‘on trial’. 
Summerfield Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner (2008) reported some interesting findings. Firstly, 
in high probability blocks BOLD signal was decreased with repeated trials in these blocks producing a 
decrease in BOLD signal of around 22% compared to alternation trials. In low probability blocks, 
repetition trials elicited only a reduction of 9% in BOLD signal compared to alternation trials. 
Statistical analysis showed a main effect of trial type on BOLD signal and more importantly a 
significant block type and stimulus interaction effect on BOLD signal meaning that the both the 
overall probability of seeing a repetition and actually seeing a repetition had an effect on BOLD 
signal. In terms of behavioural responses, reaction times to target inverted faces reported no 
significant difference between blocks. Summerfield et al (2008) concluded that the expectation of 
both stimulus repetition and block probability were both predictors of repetition suppression, with the 
context provided by block probability level superseding simple stimulus repetition. However, while 
results reported that the probability of a repetition and a repetition itself did reduce BOLD signal there 
are a number of questions related to the design and interpretation of the study with some aspects of 
Summerfield et al (2008) predictive coding interpretation of results open to debate. 
One question arises from the type of ‘predictions’ in the behavioural aspect of the study. This is 
because participants were presented with a reliable cue. While it is of course still possible to make a 
prediction about the current input based on a cue but the use of cues can be thought of as providing a 
more simple associative relationship as opposed to a more ‘forward’ type of prediction about what 
will happen next based on sequential conditional probabilities. Perhaps some behavioural measure of 
what participants ‘expected’ was going to constitute the next face image should have been added to 
the study by inserting conditional relationships between stimuli into the sequences of trials and 
omitting trials and then asking for a prediction about the next trial might have been a better design. 
Another critique is that the study does not include any notion of the difference between the 
measurement of the stimuli in the world and the actual signals stimuli produce. In a number of 
influential predictive coding models, when the measurement of the stimulus is less certain the weight 
attached to prediction errors is downgraded (Friston, 2018; Spratling, 2015). Presenting clearly visible 
stimuli cannot, therefore, test this notion. In addition, due to the rather simple probabilities assigned to 
blocks and trials, it is open to question whether the neural activity changes observed between high and 
were due to the probabilities of observing repetition or alternation trails. A possible alternative 
explanation is that the visual system, as proposed by a fixed weighted average account of integration, 
models the average of the past and current stimulus measurements and during more changeable 
alternation and less probable blocks simply signals more changes in mean values when the stimulus 
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changes producing more neural activity. A final criticism that also provides a basis for a fixed 
weighted average integration interpretation of Summerfield et al (2008) results, is that even when 
stimulus repetition was rare repetition suppression was never totally absent. In a fixed average 
account some trace of past stimulus measurements always persists as the current estimate always 
contains at least some past stimulus history. The persistence of repetition suppression could reflect the 
persistence of past values as would occur with a fixed weighted account but in predictive coding this 
does not have to be the case. An attractive aspect of predictive coding is that given the correct 
conditions all past stimulus history can be discarded and the response will equate to the current 
stimulus which in theory should extinguish repetition suppression entirely. However, as the design of 
the experiment did not manipulate the reliability of sensory measurements (how well participants 
could see the stimulus) the experimental design was not adequate to test this aspect of the predictive 
coding.  
An illustrative account from predictive coding literature that further illustrates the ambiguity in 
ascertaining which integration strategy has actually been performed comes from Summerfield & 
Koechlin (2008). In this study, the researchers aimed to manipulate predictions and predictions errors 
in upcoming stimuli orientations by providing them with specific perceptual templates that drew upon 
two classical psychophysical tasks. Task 1 was a two alternative forced choice task called the A/B 
task, because participants were shown two orientation lines of different colours (A, red & B, blue) on 
a grey circle separated by 60° on the same stimulus and then asked to report if the grating of a 
subsequently presented Gabor stimulus was the same as A or B . The second task was a yes/no type 
paradigm, in which they were only shown the A orientation and then asked to state whether the 
orientation of the next subsequently presented Gabor stimuli matched the A orientation or not (~A). 
Of total trials 50% of target Gabors in the A/B task were A and 50% B. Also in the A/~A task, 50% of 
the targets were A and 50% were ~A. The type of the target changed randomly from trial to trial in 
both tasks and trials were presented inter leaved blocks of A/B and A/ ~A.  
Summerfield & Koechlin (2008) made separate hypotheses about the level of prediction error each 
trial type should produce. The first hypothesis was that highest level of prediction error should be 
observed in the non matched A/B trials and lowest in matched A/~A trials. In A/~A when the Gabor 
matched A prediction error should be zero but when orientation was a non match or ~A, prediction 
error should be increased in direct proportion to the difference in orientation which in non match trials 
was always 60° in either direction from A i.e. 60° of prediction error. The prediction error hypothesis 
in the A/B task was that prediction error should always be lower than A/~A non match tasks but 
higher than A/~A match tasks. This was because the participants had been presented with competing 
priors on which to base predictions so as a consequence the prediction should be in between the in A 
and B orientations separated which as they were always separated by 60° when presented with either 
an A or B target Gabor orientation prediction error should always be 30°.  
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Behavioural results for the study in the form of reaction times (which Summerfield & Koechlin 
(2008) indexed as a measure of prediction error) agreed with Summerfield & Koechlin’s predictive 
coding (2008) hypotheses. Participants were faster in matched A/~A and slower in ~A trials. Reaction 
times for A/B tasks were also as hypothesized to be in middle of times for matched and non matched 
A/~A. Summerfield & Koechlin (2008) interpreted these results as largely due to the speeding effects 
of fulfilled predictions on behaviour. When predictions were 100% accurate as in matched A/~A trials 
then responses required less processing and were thus quicker. By the same measure, in non-matched 
A/~A trials, predictions were least accurate and required more processing as the prediction error was 
larger than non match matched A/~A and A/B trials and were thus slower. This interpretation applied 
by the study to behavioural data while at first glance plausible is subject to alternative interpretations 
not least due to questions about to the studies important concept of prediction. 
Summerfield and Koechlin (2008) claim they manipulate predictability by presenting prior stimulus 
orientations and target Gabor stimuli orientations with the same stimuli and manipulate predictability 
by changing task demands. However, it is very much open to question whether they manipulated 
predictability at all. Stimuli were not structured in any predictable sequence or tasks designed in such 
a way that asked participants what was going to form the next observation. In both trials types and 
blocks the dominant feature was the A orientation. As the A orientation was always present in both 
sets of trial and in task instructions this raises questions whether participants actually needed to 
‘predict’ the next orientation. An alternate explanation is that the differences in reaction times are 
simply due to an attentional resource constraint. That is in the A/~A participants had to keep in mind 
only one template while in the A/B participants had attend to two templates and attending to two 
templates simply takes more time (Bell, Wyatt, Bootzin, & Schwartz, 1996; Flaherty & Coren, 1974) 
To better test prediction error a design which also manipulated the predictability in the sequence of 
trials in a way that manipulated the conditional relationships between A/B and A/~A would be a 
better way of manipulating predictability more in keeping with current theoretical ideas of predictive 
coding. 
1.18. Summary of chapter one and experimental questions.  
The aim of chapter one was to introduce the notion of uncertainty in visual perception and current 
theory about how uncertainty in perception is resolved by the brain with an emphasis on some of the 
current theoretical limitations within the literature. To this end, we first discussed the importance of 
vision and how visual information is made uncertain by the presence of a number of sources of 
variability from both external and internal sources. We then drew attention to the apparent 
juxtaposition between the variable nature of visual information and then speed and clarity of our 
subjective visual experience. Next, we introduced ideas about of the use of past information about the 
temporal regularities present in the external world that the visual system could potentially capitalize 
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upon to help resolve its uncertain inputs with a detailed distinction about the different types of 
temporal regularities present in the world. We then provided empirical evidence from serial effects 
research that the visual system does integrate past information but explained that much of serial 
effects research operates at the findings level which while vital lacks theoretical understanding about 
why and how the visual system integrates past information. Next, we set out two broad theoretical 
strategies of how the visual system could reconcile uncertainty, namely perceptual averaging and 
perceptual inference and then discussed two current specific theoretical accounts of perceptual 
averaging and perceptual inference which form the basis for our experimental chapters. 
The two current specific theoretical accounts of perceptual averaging and perceptual inference we 
introduce in section three were fixed rate perceptual averaging and predictive coding. Fixed rate 
perceptual averaging is a more implied model in areas of perceptual averaging study such as serial 
dependence while predictive coding is more concrete type of theory albeit with multiple versions 
depending on the sensory domain. The issues we highlight in the presented literature, in regard to both 
models, is that while appearing substantially different some of the key behavioural hallmarks of each 
model are hard to identify and distinguish. We then proposed this is in part due to a lack of 
computational accounts for both predictive coding in time and fixed rate perceptual averaging that 
could be used to guide experimental design. Therefore, chapters 2, 3 & 4 compare how information is 
weighted over time based on theoretical predictions made by model called a Kalman filter which is 
very similar in many ways to predictive coding and a fixed weighed average model which is identical 
to a fixed weighted account of perceptual averaging. In chapter 5, we test the idea of the visual 
perception as a dynamic system constantly making and updating predictions by assessing its ability to 
use conditional relationships in sequences of stimuli to improve behaviours. Results from all chapters 
are discussed in the final chapter, which constitutes our discussion and conclusions. We provide full 
explanations of our models and experiments in the relevant chapters but for now we provide a general 
idea and flow of how our experimental streams and chapters will operate to aid the reader. 
1.19 Research questions and flow of experimental chapters 
The literature presented for both fixed rate perceptual averaging and predictive coding  raised a 
number of issues that could benefit from more theoretically structured experimental analysis. The 
three issues we highlight and further examine here are as follows; the adaptive weighting of prediction 
error versus fixed use of past and current information stimulus values in visual information, the 
adaptive reduction of prediction error over time and the extraction and use of conditional probabilities 
in enhancing behaviour and making predictions. To research these questions we structure our chapters 
as follows; 
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Chapter two. The Kalman filter and the fixed weighted average models. 
Chapter two, provides background. Concepts, terminology and mathematical explanation of the 
Kalman filter and fixed weighted average models and the theoretical motivation for using both models 
in relation to comparing fixed rate perceptual averaging and predictive coding.  
Chapter three. Testing the adaptive versus fixed use of past and current information. 
The first aspect of predictive coding and fixed weight perceptual averaging we wish to test is the 
adaptive weighting of prediction errors versus fixed use of past and current stimulus values outlined in 
perceptual averaging. To allow this comparison, we design experiments based on the ideas of the 
Kalman filter in which the weighting of prediction error adapts to the level of stimulus and 
measurement variability. We use serial dependency as a means to assess the weighting strategy 
underlying participant’s perceptual estimates and compare experimental predictions inspired by the 
Kalman filter and the fixed weighted average models about what should happen to the level of serial 
dependence in perceptual estimates under different levels of stimulus and measurement variability to 
participant’s actual responses. 
Chapter Four. Testing the adaptive correction of error over time. 
Chapter three, examines the adaptive reduction of estimation error posited within predictive coding 
against the fixed reduction of estimation error outlined in perceptual averaging. To allow this 
comparison, we design an experiment based on the ideas of the Kalman filter in which the reduction 
of prediction error adapts to the level of stimulus and measurement variability. We use participants 
step responses as a means to assess how error in participants perceptual estimates is reduced over time 
and again compare experimental predictions inspired by the Kalman filter and the fixed weighted 
average models about how error in perceptual estimates should reduce under different experimental 
conditions with participant’s actual responses 
Chapter Five. Testing the extraction and use of sequential information in enhancing behaviour 
In chapter five, we switch emphasis from looking at the adaptive aspects of predictive coding and 
examine the ability of the visual system to use conditional sequential transition information to make 
predictions. To examine such an ability, we test an experiment that manipulates sequential transition 
probabilities using a Markov chain. Here, we examine how participants learn and use these 
probabilities by analysing reaction times when presented with more and less predictable transitions 
and how they apply such information to make predictions in a forward manner.  
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Chapter 6. Discussion and conclusion  
Chapter 6, presents our discussion and conclusion. Here, we recap the validity of our methods, discuss 
our main contributions to the literature and conclude whether our findings provide enough evidence to 
support the predictive coding account of temporal integration in the visual system. 
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Chapter 2. The Kalman filter and fixed weighted average models- 
Concepts, math and motivations.  
Chapter two fulfils a key role in the current thesis. Its purpose is to set out the concepts and 
motivation behind our use of the Kalman Filter as a candidate model for predictive coding in time and 
fixed weighted average models as a model for fixed rate perceptual averaging. We also provide in 
depth math and equations for each model on pages 42-46 of the current chapter. Both the fixed 
weighted average and the Kalman filter models play key roles in experimental chapters 3 and 4, which 
largely focus on testing the adaptive nature of predictive coding. We begin with the simplest of our 
models, the fixed weighted average model. 
2.1. Weighted average model: concepts, assumptions and example.  
The model of temporal integration that has been implied in serial dependence literature (Corbett, 
Wurnitsch, Schwartz, & Whitney, 2012; Corbett et al., 2011; Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Kiyonaga et 
al., 2017) is the same as a fixed weighted average model (see equations 2-5, pages 42 and 43 for 
mathematical proof of this concept). A fixed weighted average model is a simple generic temporal 
smoothing model used to estimate stimulus values contained within variable measurements. This type 
of model, is perhaps the most commonly used model in signal processing and is used for estimating 
stimulus values in many applications such as global positioning systems (GPS) and radar (Lucas & 
Saccucci, 1990). The basic premise behind the use of fixed and more general weighted average 
models in signal processing, is that given a set of variable measurements, a good way reduce 
estimation error is to take an average value on a number of measurements recorded over time 
(Takahashi & Miwa, 1994; Zetterberg, 1958). Much like the stated role of averaging in serial 
dependence in perception, the model assumes that the underlying stimulus value is to some extent 
stable over time and that more random variability in measurements is due to more random noise 
unrelated to the activity of stimuli (Hua et al., 2017). The estimation process outlined in a fixed 
average models is dependent on a specific averaging calculation (see equations 2-5, pages 42-43). 
A fixed weighted average model, is based on an averaging calculation in which each measurement of 
a stimulus value included in the calculation is assigned and multiplied by a fixed weight before 
summing to an average value. The number of measured stimulus values included in the averaging 
calculation includes the current amount and potentially any amount of previously recorded values. For 
example, in a fixed weighted average calculation with three values, the current measurement value 
might always carry a weight of 0.5 in the new estimate and n-1 value 0.3 and n-2 value, carrying 0.2 
(weights must add to 1). Normally, some values in the calculation carry different weights according to 
when they were measured. Typically, the weights attached to measurements degrade as a function of 
time so that most recent values carry more weight and less recent values carry less weight but this is 
not always the case. Although the calculations involved in a fixed weighted average appear 
32 
 
remarkably simple they can be very effective if certain assumptions are met but like any temporal 
integration model fixed weighted average models also carry a number of disadvantages.  
Assumptions, Advantages and disadvantages of the fixed weighted average model. 
The assumptions for effective use of fixed weighted averages are simple. These are that the stimulus 
component within a measurement is relatively stable over time but the measurement of the stimulus 
also contains includes more random noise components (Rukhin, 2009). If this is the case then 
averaging acts to smooth over fluctuations caused by noise thus extracting a more accurate 
representation of the underlying but unknown stimulus value of interest in a very simple and easy to 
implement way. It is true that many situations meet such assumptions and due to just how often time 
series data exhibits such properties, fixed weighted average models and their variants are perhaps the 
most widely used of all temporal integration models. However, due to the simplicity of fixed weighted 
averages assumptions and its calculations they also carry a substantial number of disadvantages.  
The main problem for fixed weighted average models are large or sudden changes in stimulus value. 
If there is a sudden fluctuation in stimulus value that is drastically different to previous values 
estimates based on a fixed weighted average will be inaccurate as they will be lagged towards the 
outlying past stimulus value potentially by large amounts. Another important disadvantage of fixed 
averaging calculations in terms of lagged responses is that if a value is invalid or missing then the 
model cannot perform its averaging calculations. This leads to a fixed minimum delay in the 
formation of a new estimate until a sufficient number of values are recorded. The lagged and non 
adaptive aspects of fixed averaging calculations are perhaps the most obvious criticisms of fixed 
weighted average models but there are also more subtle disadvantages in comparison to more 
complex temporal integration models caused by an inability to take into account information about the 
way stimulus behaviours evolve over time. In fixed average models, the assumption is that stimulus 
values under measurement will be noisy and stable. Stability is only one type of statistical regularity 
present in the way a stimulus can behave over time and the type that perhaps offers the least amount 
of information when trying to estimate values over time and other models do incorporate such models 
in a way that can be updated over time to build in more complex aspects of the data to help improve 
estimates. To illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of fixed weighted average models we 
provide an example of how a fixed weighted average models provide an estimate of voltage in an 
electrical substation which is a realistic example of an application for fixed weighted average models. 
Weighted average: substation example.  
A good way to illustrate the way a fixed weighted average model estimates stimulus values with 
different variances and noise levels within its measurements is by showing how a fixed weighted 
average makes estimates of sharply changing voltage values. In this example, we want to estimate the 
level of voltage emitting from a substation that takes in electricity from a power station and increases 
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the charge ready to send over long distances via the power grid. The normal output from the 
substation is 0.4 mega volts (MV) but recently, the level of voltage sent to the grid from the substation 
has appeared to sharply fluctuate and then stabilize at values between 0.1 and 0.9 MV, indicating that 
there may be an underlying issue with the substation. However, the measurements made by the 
measuring system also appear to be more variable than usual and may not be accurate and before 
shutting down the station for repair the operations team need to provide a more accurate level of the 
true level of voltage sent from the substation. To do this, they use a fixed weighted average to 
estimate the true underlying voltage values. The fixed weighted average they use comprises two 
values with a weight of 0.5 attached to each value which they apply to four test data sets which each 
comprise 30 data points 1 second apart. All of the data sets contains different levels of voltage 
fluctuations and noise. In this example, we also assume we know the true voltage value although in 
the real world we would not. The output of the four tests are illustrated below in figure 1 which we 
use to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the fixed weighted average model. 
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Figure 1. How a fixed weighted average makes estimates of fluctuating voltage values. Here we 
see the advantages and disadvantages of the way a fixed weighted average model makes estimates 
under different levels of stimulus and measurement variability. In sub figure A, the change in voltage 
is relatively small and the measurements relatively ‘clean’. In this case, the variability in 
measurements from noise is smoothed over quite well and the estimates are more accurate than the 
measurements alone and while there is some lag during the change of the stimulus it is not too bad 
and overall the estimates are improved. In sub figure B there is a similar situation to figure A. In this 
situation, noise is higher and the measurements more variable. In this case, the fixed average model 
works very well to smooth out the noise and make estimates closer to the true value although as 
always with a fixed average there is still some lag but the estimates are improved. In sub figure C, we 
observe the major problems with averaging at a fixed value. Here, the voltage suddenly increases by a 
large amount and the estimates are much lagged behind the true stimulus value. In this case estimates 
are made worse than those given by the measurements. In sub figure D, we again observe the severe 
lag caused by the sudden change in stimulus. Again, noise is smoothed over but the cost to accuracy 
and is very high and this estimate would not be accurate or fast enough to be useful. 
 
2.2 The Kalman Filter: aims, concepts and example. 
A powerful approach for estimating the true value of uncertain stimulus values recorded over time is 
recursive Bayesian estimation theory (see Haug, 2012 for an excellent account of Bayesian estimation 
theory). A special case of recursive Bayesian estimation theory is the Kalman filter (Kalman & Bucy, 
1963). The Kalman filter, is an algorithm that takes a series of variable measurements recorded over 
time and produces estimates of current and potentially future stimulus values that are more reliable 
than those based on individual measurements alone (Hu, Chen, Chen, & Liu, 2003; Kalman, Mi, & 
Bezier, 2008). Since its introduction in the 1960’s, the Kalman filter has come to be regarded as one 
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of the most significant engineering results of the mid-20th century (Welch & Bishop, 2006). If the 
Kalman filters assumptions are met then the model is the optimal way to reduce the level of mean 
squared error in estimates of dynamic systems and is still a very useful estimator in an even larger 
class of systems which do not technically meet all of its assumptions such is its utility.  
There are four main assumptions required for the optimal use of the Kalman filter. These assumptions 
are that a) the stimulus in questions behaviour is linear over time and follows a Gauss-Markov process 
b) noise in the behaviour of the stimulus is normally distributed, c) the observation process is linear 
and finally d) observation or measurement noise is also normally distributed (Grover Brown & 
Hwang, 1999; Praveena & Ravikumar, 2013). In the world of time series analysis and signal 
processing, many dynamic systems meet such assumptions and the Kalman filter has seen huge 
application in these areas. Applications include, lunar exploration and missile guidance, terrestrially 
based navigational tools such as GPS (Grover Brown & Hwang, 1999) and is also used in many 
computer vision systems for tasks such as feature tracking and stabilizing depth measurements (Chen, 
2012; Nummiaro, Koller-Meier, & Van Gool, 2003).  
The way Kalman filter produces a reliable estimate of both current and future values of stimuli is 
reliant on two recursive steps. We define these steps as the prediction step and the correction step. 
Importantly, the prediction step also uses a model of the behaviour of the stimulus in question which 
capitalizes on conditional transition relationships in the behaviour of the measured stimulus over time 
and rules of the situation the system operates in.  
Step phases: aims, terms and concepts. 
Before outlining the details of the prediction and estimation correction steps of the Kalman filter it is 
important to be clear about what each step is attempting to do and define some terms as the concepts 
and terminology in the steps be subtle and a little confusing. The overall aim of the Kalman filter, is 
as stated, to optimize the level of mean square error in estimates of stimulus values and each step in 
the Kalman filter plays a specific role in this overall aim. In the prediction step, the Kalman filter 
calculations take information about the current value of the stimulus based on a weighted estimate of 
the difference between the previous prediction and current measurement of the stimulus value made in 
previous estimation correction step (the Kalman filter is recursive and each of the steps can be 
considered to be ‘first’, although accounts generally start with the prediction step) and then factors in 
model based knowledge of the way the stimulus behaves over time and how accurate predictions are 
and calculates a new prediction about what the next estimated value might be (Kalman et al., 2008). 
Importantly, the Kalman filter recognizes that the behaviour of the stimulus may change and the 
accuracy of measurements can become variable, potentially making its model of the stimulus 
incorrect (Welch & Bishop, 2006). This means that the Kalman filter needs to update its estimates so 
that they continue to supply relevant information in order to keep its model of the stimulus in question 
36 
 
up to date and prevent predictions from diverging from their actual values and increasing mean square 
error (Zarchan & Musoff, 2000). This step is performed in the estimation correction step of the 
Kalman filter each time a new stimulus measurement is made and by combining both prediction and 
estimation update steps the model is able to recursively drive down error over multiple iterations. To 
distinguish between prediction and estimate, which admittedly can be unclear, we define prediction as 
the next expected value of the stimulus which is made in the prediction step and passed forward for 
correction in the estimation update step and estimation as the current estimate of the stimulus value.  
The prediction step: make a prediction by combining our previous estimates and our stimulus 
model information. 
The prediction step calculates two important values. The first value is the variability of predictions 
which gives an idea about how accurate predictions might be. The calculations for deriving prediction 
variance are perhaps the real ‘trick’ of the Kalman filter as they provide an indirect means to ascertain 
the behaviour of the true, unobtainable, stimulus in the world and help inform how to weight the 
estimates in the estimation correction step (see equation 12 for a general solution). Generally, if 
prediction variance is low then predictions are considered accurate and if prediction variance is high 
then predictions are considered unreliable. The second value, is an actual prediction about the next 
stimulus value based on the current estimated value made in the previous estimation update step and a 
model of how the stimulus behaves over time that incorporates prediction variance and some rules or 
knowledge about the behaviour of the stimulus and the environment it operates in.  
The idea behind the use of a model in the Kalman filter, is that given some knowledge of the current 
estimated stimulus value and how its behaviour evolves over time, it is possible to combine both 
sources of information make a forward prediction about what the next stimulus value will be. 
However, while combining current measurements with model based information provides a good 
general basis for predicting the forward value of stimulus values there is a problem in relying on 
predictions and error variance calculations made in the prediction step alone for more than one or two 
forward projections. If the stimulus remains at a constant value then predictions remain accurate and 
prediction variance low as the stimulus is unchanging but when stimulus values change in a way not 
encompassed by the model or the level of noise fluctuates by a large amount then predictions will pick 
up error and diverge from the true stimulus value over multiple iterations, with divergence normally 
in proportion to the variability in stimulus values over time. To solve this problem, Kalman (1963) 
built in the estimation correction step of the model which feeds back new information in to the 
prediction step recursively every time a new measurement is recorded.  
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The estimation correction step: update the stimulus model, prediction variance and subsequent 
predictions based on new information.  
The estimation correction step is crucial to the way the Kalman filter keeps ‘on track’ with both its 
stimulus model and new predictions as it allows the Kalman filter to update its model of the 
stimulus’s behaviour. The update provided in the estimation correction step is based on a comparison 
of the previous prediction made in the prediction step and the current measurement of the stimulus 
values which when different produce errors termed ‘prediction errors’. The magnitude of prediction 
error provides information about how much the stimulus might have changed since the previous 
prediction and how much the next estimate to be passed to the prediction step should update and also 
provides information about current prediction variability. Importantly, because all stimulus 
measurements contain varying amounts of noise and measurement error, prediction errors need to be 
weighted for reliability before updating the new estimate. The weighting of prediction errors in the 
estimation update step is modulated by an adaptive weighting factor called the Kalman gain. 
The optimal Kalman gain has a closed form solution that depends on just two variance values: the 
variance of the current measurement of the stimulus (as opposed to the stimulus itself) which we term 
the proximal stimulus and proximal variance and the variance of previous predictions (see previous 
paragraph) which is largely derived from the variance in the behaviour of the external stimuli which 
we define as the distal stimulus and distal variance (see fig 2). The Kalman filter considers proximal 
variance as “noise” which it wants to filter out, while it considers distal variance to represent true 
changes that its wants to keep. Understanding how the ratio of distal and proximal variance affect 
Kalman gain and how Kalman gain modulates the way prediction errors are weighted and the 
recursive process of the Kalman filter is key to understanding how the Kalman filter works and indeed 
much of the current thesis. 
How much to update our estimates: prediction, distal and proximal variance and the Kalman 
gain 
Kalman gain is vital to understanding the use of the Kalman filter in the two subsequent experimental 
chapters. This is due to the way Kalman gain optimally modulates how past and current information 
are integrated and the rate by which error is reduced over time. Kalman gain is an adaptive weighting 
factor that runs from 0-1 and is calculated based on the ratio between prediction variance and 
proximal variance. When prediction variance is larger, which is normally due to changes in distal 
stimulus values, relative to proximal variance, a higher Kalman gain closer to one is produced. With a 
higher Kalman gain, the Kalman filter weights prediction errors as being more reliable and updates 
new estimates by a larger amount and corrects faster towards the full extent of the prediction error the 
closer to one the Kalman gain becomes i.e. a gain of one means the new estimate will update to the 
full extent of the prediction error instantly. Alternatively, when proximal variance is higher relative to 
prediction variance, normally due to factors that disrupt the measurement of the stimulus of interest, 
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then a Kalman gain closer to 0 is produced. With a Kalman gain closer to zero, prediction errors are 
considered less reliable and new estimates update slower and by a lesser amount relative to the 
prediction error i.e. a gain of zero means the new prediction totally ignores the prediction error and 
remains unchanged. Importantly, the whole update, measurement, prediction error and weighting 
process is adaptive and unlike the fixed weighted average model optimally updates its estimates to 
deal with more or less uncertain situations. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the Kalman filter. 
In a similar fashion to fixed weighted average models the Kalman filter has a number of advantages 
and disadvantages. One major advantage is that unlike fixed weighted average models the Kalman 
filter is adaptive to the level of stimulus change and measurement variability. When faced with a 
rapidly changing stimulus values (high distal variance) and low measurement variability (proximal 
variance) the Kalman filter can increase Kalman gain and change its estimates to match the level of 
change signalled by prediction errors entirely. The same idea applies to situations when measurements 
are highly variable and stimulus changes small, meaning distinguishing between noise and true 
change can be difficult. In this case the Kalman filter can ‘hedge its bets’ and reduce Kalman gain 
making estimates less responsive to untrusted measurement change and smooth over noise. 
Furthermore, due to the nature of the model which takes information from the adaptive estimation 
correction step, estimates can be updated to take into account previously unmodelled aspects of the 
data set and changes in the behaviour of the stimulus over time. This use of a predictive model also 
means that if a data point is missing the model can use the last prediction to some extent meaning the 
new estimate is not delayed. By factoring in and updating quantities such as prediction error alongside 
prediction, distal and proximal variance data the Kalman filter can also provide an adaptive weight 
that can further refine mean squared error almost instantly without the need to wait for additional 
values or attaching a fixed weight to previous values. Another benefit of the recursive structure of the 
Kalman filter is that there is no need for memory per se as all that is retained is the previous state 
estimate making the model computationally ‘light. The final benefit of the Kalman filter we list and 
perhaps its main contribution to the field of signal processing is the way the model can determine the 
reliability of its predictions without direct access to the stimulus in question which when thinking 
about the applications of the Kalman filter in estimating remotely provided GPS or radar signals is 
imperative. However, despite the Kalman filter being a more adaptable and effective model given 
certain assumptions it does also have its disadvantages.  
The main disadvantage of the Kalman filter largely stems, from its use of a model to help reduce 
estimation error which somewhat ironically is perhaps also its biggest strength. Using knowledge of 
the systems dynamics works well if the systems behaviour is known. Normally, in signalling 
processing applications this is the case. However, if the systems behaviour is not correctly modelled 
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then it can create errors in predictions which generally suffer from over or under shoots. This is 
because incorrect information is factored into the prediction step which skews predictions towards an 
incorrect assumption about the behaviour of the stimulus. Due to the recursive nature of the Kalman 
filter the stimulus model can be updated but this can still be a problem especially in the first few 
iterations before the Kalman filter has had a chance to correct its model.  
Another drawback is that the Kalman filter has quite a lot of assumptions for its optimal use. It 
requires that measurements and noise be linear and Gaussian. These assumptions not always met in 
many dynamic systems and although there are variants of the Kalman filter that can deal with such 
instances the Kalman filter in its original form is not appropriate for dealing with these occasions. The 
concepts of the Kalman filter and integration processes we describe are more complex than that 
outlined in fixed average models and also factors such as proximal and distal variance are admittedly 
more abstract. Although we do provide full mathematical explanation later in the current chapter it is 
again useful to provide illustration of an example in which the Kalman filters principles can be 
outlined. For this purpose, we again make use of our voltage estimation example we used to illustrate 
the fixed weighted average model using exactly the same scenarios and data sets we used previously 
and also include an additional figure to explain distal and proximal variance. 
The Kalman filter: Substation example 
Before illustrating the way a Kalman filter would hypothetically estimate uncertain and fluctuating 
voltage values it is useful to provide an example of exactly what constitutes proximal and distal 
variance in our example. 
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Figure 2. Example of the distinction between proximal and distal variance. Here, we illustrate the 
key distinction between proximal and distal variance. In our voltage example the distal stimulus is the 
actual voltage value while distal variance is the level of variability in the behaviour of voltages over 
time. Importantly, the value of the distal stimuli is unknown to the model and is what the Kalman 
filter is actually trying to model over multiple iterations until the error between the models estimates 
and true value becomes zero or ‘steady state’ is achieved. The proximal stimuli is the measurement of 
the voltage with proximal variance the variability in measurements over time. This is the aspect of the 
data that the model is trying to ‘filter’ as it represents unimportant variability that is unrelated to the 
behaviour of the stimulus and is considered noise. 
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Figure 3. How a Kalman filter makes estimates of fluctuating voltage values. In this figure we 
observe the way the adaptive Kalman filter makes estimates under different levels of distal and 
proximal variability. In sub figure A we have a situation in which we have a relatively stable distal 
stimuli and low measurement variability. In this case, due to the low measurement variability or 
proximal variance, coupled with low prediction error variance due to a relatively stable stimulus we 
have a high Kalman gain close to one. In this case the estimate corrects almost entirely and instantly 
to the step in voltage values with very little error between the true stimulus value and the Kalman 
filters estimate. In sub figure B we observe a situation in which Kalman gain is reduced and is closer 
to zero. This is because the level of proximal variance is increased combined with low prediction error 
variance due to a quite stable stimulus. The effects of reduced Kalman gain is to smooth out noise and 
be less responsive to prediction errors that are trusted less. In sub figure C, we again observe the 
effects of higher Kalman gain we saw in sub figure A but they are more pronounced. The large step in 
voltage values causes a large increase in prediction error but because the level of proximal variance is 
low a gain very close to one is produced meaning prediction errors are corrected immediately despite 
the size of the change in value. Sub figure D again shows how the ratio of prediction variance and 
proximal variance modulate Kalman gain allowing the model to smooth over such variability and 
stabilize estimates. In this situation proximal variance is higher than in sub figure C and the model 
therefore reduces Kalman gain closer to zero which smooths out variability in measurements. 
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2.3 Equations.  
Fixed weighted average and Kalman filter models 
This section details the mathematical formulations of our fixed weighted average model and our 
Kalman filter model and a number of related issues (all equations for the Kalman filter are taken from 
(Orfanidis, 1988 with those for the fixed weighted average model based on generic averaging 
calculations). Both models deal with variables that change over time as well as variables that depend 
on different time periods. For simplification, we now outline notation. X will be used to refer to the 
true distal stimulus value, Y will be used to refer to measurements available to the observer (i.e. the 
proximal stimulus), and a hat identifies an estimate of a quantity. (E.g. X̂ is the observer’s estimate of 
the stimulus value). This section will adopt a notation that distinguishes between the current time 
point and the time from which previous information is being used. Subscripts will be used to identify 
different time points. A single subscript (e.g. Yn) is used when the value only depends on a single time 
point. Two subscripts will be used to identify the time point and the information available to the 
variable. For example, Xn|n means the value of X at time point n given all information up to n, X̂(n|n) is 
the observer’s estimate of X at time n given all information up to and including the observation at 
time n. While X̂(n|n-1) is the observer’s estimate of X at time n before having information, that is the 
observers prediction of what X will be at time n. For the following sections, we will assume the 
observers measurement Y reflects the true stimulus value X plus additive white Gaussian noise (EQ 
1). Therefore, the reliability of the observer’s measurement (σ2m). 
 Yn = Xn + εm , εm ~ N (0, σ2m)      EQ 1 
  
2.3.1 Fixed weighted average model  
 
?̂?𝑛|𝑛 = ∑ 𝑊𝑝−𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=0
𝑌𝑛−𝑖 
 EQ 2 
 
 ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0
= 1 
  EQ 3 
 
If the weighted average is computed using just the current and previous trial it simplifies  
Rearranging and grouping terms provides the linear equation 
                                                    ?̂?𝑛|𝑛 − 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑊(𝑌𝑛−1 − 𝑌𝑛)                           EQ 5 
 ?̂?𝑛|𝑛 = (1 − 𝑊)𝑌𝑛 + 𝑊𝑌𝑛−1  EQ4  
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Equation 4 shows that for a simple weighted average of two past stimulus values the weight can be 
found by doing a linear regression that relates the current error to the change in stimulus values. As 
shown by equation 5 the slope of this linear regression (W) can be interpreted as the weight applied to 
the previous trial as shown in equation 5. Several previous studies have used this equation to estimate 
serial dependencies and therefore implicitly assume a weighted average of the current and previous 
trial (Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Manassi et al 2018; Liberman, Fischer & Whitney, 2014; John 
Saaltink, Kok & de Lange, 2016). Describing the problem in this form is equivalent to restricting 
solutions to be a finite impulse response (FIR) filter of the observations. The optimal weights (in 
terms of mean square error) can then be found by solving for the finite impulse response Wiener filter. 
However, while the finite impulse response constraint is useful in some contexts it is not needed for 
neural systems. While the Wiener filter can also be solved for without the FIR constraint, the Kalman 
filter provides a more useful conceptual framework for this problem. So we will now turn to 
explaining in detail the Kalman filter solution.  
2.3.2. Kalman Filter. 
The full form of the Kalman filter provides a general solution of estimating a changing variable that 
can be described by a linear system of equations in which measurements contain Gaussian noise. In 
this section we will use a restricted form of the Kalman filter that applies directly to our current 
experiments. 
 ?̂?𝑛|𝑛 = ?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1 + 𝐺(𝑌𝑛 − ?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1) EQ6 
 
  
𝐺 =
𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2
𝜎𝑚
2 + 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2  
                           EQ7 
 
In equation 6 the estimate of the stimulus value on trial n given all information up to trial n is X̂n|n. The 
estimate of the stimulus value on trial n given all information up to the previous trial is X̂n|n-1 that is the 
prediction of the stimulus value. The current perceived measurement of the stimulus value is Yn. The 
Kalman filter creates an estimate of the current stimulus values by taking the predicted value and 
recursively updating based on a proportion (G, Kalman gain) of the prediction error shown in equation 
7. 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
Kalman gain. 
The key quantity for the Kalman filter and conceptualising its adaptive integration strategy is Kalman 
gain. To calculate its value we need to determine the variance of the prediction (σ2pred). The solution 
for determining prediction variance is one of the key results of the Kalman filter. The prediction 
incorporates both past measurements as well as how the stimulus changes over time. Therefore, a 
model of how the distal stimulus changes over time is needed. It should be noted that the Kalman 
filter algorithm is an iterative algorithm and values are updated on every iteration based on the current 
measurement. The solutions presented below represent the values the Kalman filter will be after the 
estimate has achieved steady state. Furthermore, the general Kalman filter allows the model to be any 
linear system. In order to present the filter in a more intuitive way, here we will consider solutions to 
three restricted situations; uncorrelated stimuli, stable stimuli and a stimuli that follows a random 
walk. The uncorrelated model corresponds to the common experimental design choice to present 
stimuli in a random order. The stable model represents the extreme of a stable world in which the 
stimulus is stable and does not change. The random walk is used here and later in the thesis and 
provides a simple changing value that has some level of predictability. All three of these cases can be 
seen as special cases of a one term autoregressive model (EQ8&9). 
 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝑎𝑋𝑛−1 + 𝜖𝑑 
 
EQ8  
 𝜖𝑑~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑑)  EQ9 
 
Performing Kalman filtering requires predicting the next measurement and then using the error 
between the measurement and prediction to update the current estimate of the stimulus by a 
proportional amount governed by the Kalman gain (G). Given the model in equations 8 and 9 the 
solution for these values are given by  
 
 
?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1 = 𝑎?̂?𝑛−1|𝑛−1 + 𝑐  
 EQ10 
   
 
 𝜎𝑑
2 = 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2 −
𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2 𝜎𝑚
2 𝑎2
𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2 + 𝜎𝑚2
  
 EQ 11 
 
Where σ2m is the variance of the measurement (proximal), σ2d is the variance of the stimulus and σ2pred 
is the variance of the prediction of the next value X̂n|n-1. Equation 12, is a solution to the Riccati 
equation outlined in equation 11, solving the equation for the prediction variance. 
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𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2 =
1
2
(±√2(𝑎2 + 1)𝜎𝑑
2𝜎𝑚2 + (𝑎2 − 1)2𝜎𝑚4 + 𝜎𝑑
4 + 𝑎2𝜎𝑚
2 + 𝜎𝑑
2 − 𝜎𝑚
2 ) 
 
  
As we can see in equation 12, even in the case of a fairly simple stimulus model solving the variance 
of the prediction becomes quite a complex equation. In order to provide intuition for this equation, we 
will now show solutions to three specific cases. 
Uncorrelated  
For a presented stimulus that is randomly chosen, with no correlation to previous stimuli, prediction 
variance is equivalent to setting parameters a and c to 0. 
 𝑋𝑛 = 𝜖𝑑   EQ13 
 
 
?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1 =0 
 EQ14 
 
 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2 = 𝜎𝑑
2  EQ15 
   
 
𝐺 =
𝜎𝑑
2
𝜎𝑚2 + 𝜎𝑑
2  
 EQ16 
 
This result represents the fact that if the stimulus has no predictability then the prediction should only 
represent the distribution the stimulus values are drawn. In this case, a uniform distribution. The gain 
is then identical to combining the measurement value with the mean of the stimulus distribution each 
weighted by their inverse variance.  
Stable 
To represent a stimulus that is completely stable we can set a and 𝜎𝑑to 0. 
 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑐 EQ17 
 
 
?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1 = ?̂?𝑛−1|𝑛−1 
EQ18 
 
 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2 = 0 EQ19 
   
 𝐺 = 0 EQ20 
 
This finding of a Kalman gain of 0 may seem nonsensical as it means one should completely ignore the 
current measurement and purely respond only to previous values. However, these solutions represent 
the steady-state solution for the Kalman Gain. That is it’s the gain value that is achieved by the filter in 
EQ12 
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the limit of an infinite number of measurements. What really happens is that if the world is completely 
stable, all information should be integrated with each new value getting progressively less weight in 
order to represent the sum total of all values. Because the value of the stimulus never changes, every 
measurement can be used to estimate the fixed value and with each new measurement the prediction 
becomes more reliable, and 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2  monotonically decreases to 0. 
 
 Gaussian Random Walk. 
 
 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑋𝑛−1 + 𝜖𝑑 EQ21 
 
 ?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1 = ?̂?𝑛−1|𝑛−1 EQ22 
 
 
 𝜎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑
2 =
𝜎𝑑
2 + √𝜎𝑑
4+4𝜎𝑑
2𝜎𝑚2  
2
=
𝜎𝑑
2 + 𝜎𝑑√𝜎𝑑
2 + 4𝜎𝑚2  
2
 
EQ23 
 
In this case, we have a stimulus value taking random steps drawn from a Gaussian distribution (EQ21 
& 22). This creates a minimum level of predictability because the next value of the stimulus is related 
only to the previous time step. In order to build intuition, it is useful to consider the case where the 
measurement error is reduced to zero. In this case, the prediction variance becomes identical to the 
measurement and the variance is bound by the randomness of the stimulus and the Kalman gain 
becomes 1. This means that the prediction becomes identical to the measurement and the variance of 
the prediction is bound by the randomness of the stimulus (EQ23). As you add noise to the 
measurement the prediction variance becomes higher because a perfect estimate of the true value of 
the stimulus cannot be obtained. However this increase is sublinear. 
2.5.3. Motivation for use of fixed weighted average models and link to experimental chapters 3 
& 4. 
Both the fixed weighted average and Kalman filter models play a central role in the next two 
experimental chapters. This is due to the marked similarities in the models to the method of 
integration implied in perceptual averaging literature in the case of the fixed weighted average model 
(Fischer & Whitney, 2014) and the more explicitly linked Kalman filter in the case of predictive 
coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Wolpert, 2007). Based on the concepts and mathematical formulations 
each model should produce behavioural aspects that can equate to aspects of fixed rate perceptual 
averaging and predictive coding that lack the experimental and computational clarity we outlined in 
chapter 1. Namely, the adaptive use of prior and current information and the adaptive reduction of 
error over time. 
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Use of fixed weighted average models and the Kalman filter to test the fixed versus adaptive 
weighting of past and current information to be tested in chapter 3 
If the integration of past and current information over time functions at a fixed rate, as implied in 
serial dependence literature, then participant’s behaviour should be approximated by a fixed weighted 
average model and certain signatures apparent. The most apparent signatures, would be that the level 
of past and current information in any estimate of a stimulus value should remain constant in any 
situation and at least some influence of past stimulus information should always be present (see 
equations 2-5). This is because the fixed weighted average model makes no distinction between 
variance caused by the change in stimulus or variance caused by viewing conditions and cannot adapt 
its estimates to recognize situations in which such factors may arise. Attaching a fixed weight to 
measurements also means that any amount of error produced by change in a stimulus value should 
remain constant when a change is repeated regardless of any viewing conditions or predictability of 
change. Another signature of a fixed weighted averaging strategy should be that responses should 
always be lagged or biased towards at least one previous stimulus value. Moreover, because the model 
does not contain any model of the behaviour of the external stimulus as proposed in predictive coding 
any predictive relationships in the sequential regularities in the behaviour of the stimulus would make 
no impact on the way estimates are formed.  
If the integration of past and current information is adaptive, as proposed in predictive coding, then 
participants behaviour should be well approximated by the Kalman filter. The most obvious 
behavioural signature would be that due to way the Kalman filter adaptively weights prediction errors, 
the weight attached to past and current stimulus values should appear to change under different levels 
of proximal and distal variance. If we have a stimulus with high distal variance but low proximal 
variance, a higher Kalman gain should be calculated. With a higher Kalman gain, prediction errors are 
weighted as being more reliable and the new estimate is updated by a larger amount (see equations 
13-20). Crucially, because when estimates update by a larger amount towards the new stimulus 
measurement value the estimate appears closer to the current distal stimulus value and further from 
the previous value (see equation 6). Alternatively, when the stimuli have low distal but high proximal 
variance a lower Kalman gain is produced. With a lower Kalman gain then prediction errors are 
weighted as being less reliable and the new estimate in the estimation correction phase of the Kalman 
filter will be closer to the previous prediction and appear biased towards previous stimulus values. 
Another behavioural signature should be the influence of sequential regularities or correlations in the 
behaviour of the distal stimuli over time (see equations 10-12). If the behaviour of the distal stimulus 
is correlated over time then this should produce some impact on the level of past information in 
estimates, especially in conditions of high proximal variance. 
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Use of fixed weighted average models and the Kalman filter to test adaptive reduction of error 
over time to be tested in chapter 4. 
In the fixed weighted average strategy implied in serial dependence literature, the way estimates are 
formed are based on simple equations (see equations 2-5) in which a fixed weight is attached to each 
new stimulus value as they are measured. This means that this is a non adaptive model in which 
estimates do not update in a way modulated by any changes in proximal or distal variance. If this 
estimation strategy is approximated in humans then a similar pattern of lagged or speeded corrections 
in which the rate of correction is not modulated by the ratio of proximal and distal variance calculated 
as in the Kalman filter. In predictive coding, the way prediction error is reduced occurs in such a way 
that it reduces each time new comparisons between predictions and sensory inputs are over compared. 
This process can be considered an iterative process in a very similar way to the way the Kalman filter 
corrects error over time. If the way participant’s correct error over time is approximated by the 
Kalman filter then we would expect past and current information and the way error reduces to be 
governed by the level of Kalman gain. With a high Kalman gain, less current information should be 
present in estimate and error should reduce more quickly and with a low Kalman gain more current 
information should be present in estimates which should reduce error more slowly. The next two 
experimental chapters tests these ideas directly.  
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Chapter 3. Testing the Adaptive Weighting of Prediction Errors: 
Serial Dependence and the Kalman filter. 
3.1 Abstract. 
Predictive coding offers a current theory of how the brain extracts and encodes behaviourally relevant 
information from the environment. However, while predictive coding is increasingly popular, certain 
tenets of the model lack behavioural support and computational understanding. One such idea is the 
precision weighting of prediction errors that mediate prediction updating. In predictive coding, 
precision relates to the best estimate of the reliability of prediction errors. If prediction errors are 
weighted by too high an amount predictions will update to change in the world that may not have 
occurred. Alternatively, if weighted by too low an amount predictions might be too slow to update to 
change. Technically, optimally estimating precision corresponds to optimizing the Kalman gain in the 
Kalman filter. In computational terms, Kalman gain underpins the optimal combining of different 
sensory information streams that differ in their variability as seen in multisensory studies but seldom 
tested in purely visual terms. Here, we model and behaviourally test the adaptive weighting of 
information over time outlined within the Kalman filter against the fixed use of past and current 
stimulus values implied in ideas of perceptual averaging using a fixed weighted average model. As it 
is not possible to isolate prediction errors directly via behavioural means we use serial dependence as 
a proxy measure of temporal integration and test model based hypotheses about what should happen 
to serial dependence under a number of experimental manipulations. According to the Kalman filter, 
the magnitude of serial dependence should adapt to different levels of measurement and stimulus 
variability while in the fixed weighted average model serial dependence should remain at a fixed level 
regardless of conditions. We tested both ideas using an experimental design from a study that had 
previously observed serial dependence (Fischer & Whitney, 2014) measurement and stimulus 
variability. In experiment one, we observed that when participants viewed highly variable randomly 
presented Gabors in two different contrast conditions (5 & 20%), less serial dependence was recorded 
consistent with our Kalman filter model predictions for a highly variable but clear stimulus. In 
experiment two, we reduced variability in our stimulus by introducing a correlated sequence into the 
orientations of stimuli across trials. In this experiment, we recorded a high level of serial dependence 
in the 5% contrast condition but no serial dependence in the 20%, again consistent with our Kalman 
filter model predictions for a less visible but more stable stimulus. Lastly, we report a supplemental 
experiment designed to replicate Fischer & Whitney’s (2014) paradigm more closely. This experiment 
also reported no serial dependence, again consistent with our Kalman filter model predictions, 
providing general support for the predictive coding account of temporal integration. 
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3.2. Introduction. 
Predictive coding is perhaps the most interesting theory of neural function to emerge in the last 30 
years. Over time, a significant body of literature has emerged in support of predictive coding’s ideas 
from many areas of psychology not least neuroimaging  (den Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012; 
Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008; Summerfield, Wyart, Johnen, & de Gardelle, 2011), psychophysics( 
Denison, Piazza, & Silver, 2011; Grotheer, 2016; Schmitt, Klingenhoefer, & Bremmer, 2018) and 
computational neuroscience (Friston, Parr, & Zeidman, 2016 ; Parr, Rees, & Friston, 2018; Spratling, 
2008, 2015). However, despite a large body of literature in support of predictive coding and an 
increasing acceptance of at least its general principles, in some areas of sensory processing sections of 
predictive coding’s computational ‘puzzle’ remain missing or incomplete. One such signature that 
lacks support is the precision weighting of prediction errors we discussed in chapter 1.  
Determining the reliability of predictions relative to incoming sensory information is vital to 
predictive coding (see Friston, (2018) for an interesting debate about the importance of precison 
weighting in predicive coding). If the weight attached to sensory information is too low then 
prediction errors might not be weighted sufficiently. This could potentially lead to an over reliance on 
predictive information from the past and a delay in correcting to change in the world. Alternatively, if 
we attach too high a weight to potentially unreliable sensory input, we might over weight prediction 
errors leading to an over reliance on potentially unreliable sensory information, making perception too 
quick to correct errors when a real change may not have occurred. In predictive coding literature, 
there are a number of models (O’Shaughnessy, 1988; Rao, 1999; Friston, 2010; Spratling, 2015) 
which provide explanations of how prediction errors are weighted for reliability in different 
circumstances in a number of visual modalities. However, to date, there is no accepted tractable 
computational account of predictive coding that explains the way prediction errors are weighted in the 
temporal domain. One rich source of ideas that has great potential for providing models for testing 
adaptive weighting of prediction errors over time that have become prevalent outside of purely visual 
error processing is control theory. 
Ideas from control theory: the Kalman filter and fixed weighted averaging models. 
Control theory and the related field of control system engineering have vast experience in how to deal 
with uncertain inputs and correcting estimation errors in dynamic systems. One approach from control 
theory, increasingly used for understanding how errors in multi-sensory estimates should be weighted 
is recursive Bayesian estimation theory (see Haug, 2012 for an excellent account). An especially 
important concept contained in recursive Bayesian estimation theory, is the distinction between two 
related but distinct sources of variance. These sources of variance are variance in the behaviour of 
stimuli in the world or the distal stimuli and variability in the measurement of the distal stimulus at 
the measuring device or the proximal stimulus (Berger, 1985) that we explained in chapter 2. 
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Importantly, distal variance and proximal variance have different consequences for perception. Distal 
variance normally means that something in the world is changing that could be important so we want 
to keep this variability-on the other hand proximal variance tends to arise from factors such as poor 
lighting and weather conditions and can be thought of as noise which we want to remove. In Bayesian 
estimation theory, the interaction between proximal and distal variance has an important impact on the 
way predictions and estimation errors are weighted. A special case of recursive Bayesian estimation 
theory in which the relationship between distal and proximal variance on the way estimation errors are 
weighted is particularly well conceptualised is the Kalman filter (Kalman & Bucy, 1963) (See chapter 
two). The Kalman filter has been widely applied in an area of literature closely related to predictive 
coding termed Bayesian visou-motor integration that we have explained in depth in chapter 2.  
The use of the Kalman filter to explain adaptive weighting of visou motor errors  
Bayesian visuomotor integration deals with the problem of optimally combining noisy visual and 
motor information to produce an accurate estimate of our body in relation to its surroundings 
(Berniker & Kording, 2011) An interesting type of visuomotor experiment that often uses the Kalman 
filter as an explanatory model are reaching tasks (Baddeley, Ingram, & Miall, 2003; Knill, 2007; 
Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). When reaching to point at a stimulus, estimates of hand position are 
uncertain due to noise in the motor system and in the visual estimates of hand and stimulus position 
(Knill, 2007; Kwon et al., 2015). This means the movement of the hand to the target is often 
inaccurate, especially initially. Visual feedback about the position of the hand can be used to guide the 
reaching but due to visual noise exactly how reliable this feedback is can be variable and sensory 
systems, if the aim is an optimal response, should represent this uncertainty in weighting visual 
feedback when correcting reaching errors (Denève, Duhamel, & Pouget, 2007). For example, when 
the hand is hidden is partially hidden or in the periphery of the visual field, visual feedback about the 
position of the hand should be weighted less than when fully visible or in the centre of the visual field 
(Knill & Pouget, 2004.). By the same measure, errors in hand motions should also be adaptively 
weighted. When the hand is moving quickly, motion signals should be considered less reliable then 
when the hand is moving more slowly (Wolpert, 2007).  
Recent work has provided solid support that participants do indeed correct reaching errors in a way 
consistent with Kalman filter theory. A body psychophysical work has indicated a number of Kalman 
filter like response properties in the way humans correct reaching errors. A number of such studies 
have reported that humans use continuous on line feedback from the hand to correct errors in reaching 
which mirrors the adaptive process of the Kalman filter (Cluff, Crevecoeur, & Scott, 2015; Scheidt, 
Dingwell, & Mussa-Ivaldi, 2001; Wei & Körding, 2010; Wei et al., 2010). Furthermore, the 
weightings applied to both haptic and visual cues does appear to depend in part on the sensory noise 
(proximal variance) associated with each cue. (Baddeley et al., 2003; Harris & Wolpert, 1998) 
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Furthermore, evidence suggests that not only do participants weight the reliability of different cues 
based on their sensory noise levels but when variability is experimentally added to the visual feedback 
about the position of the hand (distal variance) this information is also optimally weighted when 
determining how much to correct previous errors (Burge, Ernst, & Banks, 2008; Burge, Girshick, & 
Banks, 2010; Cressman & Henriques, 2011; Saijo & Gomi, 2012) Based on such findings, which 
indicate that reaching errors are corrected based on the reliability of sensory information and level of 
stimulus change it is therefore logical to think that such an adaptive strategy may also be applied to 
purely visual integration . However, findings from visou-motor integration may represent the actions 
of distinct mechanisms than those of purely visual integration perhaps due to the high level of noise 
contained in motor commands (Lee, et al., 2016). Indeed, there is large amount of research about the 
way purely visual information is integrated which posits a simpler non adaptive strategy to interpret 
the world.  
An alternate account: perceptual averaging and serial dependence 
In the area of visual integration research termed perceptual averaging a much simpler way to interpret 
variable stimulus values has been proposed than that in predictive coding or the Kalman filter. 
Perceptual averaging studies have based their interpretation of temporal integration on the finding that 
the visual system appears to summarise the statistical values of stimulus values observed spatially and 
temporally (Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2005; Cicchini et al., 2016; Corbett & Oriet, 2011; 
Corbett, Wurnitsch, Schwartz, & Whitney, 2012) as the mean of observed values. Such findings have 
been used to support the notion that because visual signals contain a substantial amount of noise but 
that the world is generally stable a good predictive strategy is simply to average together observed 
values (Liberman et al., 2014). In this way, variability from noise and retinal motion in individual 
retinal images is smoothed over making perceptions less noisy and more accurate than relying on 
individual potentially unreliable individual retinal samples (Corbett, Venuti, & Melcher, 2016). 
Although perceptual averaging is long standing finding (Gibson & Radner, 1937) it has recently 
received renewed popularity in the form of serial dependence. 
Serial dependence is defined as the bias in current perceptions towards the average of previous 
stimulus values (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). In serial dependence literature the averaging strategy 
applied has been implied to function in a simple way. Specifically, it is implied that averaging is 
pervasive and functions at a fixed level across task demands or conditions (Corbett, Fischer, & 
Whitney, 2011; Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Liberman, Zhang, & Whitney, 2016). This is despite data 
indicating that serial dependency does appear to be adaptively modulated in many serial dependency 
experiments. For example, Fischer & Whitney report serial dependence to both totally random and 
counterbalanced stimulus orientations. However, when stimulus orientations were closer to one 
another they observed more serial dependence than when orientations were further apart with similar 
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findings indicating modulation of serial dependence by stimulus variability reported in a number of 
serial dependence papers (Bliss, Sun, & D’Esposito, 2017; Corbett, Fischer, & Whitney, 2011; 
Liberman et al., 2014, 2016; Taubert & Alais, 2016). 
3.2.1. Theoretical motivation, aims and hypotheses of the current chapter.  
The precision weighting of prediction error is central to predictive coding. The Kalman filter, already 
used in areas linked to predictive processing (Friston, 2018; Wolpert, 2007) offers an optimal model 
of how weighting might function. By providing the optimal Kalman gain, based on the ratio of distal 
to proximal variance, estimation errors are optimally weighted to prevent an over or under reliance on 
past and current information. However, most evidence for a Kalman filter type weighting comes from 
visou-motor work. It is possible that vision relies on a simpler averaging type mechanism which 
simply attaches a fixed weighted average to past and current stimulus values (Fischer & Whitney, 
2014; Kiyonaga et al., 2017; Liberman et al., 2016). The current chapter aims to test the fixed 
weighting account of stimulus values outlined in serial dependency research versus the adaptive 
weighting of prediction errors as outlined in predictive coding and the Kalman filter. However, while 
the fixed weighting average integration strategy is relatively easy to test as it is based on actual 
stimulus values, isolating prediction errors is actually impossible behaviourally. This is because we 
cannot have access to the individual’s actual prediction inside the brain if indeed this even exits. 
Therefore, we need an indirect experimental medium to test the adaptive weighting of prediction 
errors outlined in the Kalman filter and the fixed strategy outlined in fixed weighted average models. 
In various parts of predictive coding literature a number of behavioural mediums have been linked to 
isolating and quantifying prediction errors. For example, reaction times (Summerfield & Egner, 2009; 
Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008) and task accuracy (Heeger, 2017). While we make use of both of 
these measures in subsequent chapters, at this initial stage we are more interested in testing the basic 
adaptive prediction error weighting strategy of the Kalman filter against the fixed weighting of 
implied in weighted average models as general commentary for the validity of predictive coding. A 
current and indeed useful medium for testing adaptive versus fixed weighting of information over 
time we have already introduced is serial dependence (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). 
Serial dependencies are a good model phenomena for comparing the Kalman filter against the fixed 
weighted average model for multiple reasons. Firstly, considering that the Kalman filter has been 
previously linked with integrating visual and motor integration it is especially important to model a 
purely visual integrative phenomena. In this regard, a number of excellent control experiments by 
Fischer & Whitney (2014) have provided support that serial dependence is a visual phenomenon. 
Secondly, previous serial dependence studies have utilised some simple but effective experimental 
designs that lend well to manipulation under the ideas of distal and proximal variance (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) contained within the Kalman filter. Additionally, the way serial dependence is 
54 
 
calculated provides an easy to understand statistical measure of the way information is 
weighted/averaged by the visual system over time. Furthermore, both the Kalman filter and fixed 
weighted average models make strong and clearly defined experimental hypotheses about serial 
dependence in our experiments.  
If the adaptive, predictive coding, account of prediction error weighting outlined in the Kalman filter 
is correct then Kalman gains and modelled trial stimulus weightings should predict the level of serial 
dependency over trials. With higher Kalman gains we should observe less serial dependence. This is 
because with a Kalman gain of one prediction errors (𝑌𝑛 − ?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1) are weighted fully in a new 
estimate. When prediction errors are weighted fully estimates shift entirely towards the new 𝑌𝑛 
stimulus measurement and past stimulus information has no influence making estimates appear 
entirely serially independent. Alternatively, with a Kalman gain of zero, total serial dependency 
should be observed. This is because with Kalman gains closer to zero prediction errors carry no 
weight and new estimates do not change and remain the same as the previous ?̂?𝑛|𝑛−1 estimate. 
Alternatively, if the fixed average account of stimulus weighting implied in perceptual averaging 
literature is correct then changes in Kalman gain should not predict the magnitude of serial 
dependence. In this case the magnitude of serial dependence should always be the same and remain at 
a fixed weight on trials regardless of any manipulation of distal or proximal variance. 
3.3. Methods 
Ethics 
All calibration and experimental procedures were approved by the University of St Andrews Teaching 
and Research Ethics Committee. All participants gave informed consent. 
Stimuli design and presentation. 
In all experimental and calibration procedures visual stimuli were created in MATLAB 2015b (The 
Mathworks Inc) and presented using PsychToolbox (Brainard, 2007).  
3.3.1 Proximal variance calibration experiment. 
In order to provide an estimate of proximal variance that will allow the calculation of participant 
estimated Kalman gains we first undertake a proximal variance calibration experiment (see 3.8.2 page 
64 for how we calculate proximal variance and relate it to our serial dependence experiments).  
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Participants  
A total of eight participants undertook the proximal variance calibration experiment which followed a 
two alternative forced choice paradigm. (6 females, mean age 22, range 19-41). All participants were 
volunteers and recruited from the St Andrews SONA recruitment database. 
Stimulus design and procedure 
The proximal variance calibration experiment followed a two alternative forced choice paradigm in 
which participants were presented with an orientation discrimination task. Stimuli were oriented 
Gabor patches presented at either 5 or 20% contrast. All Gabors were embedded in Gaussian white 
noise (SD=15.5 cd/m2) Noise following Gabors is also Gaussian white noise and covered the whole 
screen. All Gabor patches had a radius of 8 visual degrees and had a spatial frequency 0.5 cycles per 
visual degree. In trials pairs of Gabor stimuli were presented one after another in which the second 
Gabor was presented at a series of 7 different orientations from the first Gabor in the pair. These were 
+/- 1.5°, +/- 3.6°, +/- 5.7°, +/- 7.9°, +/- .10.1°, +/-12.16° and +/- 14.3. Each block presented 5 trials at 
both 5% and 20% contrast at each orientation difference giving 70 trials per block with each 
participant completing 3 blocks thus performing 210 trials in total. Fixations were positioned centrally 
(see Fig 1 below). The procedure of the experiment in outlined in figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proximal variance calibration experimental procedure. Participants were seated 57 cm 
from a CRT monitor. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of the 
screen for 250ms. Then a randomly oriented Gabor patch was presented for 500ms at 5% or 20% 
contrast depending on the condition then a noise mask for 500ms. Next a second Gabor was presented 
at one of 7 different angles ranging from (+/- 1.5°, +/- 3.6°, +/- 5.7°, +/- 7.9°, +/- 10.1°, +/-12.16° and 
+/- 14.3°) anti clock wise or clock wise from the first Gabor and then a second noise mask for 500ms. 
The task of the participant was to fixate on the fixation cross and then discriminate whether the 
orientation of the second Gabor was clock wise or anti clock wise of the first Gabor orientation. This 
was signalled by pressing j for clock wise and f for anti-clock wise. Each trial took approximately 6-8 
seconds depending on how the response of the participants. After making a response, there was a 2-s 
delay during which only the fixation point was present before the onset of the next trial. 
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3.3.2 Main experiment one. Testing serial dependence under conditions of high distal 
variance versus low and high proximal variance. 
Experiment one aimed to produce a high level of distal variance and a range of proximal variance 
conditions and to assess serial dependence under such conditions. 
Participants. 
Main experiment one had a total of 10 participants (eight females, mean age 23, range 19-41) 
Participants were a different set to those who had completed the proximal variance calibration 
experiment. 
Stimulus design and procedure 
To produce a high level of distal variance, Gabor orientations were presented in a fully random 
sequence between 0 & 360°. We manipulated proximal variance, based in part on our proximal 
variance calibration and presented Gabors in the 5% and 20% contrasts used in this calibration 
experiment but also presented Gabors at 10% contrast as an exploratory measure. However, upon 
analysing the basic error variances for the 10% contrast condition we did not detect any differences 
between the 10% and 20% contrast conditions so do include data for this condition in our analyses 
and modelling. Gabor patches had a radius of 8 visual degrees and had a spatial frequency 0.5 cycles 
per visual degree. All Gabors were embedded in Gaussian white noise (SD=15.5 cd/m2). Each 
participant completed 3 blocks of trials. Each block comprised 210 trials comprised of 70 trials in 
each contrast condition (5%, 10% & 20%). This meant each participant completed 210 trials in each 
contrast condition and 630 trials in total. Condition order presentation was randomized across 
participants. Blocks held the method of orientation change constant. The procedure and timings of the 
experiment are shown below in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Stimulus design and procedure. Here we show how the experiment ran over two 
individual trials. Each trial began with the presentation of a blank screen (inter trial interval) for 
250ms. Next a Gabor patch was shown in the centre of the screen for 500 ms, then a noise patch was 
presented for 500ms then an adjustment response bar was presented. The task of the participant was to 
move the adjustment response bar to try and match the orientation of the Gabor they had just 
observed. Each trial lasted approximately 6-8 seconds. After making a response, there was a 250 ms 
delay during which only a blank screen was present before the onset of the next trial.  
3.3.2 Main experiment two. Testing serial dependence under low distal variance versus low and 
high proximal variance. 
Experiment two, aimed to produce a lower level of distal variance than in experiment 1 and two levels 
(high and low) of proximal variance conditions and to assess the magnitude of serial dependence 
under such conditions. 
Participants. 
A total of 9 participants took part in experiment two (seven females, mean age 24, range 19-41). 
Participants were a different group to experiment one and the proximal variance calibration 
experiment. All participants were recruited from St Andrews SONA recruitment database. 
Stimulus design and procedure 
Stimuli design, timings and procedure were identical to experiment one with the only difference being 
the variability of Gabor orientations. To reduce the distal variance of our Gabor stimulus orientations 
were presented in a sequence that followed a Gaussian random walk (μ=0, SD=11.552), (see below for 
details and an explanation of the reason for this). As the 10% contrast condition recorded no 
differences in proximal variance to the 5% or 20% contrast conditions in experiment one, we did not 
include the 10% contrast condition in experiment two. Each participant completed 3 blocks. Each 
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block comprised 210 trials of 105 trials in each contrast condition. This meant each participant 
completed 315 trials in each contrast condition and 630 trials in total. Contrast condition order 
presentation was randomized across participants across blocks. All blocks kept the method of 
orientation change constant. 
The reason we use a Gaussian random walk in our presentation of orientations in experiment 
two. 
The term random walk, describes a stochastic process that follows a series of steps in some 
mathematical space. In a Gaussian random walk, steps are drawn from a normal distribution with the 
variability of values from the mean of values determined by the standard deviation of the Gaussian 
distribution. In terms understanding the use of a Gaussian random walk in the current experiment, 
which has a mean of zero, it simply means that the next orientation value can be considered to be the 
same as the previous with some level of variance, which here is a standard deviation of 11.552. This 
has the twin effect of introducing some level of predictability in the sequence of orientations and as 
how far from the mean orientations are presented is constrained by the standard deviation of the 
random walk built into the stimulus design code, the overall level of variability in orientations over 
time is reduced.  
3.4 Analyses and statistical tests 
 
Equations 
 
Equations for both the Kalman filter for both a randomly changing and correlated stimulus which we 
use in the current chapter and a fixed weighted average model are fully outlined in chapter 2, pages 
44-46. 
Confidence intervals. 
We report standard (parametric) 95 % confidence intervals of the mean.  
Correction for potential ambiguity in responses using circular stimuli. 
Recording responses and associated error from circular stimuli using a straight response bar can 
potentially be problematic. The reason for this problem is because the response line participants use to 
signal their estimate of orientation partially spans the diameter of the circle and points to two different 
angles. For example, a line at 60° also lies at 240° at the other side of the circle. This means that if an 
orientation on a trial is presented at 60° and the subject responds at say 65°, it is possible to record a 
response of both 65 giving 5° of error or 245° giving 180° of error. The way we and others (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014) deal with this issue is to assume the response angle closest to the true trial orientation 
angle, as the angle the participant meant to signal and calculate the minimum angle difference 
between response and trial orientation as the response. This is performed by calculating the raw 
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difference between response and trial orientation and converting this to vector form using sin and cos 
and then converting this value back to an angle using the Matlab four-quadrant inverse tangent 
function (Mathworks Inc, 2012).  
Proximal variance calibration calculations and relationship to Kalman filter equations. 
To calculate proximal variance from our proximal calibration procedure we fit cumulative normal 
psychometric functions to the participants’ responses data for both the 5% and 20% contrast 
conditions using the Palamedes toolbox’s fitted variance parameter (Prins & Kingdom (2009). We 
take the variance (degs2) of the width of the slope of fitted cumulative normal psychometric function 
as our measure of proximal variance i.e. a narrower slope indicates a less variable response (for 
example, a slope with a variance of 20 (deg2) indicates a less variable perception of the stimulus in 
comparison to a slope with variance of 120 (degs2) for the 5% contrast condition). To provide an 
estimate of proximal variance for a single stimulus presentation used in the main experimental 
conditions we divide the square root of the variance by two. Importantly, the variance we record 
represents the vital quantity of measurement variance (σ2m) or the reliability of the observer’s 
measurement in the Kalman filter equations and can be used to form an estimate of participants 
Kalman gain for a response to a single stimulus presentation in conjunction with a figure for distal 
variance (see equation 7, page 48). To test for differences between proximal variances across 
participants for both contrast conditions we perform repeated measure t tests. 
Estimated Kalman gains, Model fitted Kalman gains and fitted weights to participant data. 
To calculate an estimated level of Kalman gain at the group level, we took our mean proximal 
variance measurements from our proximal variance calibration experiment and pre-set mean distal 
variance figures and followed the Kalman gain equation (see methods equations page 48). It should be 
noted, that due to the nature of presenting random orientations which produces a uniform distribution 
(high variance) and a Gaussian random walk (lower variance) the level of distal variance changes 
between each block and for each participant in each experimental session. This meant that the distal 
variance data was not the same for every participant. This meant that any statistical tests we ran on 
estimated Kalman gains for individual participants might not have provided unbiased comparisons so 
this aspect of our analysis is only intended to provide an approximate estimate of Kalman gains at a 
group level. In addition to estimating approximate Kalman gains, we computationally modelled 
participant Kalman gains. 
Modelling of participant Kalman gains was carried out by running a nonlinear squares fit to ascertain 
which level of Kalman gain explained participant’s responses (corrected for circular stimuli) most 
appropriately. A least squares model fit is a mathematical procedure for finding the best fitting 
regression slope or curve to a given set of data points. Here, this works by plotting a regression model 
based on the equations for estimation in the Kalman filter (chapter 2, page 43, and equation 6) at a 
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number of Kalman gain levels to participants’ responses until the regression slope with the least 
residual squared error is found. The gain at which point is reached is taken as the participants’ model 
fitted Kalman gain 
Our modelling analysis of Kalman gain produces a specific level of Kalman gain in each subject and 
therefore is suitable for statistical comparison. Statistical analysis of model fitted Kalman gains 
between contrast conditions is carried out using paired sample t tests (Bonferroni-corrected). We 
report 95% confidence intervals. We also modelled participant responses with a fixed weighted 
average simulation model by running another nonlinear least squares fit to find the best fitting weights 
from the preceding 6 trial orientations to the current participant response.  
Serial dependence calculations 
To assess the magnitude of serial dependence across contrast conditions and experiments we 
calculated serial dependence based on Fischer & Whitney (2014). We first calculated and plotted the 
error in degrees on each individual trial on the Y axis (corrected for circular responses). Error is 
calculated as the participant response minus the actual stimulus orientation. Positive errors indicate 
responses clockwise of the true current trial orientation and negative errors indicating responses anti 
clockwise of the true trial orientation. Next, we plotted the relative orientation of the current stimulus 
in comparison to the previous stimulus orientation. Relative orientation is calculated as the previous 
(n-1) stimulus orientation minus the current stimulus orientation. To measure the magnitude of serial 
dependence over all trials we fit standard regression slopes corrected for symmetrical and circular 
stimuli to error and relative orientation. By this measure serial dependence is directly related to the 
steepness and intercept of the regression slope. In both experiments, statistical analysis of regression 
slopes used paired t tests (Bonferroni corrected).  
N-back serial dependence analysis. 
Previous studies have shown that participant’s responses are not only serially dependent on the 
immediately preceding trial but that responses also depend on trials presented over the last 10-15 
seconds (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). To assess how serial dependence changed as a function of time in 
our experiments we measured serial dependence between not just the current and immediately 
previous trial but between the current and previous six trials. This was calculated in the same way as 
serial dependence but instead of only comparing error on the current trial against the relative 
orientation of the current trial compared to immediately previous trial but also error on the current 
trial compared to the relative orientation of the previous six trials. Again, we fit regression slopes 
corrected for circular and symmetrical stimuli to participant’s data and report standard deviations and 
95% confidence intervals. 
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3.5. Results. 
3.5.1 Proximal variance calibration. 
Analysis of proximal variance data reported significant differences in the variability (degs2) of 
cumulative psychometric functions fitted to participants responses between the 5% (M=141.66, CI 
[198.02, 91.88]) and 20% contrast conditions (M=38.50, CI [67.34, 19.05].) t (6) =4.01. p=.007. 
Significant differences between contrast conditions indicate that our experimental manipulation of 
contrast and our measurement paradigm were successful and this result is given extra validity by non 
overlapping 95% confidence intervals (see figure 4). One aspect of the results to draw attention to is 
how well participants could see the stimuli in the 20% contrast. Despite the presence of a noise mask, 
all participants were very accurate in observing changes between the first and second presented 
Gabors as soon as orientation changes became more than a few degrees (see figure 3 for an individual 
example).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Typical individual 2AFC cumulative psychometric fit from our proximal variance 
calibration experiments All participants recorded less variability and greater accuracy in the 
judgment of the stimulus orientation relative to the previous in the more visible low proximal variance 
condition (20% contrast) as indicated by the steeper slope of the psychometric function in comparison 
to the less visible high proximal variance (5% contrast) condition which in all cases had a broader 
slope.  
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Figure 4.Group level differences in proximal variance obtained during our proximal variance 
calibration experiment-Note the large and significant difference in response variability between 
contrast conditions. In the 20% contrast condition participants performed well in nearly all cases. This 
contrasted with performance in the 5% contrast condition in which participants were less accurate in 
all cases. 
3.5.2. Main experiment one. 
Distal variance levels 
The level of distal variance was determined by the variability of our stimulus orientations which in 
this case was high due to being presented completely randomly. As the level of variability inevitably 
changed over blocks due to the way orientations were presented randomly we needed to provide a 
mean figure we could plug into the equation for Kalman gain. Therefore, we took the mean variance 
figure from each block from all participants and divided it by the total number of blocks carried out in 
all experimental sessions to provide an approximate figure for distal variance. This figure was 2700 
(deg2). 
Estimated Kalman gains 
In experiment one we calculated estimated Kalman gains of 0.95 (5% contrast) and 0.98 (20% 
contrast) based on the calculations for the Kalman filter provided in chapter 2 page and our proximal 
variance calibration data for each contrast condition corrected for a single stimulus presentation (see 
figure 5 below). 
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Model fitted Kalman gains 
Analysis of model fitted Kalman gain data mirrored results from our predicted Kalman gains and 
reported Kalman gains exactly the same as our estimated Kalman gains (see figure 5 below). In 
addition, no effects of contrast conditions on Kalman gain were observed in our analysis of model 
fitted Kalman gains with 5% (M= 0.95 SD=0.09, CI [1.00, 0.90]) and 20% (M=0.98, SD =0.07, CI 
[1.02, 0.93) t (9) =-2.270. p=0.059. No difference between conditions in modelled Kalman gains is 
confirmed by overlapping upper and lower bound 95% confidence intervals for the 5% contrast 
condition and 20% contrast condition, albeit with as expected slightly less variability in the more 
visible 20% contrast condition (see figure 5 below) 
 
Estimated Modelled
Figure 5. Estimated and model fitted Kalman gains for experiment one averaged across all 
participants. Note both predicted and model fitted Kalman gains are identical at close to one 
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Mean model fitted weights 
In our fitted weight simulations in experiment one, we recorded weights at around one for the current 
trial orientation and around zero for both the 5% and 20% contrast conditions, (or in fact slightly 
negative weights in some cases), for all other 6 included n back trials in both contrast conditions (see 
figure 6 and table 1). This result, is consistent with Kalman gains of one we recorded in both contrast 
conditions in this experiment indicating that participant’s responses, were all in cases centred on the 
current trial orientation. Interestingly, we also appear to observe a small of amount of negative 
weighting in both the 5% and 20 % contrast conditions. At this stage we cannot be sure of the reason 
for this and may be down to random effects or modelling errors and it will be interesting to see if it 
translates into serial dependence analysis directly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean model fitted weights for experiment one. Sub figures A & B illustrate mean model 
fitted weights in the 5% (A) & 20% (B) contrast condition on the current and previous 5 trial 
orientations. As expected based on our predicted and modelled Kalman gains we observed no 
indication of any influence of trial history in modelled weights or in our n back participant data. 
Model fitted weights are at 1 for the current trial orientation with no weight on any previous 
orientation. Note, as mentioned above we also appear to observe a small of amount of negative 
weighting in both the 5% and 20 % contrast conditions. 
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Table 1. Current and N back trial weights and 95% confidence intervals for experiment one 
   5% Contrast                                                             20% Contrast  
 Weight on trial   CI (LL, UL) Weight on trial  CI(LL, UL) 
Trial     
Current 1.02 [1.00, 1.36] 1.03 [ 0.84, 1.15] 
N-1 0.09 [0.00, 0.20] 0.00 [-0.04, 0.06] 
N-2 0.07 [-0.08, 0.08], 0.00 [0.03, 0.03] 
N-3 0.00 [-0.05, 0.05] 0.00 [-0.04, -0.06] 
N-4 -0.09 [-0.06, 0.13] -0.01 [-0.06, 0.03] 
N-5 -0.04 [-0.13, 0.10] -0.01 [-0.02, 0.04] 
N-6 -0.08 [0.09, 0.21] -0.02 [-0.06, 0.03] 
 
 
Serial dependence modelling predictions for experiment one. 
Our modelling analyses allowed us to make very specific predictions about the level of serial 
dependence we should observe, not only between the current (n) and immediately previous trial 
orientations also between the current and previous five trial orientations (n-1, n-2, n-3, n-4, n-5 & n-
6). Predicted and modelled Kalman gains of 0.95 for the 5% contrast condition and 0.98 for the 20% 
contrast condition make strong predictions that we should observe little if any serial dependence in 
experiment one for either contrast condition. Fitted weight analysis also provided a clear prediction 
that we should not observe any serial dependence towards any of the previous 6 trial orientations and 
that responses should be centred only on the current trial orientation in both the 5% and 20% contrast 
condition. Interestingly, model fitted weights also appear to support the idea of some form of negative 
weighting/serial dependency towards the previous trial orientations in the 5% contrast condition.  
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Individual serial dependence illustrations. 
Before moving on to reporting our main analyses of serial dependence at a group level it is worth 
noting and illustrating that our model predictions were also accurate at the individual level. All 
participants (although some data was more noisy than others) recorded regression coefficients at or 
very close to zero indicating no bias towards previous values. This result, is entirely consistent with 
Kalman gains close to 1 and model fitted weights at 1 on the current trial orientation. Our individual 
plots also provide an idea of how well participants could perform at the task which although may 
seem simple is important in interpreting results. Based on the relatively low amount of error over 
trials, which was around the five to ten degree mark (shown by the width of shaded regions), it 
appears subjects could see the stimulus in both contrast conditions and perform the task very well as 
shown in figure 7 (below). 
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Figure 7. Four individual serial dependence plots for four individual participants. Positive 
values of the X axis indicate that the current trial was more clockwise than the current trial and 
positive errors on the current trial (Y axis) indicate that reported orientation was more clockwise than 
the true stimulus orientation. Regression slopes indicate the strength of relationship between error and 
the sined change in orientation. For example a slope of one would indicate that the subjects error to 
100% captured by the change in orientation between trials and 100% serially dependent. By the same 
measure a slope of zero would indicate no relationship between error and the change in orientation 
and no serial dependence and in fact this is what we observe. Participants plotted in sub figures A, C 
and D reported regression coefficients at precisely zero while the participant plotted in in sub figure B 
may have exhibited some serial dependence (slope of 0.05) but at this low level could be simply 
attributable to statistical or response noise in an individual participant.  
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Serial dependency main analysis. 
We hypothesised that the magnitude of serial dependence is modulated by the ratio of proximal and 
distal variance in our stimulus and commensurate to the level of Kalman gain. Analysis reported no 
differences in regression slope coefficients between contrast conditions and regression slope 
coefficients at or close to zero with 5% (M=0.03, SE =0.03, CI [0.00, 0.05]) and 20% (M=0.00, SE 
0.02, CI [0.00, 0.02] ), t(9)=2.530, p=0.320, This meant that while we did not record any differences 
in Kalman gains between conditions, we did observe a pattern of results indicating the level of serial 
dependence was commensurate to the level of Kalman gain. To clarify, the Kalman gains that we 
have obtained for experiment one are all close to one. This means that full weight should be attached 
to any prediction error. When full weight is attached to prediction errors, estimates should update 
fully and no past history (serial dependence) should be visible in estimates. Results strongly indicate 
participants responses are centred on the current trial (see figure 8) entirely consistent with this idea. 
However, such a result, while consistent with our model predictions is interesting, it is impossible to 
ascertain any adaptive effects of proximal or distal variance on serial dependence in this experiment 
as quite simply we do not observe any serial dependence. Also, this is clearly a failure to replicate 
Fischer & Whitney (2014).  
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Figure 8. Group serial dependence plot. To recap, positive values of the X axis indicate that the 
current trial was more clockwise than the current trial and positive errors on the current trial (Y axis) 
indicate that reported orientation was more clockwise than the true stimulus orientation. Regression 
slopes indicate the strength of relationship between error and the sined change in orientation. Here we 
observe that subjects overall responded at the current trial orientation. While it may appear that there 
is some serial dependence between -10 & 10 we contend that the dip below zero on the anti-clockwise 
does not sufficiently rise above zero error on the clockwise (+) direction to be considered a ‘serially 
dependent’ distribution.  
 
Experiment one n back analysis. 
Results from our n back analysis were consistent with our main analysis of serial dependency and 
model predictions. Unsurprisingly, given we had recorded no serial dependence in our main analysis 
and based on Kalman gains of 1 and our model fitted weights at one for the current trial orientation 
we found no n back serial dependence for either the 5% or 20% contrast conditions (as shown below 
in figure 9 with exact figures provided in table 2). Interestingly, we also appear to observe some slight 
negative serial dependence or a repulsion effect in later n back trials. This may be attributable to 
chance due to limited trial numbers of perhaps more plausibly be related to adaptation after effects. 
While it may seem counter intuitive to associate adaptation with stimulus presentations lasting only 
500 ms sub second negative after effects have been recorded previously Fritsche et al., 2017; Kanai & 
Verstraten, 2005) which can last for several seconds Fritsche et al., 2017). Fritsche et al. (2017). 
Again, though it should be noted that while our modelling predicted our results extremely accurately 
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it not possible to ascertain whether such a result supports our adaptive versus fixed hypothesis for 
serial dependence based on this experiment alone as none was observed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean n back regression slopes for experiment one. Sub figures A & B illustrate mean 
regression slope coefficients from all participants in experiment one in both the 5% contrast (A) and 
the 20% contrast (B). As we had observed no serial dependence in our main serial dependence 
analysis we were highly unlikely to observe any serial dependence in our n back analysis. This was 
confirmed with all regression slope coefficients being at or around zero in both the 5% and 20% 
contrast conditions.  
 
Table 2. Serial dependence N back trial analysis for experiment one 
   5% Contrast                                                          20% Contrast  
 Regression slope  CI (LL, UL) Regression slope  CI (LL,UL) 
Trial  
N-1 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 
N-2 0.00 [0.01, 0.01] 0.00 [0.01, 0.01] 
N-3 -0.01 [-0.00, 0.02] 0.00 [0.01, 0.02]  
N-4  0.00 [-0.01, 0.02] 0.00 [-0.01. 0.03] 
N-5 0.02 [-0.03, 0.03] -0.02 [-0.04, 0.02] 
N-6 -0.03 [-0.04, 0.01] -0.04 [-0.06,0.02] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
3.5.3. Main experiment two 
Testing serial dependence under reduced distal variance versus low and high 
proximal variance. 
Distal variance levels. 
To calculate the mean variance of orientations across all experiments we recorded the level of 
variability in stimulus orientations in each block and divided it by the number of blocks carried out in 
all experiments to provide an approximate figure for distal variance. This figure was 133 (deg2) which 
is much reduced from the figure of 2700 (deg2) we recorded in experiment one. 
Estimated Kalman gains 
Based on the calculations for prediction variance in a stimulus that follows a Gaussian random walk 
sequence (μ =0, σ =11.552) and our figures from our proximal variance calibration we calculated 
estimated Kalman gains of 0.62 for the 5% contrast condition and 0.83 for the 20% contrast condition. 
The interesting aspect of our estimated Kalman gains is that for both contrast conditions, Kalman gain 
is reduced away from one as we observed in experiment one. Such a result, also highlights the 
difficulty in reducing Kalman gain away from one. We have had to drastically reduce distal variance 
and make our stimulus extremely difficult to see but even here Kalman gains are still closer to one 
than they are to zero. Nonetheless, the fact that we have observed a difference between Kalman gains 
between contrast conditions is the important factor here and supports an adaptive weighting strategy. 
Mean model fitted Kalman gains. 
As in our estimated Kalman gains, in model fitted Kalman gains we recorded reduced Kalman gains 
from those recorded in experiment one but on this occasion only in one contrast condition (5%). We 
calculated a Kalman gain of 0.74 for the 5% contrast condition but a Kalman gain of 1.02 for the 20% 
contrast condition. Importantly, t tests reported significant differences in modelled Kalman gains 
between contrast conditions with 5% (M=0.74 SD=0.20, CI [0.88, 0.63]) and 20% (M=1.02 SD=0.53, 
% CI [0.99, 1.05]) t (8) =-3.629. p=.007. Note here, we have a discrepancy in model fitted Kalman 
gains and estimated Kalman gains. Model fitted Kalman gains have not reduced away from one as 
much as estimated Kalman gains. Results from model fitted Kalman gains again provide an insight 
into just how good visual perception is. Even in the 20% contrast condition, our stimulus was quite 
noisy and used noise masks, yet participants were able to respond almost entirely to the current trial 
orientation. In the 5% contrast condition, which it must be said was a tough stimulus to see, 
participants are still quite accurate given the noise level of the stimulus. Once again though, the key 
factor here is that we have a difference between Kalman gains consistent with an adaptive weighting 
strategy (see figure 10). 
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**
Figure 10. Estimated and model fitted Kalman gains for experiment two. Here, we observe the 
clear and indeed significant differences in model fitted Kalman gains between contrast conditions in 
experiment two. Estimated Kalman gains for the 5% were 0.62 while in the 20 % we calculated gains 
at 0.83. This was a slightly different outcome to our model fitted Kalman gains. In the 5% contrast we 
record a Kalman gain of 0.74 while in the 20% condition we recorded a Kalman gain of 1.02. This 
result provides an interesting comparison with our predicted Kalman gains for experiment two and if 
correct predicts serial dependence in only the 5% contrast condition but not in the 20% condition and 
importantly an apparent effect of the ratio between proximal and distal variance and an adaptive 
weighting process 
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Mean model fitted weights  
Analysis of model fitted weights were consistent with our differences in Kalman gains between 
contrast conditions and indicate a more distributed weighting in the 5% contrast condition than in the 
20% contrast condition (see figure 11 and table 3). Mean weighting figures and upper and lower 
bound 95% confidence intervals for the 5% percent contrast condition indicated a distributed 
weighting albeit with some inter individual variations and are illustrated below in figure 11and 
reported in detail in table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean model fitted weights for experiment two. Sub figures A & B illustrate mean 
model fitted weights in the 5% (A) & 20% (B) contrast conditions on the current and previous 6 trial 
orientations. Here again we see evidence of an adaptive weighting of information over time 
modulated by the ratio of proximal to distal variance. In the 5% contrast condition, weights are 
distributed over the current and previous two trials while in the 20 % contrast weighting is confined 
entirely to the current trial orientation .While it is correct to note that our model fitted analysis is only 
fitting a model to data it does appear that our both our models provide support for an adaptive 
weighting strategy and essentially concur with Kalman gains on the way weighting is distributed over 
conditions. 
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Table 3 Current/N back trial fitted weights and 95% confidence intervals for experiment two 
   5% Contrast                                                               20% Contrast  
 Weight on trial   CI (LL, UL) Weight on trial  CI(LL,UL) 
Trial     
Current 0.78 [0.64, 0.93]  1.03  [0.95, 1.10] 
N-1 0.09 [0.02, 0.19]  0.00  [0.00. 0.10] 
N-2 0.12 [0.06. 0.18] 0.00 [-0.05, 0.05],  
N-3 0.01 [0.03, -0.03] 0.00 [-0.03, -0.03] 
N-4 -0.02 [-0.04, 0.04] -0.01 [-0.05,0.05] 
N-5 0.04 [-0.06, 0.15] -0.01 [-0.05, 0.03] 
N-6 0.00 [-0.04, 0.07] -0.02 [-0.06, 0.03] 
 
Serial dependence predictions for experiment two 
Our Kalman gains and model fitted weights allow us to make specific predictions about the level of 
serial dependence we might observe in experiment two-albeit with some slight ambiguity between 
estimated and model fitted Kalman gains. Estimated Kalman gains of 0.62 (5% contrast) and 
0.83(20% contrast) mean that we should observe high serial dependence for both conditions. 
Translating these figures to our serial dependence regression slopes we can expect a slope of 0.38 (1-
K(0.62)) for the 5% contrast condition. This would be a huge amount of serial dependence. Model 
fitted Kalman gains make a different prediction about serial dependence. In the 5% we should observe 
a regression slope of 0.26 (1-K(0.74)) which is still a large amount of serial dependence but in the 
20% condition we would expect no serial dependence (1-K(1.02) and in fact we might even expect 
some repulsion effects as opposed to bias towards previous orientations. Fitted weights also provide a 
prediction about serial dependence on our n back analyses. With a weight of 0.78 on the current trial 
for the 5% contrast condition and some weight on the previous 2 n back trials we would expect some 
serial dependence going back over trials. In the 20% contrast condition, the weight was around one on 
the current trial. In this case, we would expect no serial dependence on the immediately previous trial 
orientation and no serial dependence to any previous n back previous trial orientation. In summary, 
predictions made by both Kalman gains and fitted weights state that we should observe different 
amounts of serial dependence between contrast conditions thus supporting the adaptive predictive 
coding account of the phenomena.  
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Individual serial dependence illustrations. 
Our individual serial dependence error plots for four participants from experiment two (see figure 12) 
provide an early indication that the adaptive account of serial dependence may be supported. Here, 
while we do not carry out statistical tests we see the clear difference in serial dependence between 
conditions, with on some occasion a very high level of serial dependence recorded in the 5% contrast 
condition. Another interesting aspect of our individual plots is the visible relationship between error 
variance (proximal variance-the width of the shaded regions) and serial dependency which is 
especially evident in the 5% contrast condition. When we have a low level of proximal variance 
participants generally respond at the current trial orientation. However, when we have a high level of 
proximal variance participant’s error generally becomes serially dependent on the previous trial 
orientation. In some participants (A) the relationship is very strong with a regression slope coefficient 
of 0.26 while in others the effect is less strong. For example in sub figure B the regression slope 
coefficient is at 0.11. Also note in sub figure (A) the subjects highly variable response errors which 
can be considered to be the effects of stimulus visibility in both the 5 & 20% contrast conditions i.e. 
proximal variance This is especially interesting as this is the only subject in which we observe serial 
dependence in both contrast conditions. A further interesting aspect of our individual data plots is that 
we again observe ‘negative’ serial dependence in sub figure C. As we observe it again it is 
increasingly unlikely that this is not down to statistical errors or chance but that perhaps a different 
perceptual mechanism or strategy is at work.  
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Figure 12. Four individual serial dependence plots. Here we can observe a possible effect of 
proximal variance on serial dependence. In participants with larger SEM (sub figures A & C) there 
appears to be larger amount of serial dependence-note in sub figure A we see this effect strongly. Also 
note the quite strong negative serial dependence in subfigure D the reason for this is unclear 
especially in light of the large individual differences in responses. Indeed, this is a recurring issue in 
our data with different participants responding in quite different ways to the trial orientations.  
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Serial dependency main analysis. 
We hypothesised that the magnitude of serial dependence is adaptively modulated by the ratio of 
proximal and distal variance in our stimulus and commensurate to the level of Kalman gains. Here we 
found this to be the case and report significant differences in regression slope coefficients between 
contrast conditions with 5% (M=0.20 SD=0.20, CI [0.63, 0.88]) and 20% (M=-0.02, SD=0.99, CI 
[0.99, 1.05]) contrast conditions t (9) =4.791. p=.001, strongly indicating an adaptive integration 
strategy (see figure 13 below). While, the amount of serial dependence we recorded in the 5% contrast 
condition is slightly below the level predicted (see figure 13 for an illustration of predicted versus 
actual values), the fact that the magnitude of serial dependence changed under different levels of 
proximal and distal variance and were generally commensurate to our levels of Kalman gain supports 
our adaptive hypothesis. The effects of proximal variance can be seen in figure 13 below. In this plot, 
the green shaded standard error region (20 % contrast) is narrower than the purple shaded region (5%) 
as this is the only aspect of the study that was manipulated it indicates that stimulus variability plays a 
prominent role in the integration of past information. Results also show just how difficult it is to 
induce the visual system to integrate past information into current perceptions. To produce a 
reasonably high level of serial dependence in experiment two, we had to dramatically reduce distal 
variance from experiment one. This results again contradicts Fischer & Whitney (2014) although it 
must be said we did not directly replicate their experiment. In the next section of our results we do 
though report a more direct replication that was also carried out. 
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Figure 13. Group error versus relative orientation plots. Here we observe the significant 
difference in regression slope coefficients between conditions. The slope coefficient in the 5% 
reported a slope of 0.20, indicating a high level of serial dependency while in the high contrast (20%), 
low proximal condition, the slope is zero indicating no serial dependency. This is a vital result in 
terms of our analysis of an adaptive versus a fixed hypotheses. A significant difference in slope values 
indicates that when the amount of distal variance is reduced and measurement uncertainty increases, 
carrying higher proximal variance, as recorded in the 5% condition in this experiment, stimulus 
history influences participant’s estimates of the current stimulus value and we observe a large amount 
of serial dependence. 
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Serial dependence n back analysis 
As with our main analysis of serial dependence in our n back analysis our modelling provided a 
relatively accurate prediction of serial dependence. Results were especially consistent with our model 
fitted weights. As predicted, findings indicated that we observed serial dependence towards the 
previous six trial orientations in the 5% contrast condition and no serial dependence recorded in the 
20% contrast condition with regression slope coefficients of , n-1 0.19, n-2, 0.12, n-3 0.09, n-4, 0.09, 
n-5, 0.07 & n-6 0.03 and 20% contrast n-1, 0.00 , n-2, 0.00, n-3, 0.00, n-4, -0.01, n-5, -0.01 & n-6, -
0.01 (See figure 14 and table 4). Note here that serial dependence appears to persist longer than model 
fitted weights suggested in the 5% contrast condition and that at least some subjects contrast appear to 
exhibit negative serial dependence from around the n-3 trial in the 20% contrast condition (see fig 14 
below). The repeated occurrence of a small amount of negative serial dependence as observed in 
experiment one again represents a somewhat anomalous as aspect of the data. As it is repeated from 
experiment 1, it suggests that it is not down to chance or statistical error. However, crucially, the 
differences in the magnitude of serial dependence between conditions support our adaptive hypothesis 
of serial dependence and are consistent with ideas of predictive coding. 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Serial dependence magnitude towards trial presented 1-6 trial back. In the 5% 
contrast condition regression slope coefficients report a slope of 0.19 for the n-2 trial decreasing over 
n-backs to a regression slope coefficient of 0.07 in the n-6 trial. A linear decrease in regression slope 
coefficients is consistent with results from our fitted gains and weights which indicate an influence of 
trial history over a number of previous trials decreasing over time in this condition. This persistence 
of serial dependence over time is not observed in the 20% contrast condition, in which as expected, no 
serial dependency is observed and in data fact hints at a slight repulsion effect towards previous trial 
orientations. 
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Table 4 Serial dependence N back trial analysis for experiment one 
   5% Contrast                                                                20% Contrast 
 Regression slope CI (LL, UL) Regression slope CI (LL,UL) 
Trial     
N-1 0.19 [0.11, 0.27] 0.00 [-0.01, 0.01] 
N-2 0.12 [0.04, 0.20] 0.00 [0.01, 0.01] 
N-3 0.09 [0.02, 0.15] 0.00 [0.01, 0.02] 
N-4 0.09 [0.00, 0.14] 0.00 [-0.01. 0.03] 
N-5 0.07 [0.04. 0.13] -0.01 [-0.02, 0.02] 
N-6 0.03 [-0.04, 0.10] -0.04 [-0.05, 0.02] 
 
 
3.6. Supplemental experiment. 
Previous serial dependence literature has always reported at least some amount of serial dependency 
using an orientation judgment paradigm (Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Liberman et al., 2016; St. John-
Saaltink et al., 2016). However, we found none in all but one experimental condition in one 
experiment. Although this finding was well predicted by our modelling, we felt it warranted further 
investigation. This was especially true in regard to our replication of Fischer & Whitney (2014). This 
is because, while it is true we conceptually replicated Fischer & Whitney (2014) we did not attempt a 
direct replication of their design. Due to the strength of Fischer & Whitney’s (2014) methods and 
results it was important that we verify our results by performing a more direct replication as some 
aspects of the way Fischer & Whitney’s (2014) stimuli were presented differed from our stimuli 
presentation. The differences here, applied mainly to the reduction of spatial frequency of the stimulus 
in their experiment compared to ours, a larger Gabor stimulus, a stronger inter trial noise mask in the 
same position of the stimulus and the screen positions of the Gabor (centre and periphery). The 
general effects of the differences between Fischer & Whitney (2014) can be considered to have the 
effects of a) making the stimulus more blurred and b) in trials presented in the periphery moving the 
stimulus outside of the foveal representation and thus increasing uncertainty. Given both factors could 
have increased what could be considered proximal variance under the principles of the Kalman filter it 
may have explained our non replication i.e. our stimulus had lower proximal variance values meaning 
participants were more likely to respond to the current trial orientation in our experiment. We now 
provide methods and results. 
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3.6.1 Methods. 
Participants. 
The supplemental experiment had 5 participants (3 female, mean age 26, range 19-41). Participants 
had not taken part any of our previous experiments and were recruited from St Andrews SONA 
participants recruitment database.  
Supplemental experiment design and task. 
Gabor patches were presented at 0.25 contrast has a radius of 10 visual degrees, a spatial frequency 
0.33 cycles per visual degree and a 1.5 s.d Gaussian contrast envelope. Between presentations of 
Gabors a noise patch was presented at the same location as the Gabor. Noise patches comprised white 
noise smoothed with a 0.91 Gaussian kernel and windowed in a 1.5 s.d Gaussian contrast envelope. 
The experiment had two conditions. In condition one (peripheral), Gabors were presented 6.5 visual 
degrees to the right of fixation which was a 0.5 diameter dot (visual degrees) was presented in the 
centre of the screen. In condition two (central), Gabors were positioned centrally. In both conditions, 
Gabors were presented randomly between 0-360°. The orientation adjustment bar used to signal the 
participant’s perceived orientation was a 0.61° wide white bar at 4° in length. The adjustment line was 
always positioned at the same location as the Gabor trial location. The response bar changed its 
starting orientation randomly on each trial. Each participant completed four blocks. Each block had 52 
trials in each condition (peripheral and central). This meant each participant completed 208 trials with 
the Gabor positioned in the periphery and 208 with the Gabor positioned in the centre and 416 trials in 
total. 
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Figure 15. Design and task for the supplemental serial dependency experiment and comparison 
with our design and task from our previous serial dependency design and task. Sub figure A 
illustrates the design and task for our supplemental serial dependency experiment which is closer to 
Fischer & Whitney’s (2014) design. Here, we can compare the important differences between our 
previously used more conceptual replication which it must be said combined to make the 
supplemental experiment qualitatively distinct. The reduction in spatial frequency had an effect of 
making the orientation of the Gabors more blurred and the increase in thickness of the adjustment line 
made for perhaps a more noisy response.  
3.6.2. Analyses. 
All analyses methods are identical to the previous main serial dependency analyses except we only 
include model fitted Kalman gains as predictors for serial dependence and do not include an n back 
analysis. 
3.6.3 Results. 
Model fitted Kalman gains. 
No effect of screen position on Kalman gain was observed in our analysis of model fitted Kalman 
gains with periphery, 5% (M= 1.01 SD=0.07) and 20% (M=0.95 SD =0.06) t (4) =-1.04. p=0.232 with 
upper and lower bound 95% confidence intervals for the peripheral condition, CI [1.11, 0.91] and 
central condition CI [1.03, 0.88] (see figure 16). Importantly, figures for Kalman gain are at or around 
one indicating no impact of trial history.  
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Figure 16. Modelled Kalman gains supplemental experiment. Here we can observe the similarities 
in model fitted Kalman gains in our two experimental conditions. Kalman gains of 1.01 for the 
peripheral condition and 0.95 for the central condition. This result bears marked similarities with our 
main serial dependency in experiment one which also presented orientations at random orientations 
between 0&360 degrees, indicating at such a high level of distal variance little if any weighting to 
previous stimulus values in participant’s responses. 
Serial dependence modelling predictions for our supplemental experiment. 
Our model fitted Kalman gains were again close to one for both peripheral and central conditions. 
Based on this level of Kalman gain we would expect to see little if any serial dependency at the group 
level. However, given our lower bound confidence intervals indicating a slightly lower Kalman gain 
in some participants it is possible that some individual participants may exhibit a small amount of 
serial dependence. 
Individual serial dependence plots. 
Before providing group level results, in keeping with our previous results sections, we again provide 
an illustration of individual serial dependence plots. On this occasion, we again observe a similar 
result to our main experiment one, which also presented randomly oriented Gabors. Again, all 
regression slope coefficients are very close to zero and indeed there seems to be even more of the 
negative serial dependence or repulsion effect we observe in our previous experiments. Such results 
again lend weight to the effects of very high distal variance on the way participants respond to 
changes in stimuli over time. Namely, that when presented with a highly variable stimulus 
participants ignore past values and base responses on the current trial orientation. 
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Figure 17. Serial dependence plots for all five individual participants. Here we again observe a 
similar result to our main experiment one which also presented randomly oriented Gabors. All 
responses are centred on the current trial orientation indicating no effects of trial history in responses. 
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Group serial dependence analysis. 
Results from our analysis of serial dependency in our supplemental experiment are commensurate 
with our Kalman filter model predictions from this experiment and consistent with our initial findings 
in relation to serial dependency. Model fitted Kalman gains at or close to one again predicted very 
little or no serial dependency and no significant differences in regression slope coefficients between 
our peripheral and central conditions. This is exactly what was observed with peripheral (M= -0.020, 
SE=0.01) & central (M=0.01, SE=0.01), t (4) = -1.859, p=0.137. Upper and lower bound 95% 
confidence intervals were peripheral condition CI [0.01, -0.08] and central condition CI [0.04, -0.02]. 
It is worth noting two aspects of our data in this analysis. In this experiment, if anything we get even 
less serial dependence than in our previous experiments with a randomly presented stimuli and again 
we appear to observe a very slight ‘negative’ serial dependence or a repulsion effect in both peripheral 
and central conditions which can be observed in figure 18 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Supplemental serial dependency error versus relative orientation plots. We again fail 
to replicate Fischer & Whitney (2014) with results consistent with our initial findings that report no 
serial dependency. Both the peripheral and central condition report regression slope coefficients 
actually very slightly below zero.   
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3.7. Discussion and conclusion. 
The current experimental chapter set out with very well defined goals with clear experimental 
hypotheses. We hypothesised that the magnitude of serial dependence is adaptively modulated by the 
ratio of proximal and distal variance in our stimulus and commensurate to the level of Kalman gain. 
Based on the overall findings, we found this hypothesis to be correct and our results over all are 
entirely consistent with ideas of predictive coding’s ideas of precision weighting of prediction errors 
and well modelled by the Kalman filter. Furthermore, aside from what can be considered a novel 
overall finding within a well-defined theory our methods also provide some interesting techniques that 
could be used in future studies that examine serial effects and predictive coding. However, the study 
does raise some interesting issues that require further explanation. Not least, the failure to replicate 
Fischer & Whitney (2014). We now discuss our study beginning with the validity of our methods.  
General methods 
Perhaps the most important and indeed interesting aspect of our methods was the way we provided a 
measure of proximal variance and the implications it produced. To reliably calculate Kalman gain a 
measure of this quantity is required. While distal variance was pre-set in both experiments and a 
known quantity, proximal variance is more difficult to measure as it is very much participant specific 
and difficult to quantify. Indeed, perhaps for this reason other papers that have linked the Kalman 
filter with how estimation errors are weighted have commonly ignored the part of the equation for 
Kalman gain that requires a figure for measurement variance (Burr & Cicchini, 2014; Cicchini et al., 
2016). However, although potentially problematic, significant and consistent results from our 
proximal variance calibration experiment showed that our manipulation of contrast and our analysis 
methods in this regard were successful. Crucially, in all participants, the variance of fitted cumulative 
psychometric functions was higher in the 5% contrast condition than the 20% contrast condition 
indicating a more variable internal measurement of the 5% contrast condition than the 20% contrast 
condition. 
There are a number interesting features of the data provided by our proximal variance experiment. 
One is simply just how good vision is. In the 20% contrast condition all participants recorded a low 
level of proximal variance. This indicated that they could all see the stimulus well and respond 
accurately to the orientation. Given that we used noise masks that are known to make the perception 
of a stimulus more variable (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000) and overall the appearance of the stimuli 
was qualitatively not totally clear this was somewhat surprising. Even in the 5% contrast condition, in 
which it must be said was very hard to see the stimulus, some participants were still actually quite 
good at judging the orientations. Our proximal variance figures also quantified how vital raising the 
level of proximal variance over the level of distal variance is for allowing predictions to be more 
useful than the current input. Our figures showed that in experiment one, distal variance was much 
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larger than proximal variance and here Kalman gains were all close to one indicating that we would 
not expect to observe any input of past information and this is exactly what we observed. In 
experiment two, we reduced the level of distal variance drastically (from 2700 deg2 to 133 deg2). This 
meant that for most participants their proximal variance was higher than the distal variance. Only 
when this occurred, did we observe any serial dependence. Proximal variance figures also show just 
how hard it is to reduce the level of distal variance below that of proximal variance. In experiment 
two, we had to make our stimulus sequence highly correlated and our stimulus bordering on the 
invisible to reduce proximal variance below distal variance. Finally, our proximal variance figures can 
be considered to be reasonably accurate if a little high. We can ascertain this from experiment two. 
This is because the predicted Kalman gains of 0.62 (5% contrast) and 0.83 (20% contrast) predicted 
more serial dependence than we actually observed. In fact the model fitted Kalman gains which had 
higher Kalman gains 0.74 (5% contrast) & 1.02 (20% contrast) were a better predictor of serial 
dependence. Overall, it could be considered that our methods for introducing and estimating proximal 
variance, while not perfect are a useful means to quantify uncertainty and could be applied in many 
areas of visual research that study the effects of uncertainty including predictive coding and serial 
dependence.  
An additional aspect of our methods that represents an advancement on many previous predictive 
coding studies is the insertion of predictability into our stimulus sequences. Previous predictive 
coding studies have largely used cues or associative type relationships to induce predictability (Kok, 
Jehee, & de Lange, 2012a; Kok & Turk-Browne, 2018; Summerfield & Egner, 2009; Summerfield & 
Koechlin, 2008). In these studies trials are statistically independent from each other and indeed follow 
the randomly presented type of trial sequence in we used in experiment one. However, in experiment 
two we changed this to make trials statistically dependent to some extent on one another by inserting a 
Gaussian random walk into the trial sequence. A Gaussian random walk is a one dimensional markov 
process in which the value at one time point is conditionally dependent on the previous time point. 
Although the aim of inserting the random walk was mainly to reduce distal variability, in predictive 
coding theory, the nature of the internal models is such that they represent conditional relationships 
between events and stimuli over time (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Thornton, 2014). The fact that we 
observed differences in behaviour indicating use of past trial history when trials were correlated 
(serial dependence) supports these ideas and the increased use of statistically dependent trials in future 
experiments. Indeed, this is an area in which the current thesis expands upon in chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
Modelling analyses. 
The use of trial sequential regularities is key to one of the two models we used in the current study, 
namely the Kalman filter which was able to predict well the magnitude of serial dependence we 
observed. Predicted Kalman gains, based on proximal variance calibration figures for experiment two 
were 0.62 for the 5% contrast and 0.83 for the 20% contrast. Model fitted Kalman gains were 0.74 for 
the 5% and 1 for the 20% condition. The difference in Kalman gains for the 20% between models 
fitted gains and predicted Kalman gains is an interesting aspect of our data which could mean that two 
different predictions about the magnitude of serial dependence in the 20% contrast condition were 
possible. According to the model fitted gains that produced a gain of 1 we would not expect to see any 
integration of previous stimulus values but according to on the gain level of 0.83 derived from the 
proximal variance calibration experiment we might expect to see an influence of previous stimulus 
values in participants judgments of stimulus orientations in our integration analyses. Results from our 
serial dependence analysis supported data from our model fitted Kalman gains. In the 5% contrast 
condition we observed regression slope coefficients of 0.21 while in the 20% contrast condition a 
coefficient of zero was produced. As we have mentioned, this may be due to an over estimation of 
proximal variance in our proximal variance experiment. In summary both predicted and model fitted 
Kalman gains provided reasonable predictors of serial dependence with model fitted Kalman gains 
more accurate. This result was also commensurate with results from our model fitted weights which 
predicted serial dependence to n back trials to a certain extent. 
Model fitted weights predicted the level of serial dependence to n back trials in both experiment one 
and two. In experiment one, model fitted weights of at or close to one for both the 5% and 20% 
contrast predicted no serial dependence to any of the 6 included n back trials. This is exactly what was 
observed. We found no serial dependence to any analysed trial. For experiment two, though another 
outcome was predicted. In experiment two, model fitted weights indicated that we would observe 
serial dependence in the 5% contrast condition stretching back three trials and again that we would 
observe no serial dependence in the 20% contrast condition. Again, our modelling analysis was 
broadly correct. We did not observe any serial dependence in the 20% contrast condition but did 
record it in the 5% contrast condition and in fact recorded serial dependence to the previous six trials 
degrading as a function of time. This aspect of our results was consistent with previous serial 
dependence studies (Bliss et al., 2017; Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Liberman et al., 2016) to some 
extent but as we did not observe any serial dependence in the 20% contrast condition does flag some 
important questions in regard to our general findings in regard to serial dependence literature.  
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Serial dependence, predictive coding and a failure to replicate Fischer & Whitney (2014). 
Findings from our analysis of serial dependence support a predictive coding account of temporal 
integration. Although we cannot be certain the adaptive weighting observed in the current study 
applies to prediction errors, as we do not have access to the underlying activity of the brain, results all 
point to a predictive coding account of precision weighting. When stimuli are more uncertain and 
contain at least some amount of predictability, participants responses exhibited integration of past 
stimulus history. This result is broadly consistent with more recent findings indicating that serial 
dependence is modulated by viewing conditions in the form of distance to the foveal repression 
although again we did not observe such an effect (Fritsche, Mostert, & de Lange, 2017) and 
probabilistic information in trial sequences (Bergen & Jehee, 2019) which can be considered proximal 
and distal variance related respectively. Importantly, this was not observed during experiment one 
which presented random orientations.  
Our interpretation of why we find no serial dependence to randomly changing stimuli is that quite 
simply with a randomly changing stimulus there are no relationships in the stimulus sequence for the 
brain to model. In this case, and what happens in predictive coding and the Kalman filter is that the 
current prediction error should be weighted to its full extent as the past carries no useful information. 
In this case, we would expect responses to be at the current trial orientation and observe no serial 
dependence. While we do not actually measure how error is corrected per se in this experiment our 
data fits this explanation more than that provided by the fixed weighting account of simple perceptual 
averaging. Of course, the Kalman filter does apply a type of averaging but it is also reliant on the level 
of proximal and distal variance and the input of model based information and importantly is adaptive. 
However, despite the support from both our modelling and serial dependence analyses our results flag 
a serious issue in that we failed to replicate Fischer & Whitney (2014). 
There are a number of potential reasons why we did not replicate Fischer & Whitney (2014). One 
reason may due to the individual nature of serial dependence we observed in relation to the small 
number of participants Fischer & Whitney (2014) tested. In our experiments, some participants were 
responses were almost always serially dependent while others seemed never to be serially dependent. 
While Fischer & Whitney (2014) tested 12 different participants in total, in all of their individual 
experiments they only tested 4 participants. If those four participants had been what we could 
consider high proximal variance observers, that we have shown tend to exhibit higher levels of serial 
dependence, this may explain at least some of the discrepancy between results. However, this would 
not explain their reporting of serial dependency for a random stimulus which we certainly did not 
observe. An explanation for this is that Fischer & Whitney (2014) stimuli produced a much higher 
level of proximal variance that could have produced serial dependence to a random stimulus but this 
is questioned as we did carry out a more direct replication that again failed to replicate. Finally, a 
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potential explanation is that participants used by Fischer & Whitey (2014) had a different underlying 
model of the stimulus and task demands. In some predictive coding models, there exists not only an 
model of the stimulus behaviour but also of the task structure (Friston, 2010). It is possible that the 
four participants tested by Fischer & Whiney (2014) when faced with a random stimulus did not 
followed a non optimal strategy and integrate across trials even though this would potentially lead to 
increased error.  
Negative serial dependence or repulsion effects. 
One final issue of our data to mention that lacks clear explanation is the existence of small amounts of 
negative serial dependence in some participants responses. Initially, we felt that this was an unreliable 
or random effect related to chance with a limited number of trials and the way orientations were 
presented in experiment one. To clarify, in experiment one, when presented with a random series of 
orientations, it may have been possible that participants simply responded to the current orientation 
with some error that could randomly have been towards the previous trial or away from the previous 
trial. If there were simply more responses away from the current trial orientation then this would 
appear as a repulsion effect but was in reality due to the random nature of orientation and associated 
responses with a limited number of trials. However, as we again observed such an effect in 
experiment two when orientations were heavily correlated and on n back trials this perhaps this 
explanation is perhaps not sufficient. An alternate explanation forward in the literature is that 
repulsion effects observed in serial dependence may be related to adaptation after effects. 
While adaptation effects are usually observed after longer stimulus exposure (Kohn, 2007) than in the 
current experiment some previous studies have also reported it effects following sub second exposure 
lasting for several seconds (Fritsche et al., 2017; Kanai, et al., 2007). These studies attribute the 
finding to an interaction between perceptual and higher level post perceptual memory processes in 
which a memory trace causes a negative aftereffect on perception. However, in such studies the 
negative aftereffect was only observed in situations when trials had broad confidence intervals 
indicating low confidence in the perception of the stimuli. However, we find the opposite and observe 
more negative effects in the more visible 20% contrast condition to which participants were much 
more accurate in their response. Furthermore, this account would not explain why we seem to observe 
such individual variability in the level of repulsion effects. Overall, we must say, at present we cannot 
explain the reason for the negative serial dependence we observe and is worthy of further 
investigation.  
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Conclusion. 
There are what can be considered three important results from chapter 3. First, temporal integration 
appears tuned to the variability of sensory measurements (proximal variance) and the behaviour of the 
stimuli of interest (distal variance). When proximal variance was higher relative to distal variance 
participants perceptual estimates were closer to previous stimulus values and when distal variance was 
higher relative to proximal variance estimates were closer to current stimulus values. Secondly, serial 
dependence is adaptive. In contrast to previous characterizations of the phenomena (Fischer, & 
Whitney, 2014), it is not pervasive functioning at a fixed level and instead adapts to level of 
variability in the behaviour of stimuli (distal variance) and the reliability of the observation of the 
stimulus in question (proximal variance) more consistent with ideas from Bayesian visou-motor 
literature (Denève, Duhamel, & Pouget, 2007; Knill & Pouget, 2007; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & 
Jordan, 1995;Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Lastly, while predictive information does play a role in our 
results we found temporal integration strongly favours the current stimulus input over previous 
information. Despite designing a stimulus that was extremely hard to see, it was very difficult to 
observe the effects of past stimulus history in participants estimates until we greatly reduced distal 
variance. Overall, results favour the predictive coding account of temporal integration with some 
caveats over the strength of the role of predictive information on perception except under very 
uncertain conditions. 
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Chapter 4. Adaptive correction of response error-The Kalman 
filter and step response functions. 
4.1 Abstract. 
Predictive coding rests upon the idea that the brain is constantly predicting the nature and origin of its 
incoming signals based on a system of internal probabilistic models. To maintain the behavioural 
validity of its internal models and the predictions generated, the brain relies on errors or prediction 
errors and between predictions and sensory information. Crucially, to understand how prediction 
errors mediate predictions it is important to consider how prediction errors should be weighted in 
relation to previous predictions and sensory inputs. If sensory information is underweighted the 
weight attached to prediction errors will be too low. This can lead to an over reliance on predictive 
information from the past making perceptions too slow to correct to change in the world. 
Alternatively, if sensory information is weighted too heavily the weight attached to prediction errors 
will be too high. In this case the weight attached to previous predictions will be too low making 
prediction errors overly sensitive to noise and other unimportant factors. Theoretically, obtaining the 
correct weighting corresponds to optimizing the Kalman gain in the Kalman filter. The general 
relationship between Kalman gain and error correction is that when Kalman gain is closer to one 
prediction errors are weighted more heavily, causing estimates to update faster. Alternatively, with a 
Kalman gain closer to zero prediction errors are weighted less heavily casing estimates to update more 
slowly. Previously, in chapter three, we provided general support for this idea by showing that serial 
dependence in perceptual estimates was adaptive to the ratio of proximal and distal variance and 
commensurate to the level of associated Kalman gain but this method concentrated on testing the 
adaptive versus fixed nature of perception as opposed to error correction per se. Here as a means to 
test further the idea of adaptive weighting of prediction error in a more direct way we manipulate 
proximal and distal variance in four conditions which use a step response type experimental design 
widely used in control theory to test the way estimating systems adapt error correction to sudden 
change (condition 1, 18.6 °step/5% contrast, condition 2, 18.6° step/ 20% contrast, condition 3, 35.7 ° 
step/5% contrast and condition four 35.7 ° step 20% contrast). We test the Kalman filter account of 
error correction against the fixed weighted average account at an individual and group level. At an 
individual level we examined the general relationship between proximal variance recorded in a 
separate proximal variance calibration experiment and Kalman gain. While results were not 
significant we did find a moderate negative correlation between proximal variance and Kalman gain 
that invites further investigation. At the group level we did observe highly significant results between 
proximal and distal variance conditions on Kalman gain thus supporting the predictive coding account 
of prediction error weighting and correction.  
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4.2 Introduction.  
Classical theories of perception paint vision as a mainly passive process in which we receive input 
from the world and process information contained within these inputs as information travels from 
lower to higher visual regions and respond accordingly (Searle, 2015; Warren, 2012). While this 
view, was and is, still very prominent it does not adequately account for findings indicating that 
perceptions is also perhaps as much influenced by our previous experience and internal states as 
sensory information directly from the world. Historical ideas, such as analysis by synthesis (for a 
review see Yuille & Kersten, 2006) and perception as hypothesis testing (Helmholtz, 1863; Gregory, 
1970) offered broad explanations of how past information influences perception but they were 
somewhat separated in both theoretical viewpoints and time. More recently, these ideas have been 
combined and formalised in modern day neuroscience by models of predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 
1999; Friston, 2012). The main idea of predictive coding is that a series of internal models of the 
external environment work to generate predictions about the most likely cause of incoming sensory 
inputs and neural activity patterns. Any errors between predictions and sensory inputs produce 
prediction errors which signal to the brain that something in the world might have changed and it 
should update its internal model. However, the key words to highlight in that sentence though are 
‘might have changed’. Because sensory information contains varying levels of noise and external 
stimuli exhibiting fluctuating levels of change applying a blanket weight to each prediction error 
would not be an optimal behavioural strategy and a way to determine the reliability of prediction 
errors is required.  
How to weight prediction errors? 
Determining the optimal way to weight for weighting prediction error is perhaps the most important 
aspect of predictive coding. According to predictive models, such as the free energy principle 
(Friston, 2002; 2018), if the weight attached to sensory information is too low then prediction errors 
might not be weighted sufficiently potentially leading to an over reliance on predictive information. 
This can lead to an over emphasis on past information and make perceptual judgments too slow to 
correct to change in the world. Alternatively, if we attach too high a weight to potentially unreliable 
sensory input the brain might attach too high a weight to our prediction errors. This could lead to an 
over reliance on potentially unreliable sensory information making perceptual judgments too quick to 
correct errors when a real change may not have occurred. In predictive coding literature, there are a 
number of individual models (O’Shaughnessy, 1988; Rao, 1999; Friston, 2010; Spratling, 2015) 
which provide differing explanations of how prediction errors are weighted for reliability in different 
circumstances in a number of visual modalities. However, to date there is no accepted tractable 
computational account of predictive coding that explains the way prediction errors are weighted in the 
visual temporal domain.  
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Adaptive versus fixed correction of estimation error-Ideas for experimental design from control 
theory- Step response function in conjunction with the Kalman filter and fixed weighed average 
models. 
If the brain does use prediction error as means to update perceptions then in practical terms only 
accurately weighted prediction errors are relevant. Exactly how to ensure that weighting is accurate is 
by no means a problem confined to neuroscience. In Engineering and control theory, obtaining the 
correct weighting is identical to optimizing the Kalman gain in the Kalman filter as we have outlined 
in chapters 2 and 3. In the Kalman filter, when prediction variance is higher in relation to proximal 
variance a Kalman gain closer to one is produced. With a Kalman gain closer to one, prediction errors 
are weighted as more reliable and predictions update to a larger amount of the size of the prediction 
error. Alternately, when proximal variance is larger than prediction variance a lower Kalman gain 
closer to zero is produced. When Kalman gain is closer to zero prediction errors are considered less 
reliable and predictions update by a lesser amount of the prediction error. Of course, predictive 
coding’s ideas about prediction errors are not the only way that the brain could update perception and 
correct error and the Kalman filter is not the only model by which this updating might occur. 
In ideas of perceptual averaging and the related phenomena termed serial dependence (Fischer & 
Whitney, 2014), the concept of prediction error does not exist adaptive or otherwise. Serial 
dependence literature generally implies a simple stimulus averaging strategy we discussed in chapters 
2 and 3. This strategy is identical to that performed in fixed weighted average models used in signal 
processing which provides our comparative integration model to the Kalman filter. In fixed weighted 
average models estimates updating occurs each time a new stimulus value is recorded and is 
independent of proximal and distal variance and the magnitude of Kalman gain. In summary, in fixed 
weighted average models all estimates contain at least some past stimulus history and updating occurs 
independently and regardless of stimulus or viewing conditions.  
Previously, we examined the adaptive versus fixed weighting of prediction errors by behaviourally 
testing and modelling serial dependence with the Kalman filter (Kalman & Bucy, 1963) as our 
predictive coding model and the fixed weighted average model as our perceptual averaging model. 
This approach was successful in terms of providing support consistent with predictive coding’s 
general adaptive weighting strategy. However, Fischer & Whitney’s (2014) experimental paradigm 
while excellent for examining serial dependence, due to the way stimuli are usually presented and the 
way serial dependence is calculated means it is not the best medium to look at how error is reduced 
over time in a direct way. Serial dependence experiments commonly present stimuli in a way in which 
values either change randomly over time or are counter balanced between small numbers of values 
that change on every presentation (Corbett, Fischer, & Whitney, 2011; Fischer & Whitney, 2014). 
Because values change on every presentation it means that it is hard to see how estimation errors 
might reduce over time as they make multiple predictions and stimulus comparisons of repeated 
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values. Furthermore, serial dependence is considered as a bias towards previous values and calculated 
based on the error on the current response compared to previous stimulus values. This means the 
emphasis is always on the past rather than new stimulus values that are immediately relevant to 
behaviour. In predictive coding, the emphasis is not on the past but on reducing error in current and 
future predictions. With these issues in mind, perhaps a better experimental medium to observe how 
error is reduced to towards current values comes from ideas about step response functions.  
The step response function-what is it, terminology and motivation  
Step response functions are widely used in control theory for understanding the way estimating 
systems respond under different conditions. In technical terms, the step response function is the 
temporal response behaviour of the outputs of a general system such as a temporal filter or another 
estimator when the current inputs provided to it change suddenly and then stabilize (see Zumbahlen 
(2008) for an overview of the step response function and related terminology and figure 1 below for 
an illustration), (we actually used a step response function as an example of the response properties of 
both the fixed weighted average and Kalman filter models in chapter 2. In more basic terms, the step 
response function shows how a system reacts to a stimulus that remains stable for a time, jumps in 
value for an approximately equal time and then steps back to its original value. By presenting stimulus 
values that contain distinct stable and changing phases of equal length we aim to show how estimation 
error to current stimulus values reduces under different stimulus conditions in a more illustrative way 
than methods which present stimuli that change on every presentation and mainly look at the 
relationship to past values (see figure 2). 
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Figure 1 Step response function (A) & Extrapolation and application of the step response as a 
measure of the rate of error correction and time taken to reduce error to zero in humans (B). In 
sub figure A Here we see a basic step response function. Here the impulse values of the incoming 
signal in stimuli start at 0 for 15 seconds and then suddenly change to 50 and then remain at 50 for 
another 15 seconds before going back to 0 for the last fifteen seconds. Here we see the ‘step response 
function’ of a hypothetical filter model to the time behaviour of the impulses. The interesting points 
here are the time taken to reach maximum value often called ‘rise time’ and the time taken for the 
filter to reduce error to zero which is often called ‘steady state’ which provide useful terms in thinking 
about how humans might respond to change and reduce error in perceptual estimates. Sub figure B 
shows how we can translate the step response function to the way humans might correct error when 
responding to sudden steps in stimulus value. The impulse can be simply switched to being 
considered as a stimulus input, rise time can be considered the rate to which humans might respond to 
a sudden change in stimulus value and how they might weight the reliability of the stimulus on each 
input while steady state being considered as when the human estimate finally reached the true 
stimulus value.  
Previous studies have utilised ideas about step response functions to good effect in a number of areas 
of the literature. One area of visual literature that has long used step response function type paradigms 
to understand aspects how perceptual systems respond to change is smooth pursuit eye movements 
(Carl & Gellman, 1987; Robinson, 1965). Smooth pursuit is one of the two ways the eye can 
voluntarily shift gaze (the other being saccades) which only occurs during the movement of the head 
and acts as a stabilising mechanism when viewing stationary objects (Thier & Ilg, 2005). The type of 
step response paradigms used in smooth pursuit commonly involve step changes in the velocity of a 
stimulus participants are asked to track (Carl & Gellman, 1987; Ono & Mustari, 2008; Robinson, 
1965). Such step paradigms have seen wide utility and while a different type of task and stimulus then 
we intend to use in the current chapter such experiments illustrate the way sudden changes in stimulus 
value are a useful means to understand the way the visual system deals with change and error.  
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The use of a step change in velocity in smooth pursuit experiments has revealed a number of 
interesting findings about the phenomena which in some cases are similar to the aims of the current 
chapter. For example, step velocity paradigms have shown that smooth pursuit is modulated by an 
adaptive gain mechanism sensitive to measurement noise and the magnitude of the step in velocity 
(Brostek, Eggert, & Glasauer, 2017; Nuding et al., 2009; Tavassoli & Ringach, 2009). Studies using 
step velocity paradigms have also reported that after repeated exposure to steps in value smooth 
pursuit changes velocity and effectively starts to predict the step change and offering a way to 
ascertain how the brain learns to anticipate changes to reduce error in eye movements (Barnes & 
Asselman, 1991; Braun, Boman, & Hotson, 1996; Fukushima, Fukushima, Warabi, & Barnes, 2013; 
Zambrano, Falotico, Manfredi, & Laschi, 2010). Such findings, although present in a separate area of 
visual perception provide relevant findings to the current chapters experiment and importantly provide 
validity to the use of step response experimental designs in the study of visual perceptions. However, 
although interesting they are found in a completely different perceptual domain very early in visual 
processing and may not apply to more complex visual tasks involving a later perceptual estimate task. 
Perhaps a different area of the literature that makes use of step response experimental designs in a 
more similar way to our aims is visou-motor recalibration.  
Burge Ernst & Banks (2008) examined the way reaching errors are corrected under the term 
‘visuomotor recalibration’ using a step response type experimental design alongside ideas from the 
Kalman filter. Burge Ernst & Banks (2008) wanted to test how measurement noise and changes in the 
perceived position (mapping) of a stimuli affected the way participants adapted to changes in the 
value of the stimulus over a number of experiments. In experiment one, the aim was to investigate 
whether stimulus measurement reliability affected adaptation rate. Participants were asked to hold a 
stylus on a graphics tablet in which the hand and tablet were hidden from view. A target stimulus was 
presented at a random position for 500ms. The task of the participant was to try and match the point 
of the stylus to the position of the target stimulus on the tablet. Upon touching the stylus on the tablet 
the participants were given feedback (in the form of a Gaussian blob superimposed on a dashed circle) 
as to how accurate they were based on the difference between target and feedback location which was 
designed to provide a reference point as to how much participants should recalibrate the on the next 
trial. The reliability of feedback was manipulated by blurring the Gaussian blob in two conditions 
(σ=4°x4° & 24x24°). During the first sixty trials feedback stayed the same relative to the target but on 
the 61st trial the feedback ‘stepped’ 8.2° up and to the right (5.8° horizontally and 5.8° vertically) 
relative to the pre-step mapping, as indicated by the offset between the dashed circle and Gaussian 
blob while on the 121st trial feedback reverted to the original pre step position. The way participants 
corrected error following the step in feedback values in experiment one study revealed some 
interesting parallels with the Kalman filter. 
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Under the principles of the Kalman filter, when the stimulus measurement (proximal variance) is 
uncertain the adaption rate to a change in stimulus value should be slower than when it is more 
certain. This is exactly what was observed during the trials after the feedback stepped in position. In 
the 4° x 4° blur condition which provided a more concise appearing feedback measure, error reduced 
considerably quicker towards zero than the more blurred appearing 24x24° blur condition, in which 
error correction exhibited what can be considered a slower rise time and never achieved steady state 
during the 60 trials of the step phase. However, while interesting the manipulation of measurement 
variability alone can only partially test the ideas of the Kalman filter and to be sure that lagged error 
correction is not simply down to a more simple averaging type strategy than that proposed in the 
Kalman filter manipulation of distal variance is required. This was carried out in experiment two of 
the study. 
Experiment two of the study, switched from looking only at what might be thought of proximal 
variance under Kalman filter terminology to examining both proximal and what could be termed 
distal variance (which they call mapping uncertainty). To do this, Burge Ernst & Banks (2008) asked 
participants to carry out an identical task to that in experiment one but introduced random walks of 
different standard deviations into the relationship between the reach endpoint of the stylus and the 
visual feedback position in addition to step in presentation of feedback and again manipulated the blur 
of the Gaussian blobs. This meant the experiment had four conditions that each had different 
combinations of what can be thought of as proximal and distal variance levels. Condition one had low 
distal variance and high proximal variance (σ walk = 0.9° × 0.9°; σ blur = 24° × 24°), condition two 
had high distal and high proximal variance (σ walk = 2.5° × 2.5°, σ blur = 24° × 24°), condition three 
had low distal and low proximal and low distal variance (σ walk = 0.9° × 0.9°, σ blur = 4° × 4°) while 
condition four had high distal and low proximal variance (σ walk = 2.5° × 2.5°, σ blur = 4° × 4°). This 
more complete manipulation made it possible to make more specific predictions about the potential 
nature of the way errors might be corrected than in experiment one.  
If the Kalman filter approximated the response of participants then each of the four conditions should 
have in theory produced different levels of Kalman gain and therefore different rates of error 
correction. For example, condition four with high distal and low proximal variance would lead to the 
calculation of the highest level of Kalman gain and correct error fastest while condition one with low 
distal and high proximal variance should lead to the calculation of the lowest level of Kalman gain 
and correct error at the slowest rate. Condition two (high proximal and high distal) and condition three 
(low proximal and low distal) should calculate Kalman gains somewhere in the middle and correct 
error accordingly. Alternatively, if the fixed weighted average model account of error correction is 
correct then there should have been no difference in error correction strategy between conditions with 
rates being the same for all conditions. Results provided support for the Kalman filter like behaviour 
in participant’s responses over the fixed weighted average account of error updating. 
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Results from Burge Ernst & Banks (2008) were almost entirely consistent with Kalman filter theory 
and provide good validity for the application of step response experimental designs in vision. The 
slowest to correct to adapt to step in feedback mapping was the high proximal and low distal variance 
condition one while the fastest was indeed condition four which has the lowest blur and the highest 
variance in the random walk. Conditions two and three were also as predicted by the Kalman filter in 
the middle in terms of rate of adaption. Such results run counter to the fixed weighted average account 
of error correction in that the levels of measurements and perceived stimulus variability played a 
strong role in the way subjects adapted to change. If participants were attaching an equal weight to all 
of the stimulus inputs then this effect would not have been observed. Such results and the excellent 
use of a step response inspired paradigm provide good support for the application of experimental 
designs in purely visual experiments and we combine and build upon these ideas in our current 
experiments.  
4.2.1 Theoretical motivation and hypotheses  
One potential explanatory model that tells us how we should weight prediction errors is the Kalman 
filter where establishing the optimal weighting is provided by the Kalman gain. In the Kalman filter, 
Kalman gain adapts to the ratio between proximal and prediction variance largely modulated by 
change in the world (distal variance). Evidence for Kalman filter like behaviour has been observed in 
the correction of visou-motor errors (Berniker & Kording, 2011; Denève, Duhamel, & Pouget, 2007; 
Wei & Körding, 2010; Zylberberg, Pouget, Latham, & Shea-Brown, 2017) and may translate well to 
explaining error correction in visual terms. However, in perceptual averaging literature the updating 
process is based on fixed weighting of stimulus values observed over time (Fischer & Whitney, 2014; 
Liberman et al., 2014). Here, as in chapter three we perform a proximal variance calibration and then 
test the Kalman filter and fixed weighted average model by incorporating experimental ideas from 
Burge Ernst & Banks (2008) and a stimulus design from Fischer & Whitney (2014) with those behind 
the use of step response functions in control theory. We aim to build in steps of varying size into the 
presented orientations of our Gabor stimuli over trials in a similar way to Burge Ernst & Banks (2008) 
and manipulate the measurement variability of our stimulus but here we manipulate contrast instead 
of blur. Based on these theoretical ideas and motivations we can provide hypotheses at a sub group 
level where we aim to assess the relationship between proximal variance and error correction in high 
and low proximal variance observes and at a group level where we examine the level of Kalman gain 
which acts as a proxy measure for error correction under different levels of proximal and distal 
variance. 
At a sub group level, if the Kalman filter account of error correction is correct then participants with 
higher levels of proximal variance should show a larger negative relationship with Kalman gain than 
participants who have lower levels of proximal variance. This is because in the calculation for 
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Kalman gain (see chapter 2) as proximal variance increases Kalman gain goes down as sensory 
information is considered unreliable. At the group level, we can hypothesise that in conditions with 
lower distal variance relative to proximal variance we will record higher Kalman gains and observe 
faster error correction to changes in stimuli.  
4.3 Methods 
Ethics 
All calibration and experimental procedures were approved by the University of St Andrews Teaching 
and Research Ethics Committee. All participants gave informed consent. 
Stimuli design software and presentation details 
In all experimental and calibration procedures visual stimuli were created in MATLAB (The 
Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA) and presented using PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997).  
4.3.1. Proximal variance calibration experiment. 
In order to provide an estimate of proximal variance we first undertake a proximal variance 
calibration experiment. This experiment aims to quantify proximal variance in both our proximal 
variance conditions (5% and 20% contrast) for application in calculating Kalman gain 
Participants  
A total of eleven participants undertook the proximal variance calibration experiment. (7 females, 
mean age 22, range 19-43). Participants had not taken part in any previous experiments and were 
recruited as volunteers from the St Andrews SONA database. 
Trial numbers and experimental blocks 
Over trials Gabor orientations were presented in pairs in which the second Gabor was presented at 8 
different orientations +/- (clockwise or anti clockwise) from the first Gabor in the pair. These were 1°, 
3.33°, 5.66°, 8°, 10°, 12, 15° & 60°. Each block presented 5 trials at every orientation difference in 
both contrast conditions (5% and 20%) giving 40 trials per condition and 80 trials per block. 
Participants completed 3 blocks giving 240 trials in total. All Gabor patches had a radius of 8 visual 
degrees and had a spatial frequency 0.5 cycles per visual degrees and were positioned centrally. Noise 
following Gabors is also Gaussian white noise (SD=15.5 cd/m2) and covered the whole screen with a 
spatial frequency of 0.15 cycles per visual degree. Stimuli were viewed at a distance at 57 cm. 
Fixations were also positioned centrally (see figure 3 for an illustration of our stimulus design and 
procedure). 
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Figure 2. Proximal variance calibration experimental design and procedure. Each trial began 
with the presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 250 ms. Then a randomly 
oriented Gabor patch was presented for 500ms at 5% or 20% contrast depending on the condition then 
a noise mask for 500ms. Next, a second Gabor was presented at one of 8 different angles ranging 
from 0-15° (1°, 3.33°, 5.66°, 8°, 10°, 12° , 15° & 60°) anti clock wise or clock wise from the first 
Gabor orientation and then a second noise mask for 500ms. The task of the participant was to fixate 
on the fixation cross and then discriminate whether the orientation of the second Gabor was clock 
wise or anti clock wise of the first Gabor orientation. This was signalled by pressing j for clock wise 
and f for anti-clock wise 
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4.3.2 Main experiment-testing the rate of error correction under different levels of proximal and 
distal variance over fours conditions. 
Our main experiment aimed to manipulate proximal and distal variance in four conditions. We based 
this experiment on Burge, Ernst and Bank’s (2008) experiments and observe the effects of each 
manipulation on the rate of error correction to steps in stimulus orientations of different sizes using 
Fischer & Whitney (2011) orientation judgment paradigm. Stimuli were Gabor patches. Gabor 
patches had a radius of 8 visual degrees and had a spatial frequency 0.5 cycles per visual degree. 
Noise following Gabors is also Gaussian white noise (SD=15.5 cd/m2) and covered the whole screen. 
The basic design and task is illustrated below (figure 4) before the experimental conditions for the 
manipulation of proximal and distal variance are provided 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Experimental stimuli in main experiments-design and procedure. Each trial began with 
the presentation of a blank screen (inter trial interval) for 250ms. Next a Gabor patch was shown in 
the centre of the screen for 500 ms, then a noise patch was presented for 500ms then an adjustment 
response bar was presented. The task of the participant was to move the adjustment response bar to try 
and match the orientation of the Gabor they had just observed. 
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Participants  
The same eleven participants who undertook our proximal variance calibration also undertook our 
main experiment. 
Experimental conditions. 
Condition one. Low distal variance and high proximal variance  
In condition one, we aimed to produce low distal variance and high proximal variance. This was 
performed by presenting stimuli orientations in a step response function which was 18.6 degrees 
presented at 5% contrast. We chose 18.6° as it was 4 times the just noticeable difference (JND) of 
4.65° observed in our proximal variance calibration experiment.  
Condition two. Low distal variance and low proximal variance 
In condition two, we aimed to produce low distal variance and low proximal variance. This was 
performed by presenting stimuli which stepped by 18.6 degrees and presented at 20% contrast 
Condition three. High distal variance and high proximal variance. 
In condition three, we aimed to produce high distal variance and high proximal variance. This was 
performed by presenting stimuli in a step response function which was 35.7 degrees presented at 5% 
contrast. 35.7 degrees was chosen as it was approximately 8 times the just noticeable difference (JND) 
of 4.65° observed in our 2AFC calibration procedure and 100% larger than the 18.6 degree step used 
in conditions one and two making for a logical comparison.  
Condition four. High distal variance and low proximal variance 
In condition four, we aimed to produce high distal variance and low proximal variance. This was 
performed by presenting stimuli in which the step size is 35.7 degrees and Gabors presented at 20% 
contrast. 
Experimental blocking, trial order and numbers. 
Conditions were presented in randomized blocks. Each block consisted of 45 trials which were broken 
down into three phases to comprise 3 steps and stabilization phases which were made up of 15 trials 
each (see figure 5 below). The first trial was a randomly presented oriented Gabor (0-360°). This 
initial trial orientation is repeated five times. On the sixth trial the orientation ‘steps’ in value by 18.6° 
or 35.7° depending on the condition and then the next four trials repeat this orientation then on the 
eleventh trial the orientation returns back to the originally presented orientation for a further 4 trials. 
At the end of this sequence of 15 trials another randomly chosen orientation and the whole step 
process begins again (see fig 5 for an example of the step response function). Participants completed 
six blocks of each condition over two one hour sessions which gave 1080 trials in total and crucially 
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allowed us to compare responses over 72 step and stabilization phases (1080/15) for each participant 
in each condition (see figure 5 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Stimulus step and stabilization phase illustration. Here we show how our stimulus 
behaves during the experiment for the two step sizes we use. Sub figure A shows the step function the 
low distal variance conditions (1&2) of 18.6 degrees. In this figure we see how the orientation starts at 
a randomly chosen orientation. This orientation repeats five times and then steps to a new orientation 
that is 18.6 degrees (plus or minus) of the previous orientation. The orientation then stabilizes at this 
orientation for five trials before returning to the original orientation for another five trial at which 
point a new orientation is selected and the process begins again. Sub figure B illustrates the high distal 
variance conditions (3&4) which follows the same process but in this case the step is larger at 35.7 
degrees. 
4.4 Analyses, statistical tests and equations. 
Correction for potential ambiguity in responses using circular stimuli. 
To correct for potentially erroneous recording of the orientations participants meant to choose we 
followed the same  minimum angle difference correction to used previously  n experiment three (see 
methods page 59) 
Proximal variance calibration calculations. 
To calculate proximal variance from our proximal calibration procedure we performed the same 
procedures and analysis as in chapter 3. To test for differences between contrast conditions we 
performed a Wilcoxon signed rank test as the data for proximal variance violated the assumption of 
normality required for parametric testing. We also report the coefficient of determination (r2) as a 
measure of the proportion of variance shared by the two contrast conditions. This is calculated by 
dividing the Z value produced by the test by the square root of number of participants.  
Correlations between proximal variance and Kalman gains at a sub group level. 
In our analysis of Kalman gain and error correction between low proximal variance observers and 
high proximal variance observers we want to look at the correlation between proximal variance from 
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our proximal variance calibration experiment and the rate of error correction to the step in stimulus 
values. In this analysis, we utilise model fitted Kalman gains as a measure of the rate of error 
correction (1 being instant correction and 0 being never correcting) and assess the correlation between 
proximal variance and Kalman gain. As the range of variability in the 20% contrast condition was 
very narrow with all but one participant reporting variances between 10 & 17 deg2 we felt it highly 
unlikely that we could observe any worthwhile correlational information from this data set. Therefore 
we only used the variance data from the 5% contrast condition which had a much larger range and 
offers a realistic opportunity to detect differences in correlations. As the 5% contrast variance data 
contained significant outliers the requirements the assumptions of parametric, Pearson r correlations 
are violated, therefore we use Spearman’s Rho correlation as a measure of the monotonic relationship 
between proximal variance and Kalman gain. Here we also make a note in regard to the limitations of 
the statistical power of our correlations in this instant and the related p values from such tests. We 
recognise that due to the small sample size in each of the high and low proximal observer participant 
sets (n=4) steps any correlations indicating a relationship may not have sufficient power to be reliable. 
The same problem potentially applies to p values indicating whether any such correlations are 
significant. However, while recognising these limitations, we contend they still represent a useful if 
perhaps more illustrative measure of the relationship between measurement variability and error 
correction for this experiment. 
Model fitted Kalman gains. 
We computationally modelled participant responses at a range of Kalman gains using the same least 
squares model fitting procedure we had used in experiment 3 (see methods page 60).  Again, it is 
important to reiterate that here Kalman gain is used as a measure of the rate of error correction to the 
step in stimulus values (1 being instant correction and 0 being never correcting). Our modelled 
analysis of Kalman gain produces a specific level of Kalman gain in each subject for each of our four 
conditions and therefore is suitable for statistical comparison. Statistical analysis of model fitted 
Kalman gains between conditions is carried out using paired sample t tests (Bonferroni-corrected). 
We report 95% confidence intervals of the mean. 
Model fitted weight to the current and previous six trials. 
As well as fitting Kalman gains to participant’s data we also modelled participant responses with a 
fixed weighted average simulation model by ‘best’ fitting weights from the preceding 6 trial 
orientations to the current participant response.  
Equations. 
Equations for both the Kalman filter and a fixed weighted average model which we use in the current 
chapter are fully outlined in chapter 2, pages 42-46. 
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Simulated results. 
Here we now provide a number of simulated step response function patterns we might observe in 
situations in which either a fixed weighted average model or Kalman filter most accurately describes 
our data.  
Fixed weighted average step response simulations. 
Below, in figure 6, we illustrate a number of step responses produced by a hypothetical fixed 
weighted average models with a weight of 0.5 to the current and previous (n-1) trial for each of our 
four experimental conditions. Sub figure A, shows a fixed weighted step response to condition one 
which has low distal and high proximal (18.6° step/5% contrast), sub figure B, shows how distal and 
low proximal variance condition two (18.6° step/20% contrast), the high distal and high proximal 
condition three (35.7° step/5% contrast) and the high distal and low proximal variance condition four. 
The key aspects in all of the above sub plots is that the rate in which the response corrects to the step 
and stabilization phases of the stimulus orientations is the same in all conditions. The estimate is 
always lagged in time, which while responsive to a certain extent, cannot adapt to suit clearer and 
more unstable conditions in which the stimuli changes by a larger amount. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Simulated step response function for the fixed weighted average model with a weight 
of 0.7 on the current trial and 0.3 on the previous (n-1) trial. Note in all sub figures noise is 
smoothed over but estimates of changing values are lagged in time.  
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Kalman filter step response simulations 
Here we provide a number of hypothetical step responses to our experimental conditions made by a 
Kalman filter under a number of different Kalman gains (figure 8) and also clarify exactly what 
constitutes the proximal and distal stimuli and their variance in our experiments in figure 7 
(below).Our distal stimulus is the true stimulus orientation and distal variance the variance in those 
orientations over trials which we manipulate with large or smaller step sizes. The proximal stimulus is 
the participant’s measurement of the stimulus orientation and proximal variance the variability of that 
measurement which we manipulate by presenting Gabors in higher or lower contrast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Simulation illustration of proximal and distal stimuli & variance in our experimental 
paradigm. For clarity, we illustrate exactly what constitutes proximal and distal variance in our 
simulations which also holds true for our actual experiments.  
Figure 8, (below) shows a range of simulated Kalman filter step responses under a range of Kalman 
gains. Sub figure A, shows a simulated Kalman filter step response with to condition one which has 
low distal and high proximal (18.6° step/5% contrast). Here, due to the relatively high ratio of distal 
variance a high level of Kalman gain is formed and the Kalman filter corrects to the step in stimulus 
values almost instantly. Sub figure B shows simulated a Kalman filter step response to condition two 
which has low distal and lower proximal (18.6° step/20% contrast). In such conditions we might 
expect a lower Kalman gain to be calculated and in this case the step response should be slower to 
adapt to the step in values and slightly slower to reduce error to zero than in condition one. Sub Figure 
C show the Kalman filter step response to the high distal and low proximal condition three (35.7° 
step/5% contrast). In this case we would expect Kalman gain to be smaller due to the influence of 
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higher proximal variance and the step response in this condition to adapt and reach zero error more 
slowly sub figure D shows a simulated Kalman filter step response to condition four (35.7° step/5% 
contrast). Here we have a step that carries high distal variance and low proximal variance. In this case 
a higher Kalman gain should be calculated and confer a faster rate of correction than in condition 
three.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Simulated Kalman filter step responses to our four experimental conditions under a 
range of possible Kalman gains. Here we illustrate how Kalman gain determines how fast error is 
corrected. The closer Kalman gain is to one the faster error is corrected. 
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4.5 Results. 
4.5.1 Proximal variance calibration experiment. 
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test indicated that proximal variance (deg2) in the 5% contrast condition 
(Mdn=115.23) was significantly higher than in the 20% contrast (Mdn=9.68) Z=-3.18, p=0.00, r2 = 
0.77. Results indicate a very strong effect of contrast on response error variance. Large significant 
differences between contrast conditions also indicate that our experimental manipulation of contrast 
and our measurement paradigm were successful and this result is given extra validity by a very large 
effect size (Cohen, 1988) of contrast on error variability as shown below in figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Group level median error variances taken from our all our individual psychometric 
fits. All participants recorded less variability and greater accuracy in the judgment of the stimulus 
orientation relative to the previous in the low proximal variance (20% contrast) condition in 
comparison to the high proximal variance (5% contrast) condition. 
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4.5.2 Individual level results. 
In our individual analysis, we aimed to examine the general relationship between the level of 
proximal variance and the way error was corrected in participants’ responses. We did this in two 
parts. In the first part, we simply graphically illustrate responses in our main experiment in a number 
of subjects who exhibited either high or low proximal variance levels in our proximal variance 
calibration experiment. In the second part, we split participants into the high and low proximal 
variance observer sets (5 highest and 5 lowest) and examine changes in the relationship between 
proximal variance and Kalman gain. We then provide step response plots for both high and low 
proximal observer sets as a further graphical illustration of this relationship. 
Graphical illustrations of step response in individual high and low proximal variance observers. 
This more qualitative type of analysis, led to some interesting observations consistent with the 
Kalman filters idea about the influence of measurement variability on the way errors are weighted. In 
participants in which proximal variance tended to be higher, there did seem to be a more pronounced 
lag to correct to the step in stimulus values in conditions 1 and 3 which presented Gabors in the high 
proximal variance, 5% contrast (see figures 12 and 13) than in participants who had lower levels of 
proximal variance (see figures 10 and 11). Also, when there was a large difference in proximal 
variance between 5% and 20% contrast conditions within subjects there also appeared to be a lag in 
response in the 5% contrast condition which is not so evident or non-existent in the 20% contrast 
condition. This effect is especially noticeable when examining the rate of correction to the trial 
immediately after the step in values which we highlight in the individual participant error plots we 
provide below. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate how two single low proximal variance observers (5% 
=46.24 & 13.67, 20% = 9.63 & 7.22) correct to the two different step sizes used in our main 
experiment. Here the rate of correction in both contrast conditions is almost immediate with some 
amount of overshoot to the change of stimulus value also recorded. Contrast this response pattern with 
the rate of error correction in the two individual high proximal variance observers (5%=152.27 & 
341.67, 20% = 11.75 & 16.35) we illustrate in figures 11 and 12. In these participants, the rate at 
which error is corrected is slightly lagged in the 5% contrast condition and less overshot to the step in 
orientations. This difference in response, albeit rather small and inconclusive at an individual level is 
generally consistent with predictions made by the Kalman filter in which the rate of error correction, 
is in part, modulated by proximal variance. 
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Figure 9. Example of step responses in a single low proximal variance observer. In the above 
figure we observe the rate in which a low proximal variance observer based on values recorded in the 
proximal variance calibration (A) corrects to the two different step sizes used in our main experiment 
(B). Here in both contrast conditions the correction to the step in stimulus values in almost immediate 
with some overshoot observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of step responses in a single low proximal variance observer. The above 
participant recorded very low proximal variance in both contrast conditions in the proximal variance 
calibration (subfigure A) and corrects instantly to the change in stimulus values in subfigure B.  
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Figure 11. Example of step responses in a single high proximal variance observer. The above 
figure illustrates the lag in error correction (B) in a single subject who exhibited high levels of 
proximal variance in the 5% contrast in the proximal variance calibration (A) and average amounts in 
the 20% contrast. Note the lag in the rate of error correction in comparison to low proximal variance 
observers in figures 10 and 11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Example of step responses in a single high proximal variance observer. Here, we again 
observe a slight lag in error correction in a high proximal variance observer (A) in conditions 1 and 3. 
However, it is less pronounced than we might expect given the high level of proximal variance 
recorded in this participant. 
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To ensure our sets of low and high proximal observers had sufficient differences in proximal variance 
to allow a potentially detectable difference we only examined the correlation between proximal 
variance and Kalman gains in the 5% contrast condition (see figure 14).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Median values in proximal variance between high and low proximal observers in the 
proximal variance calibration experiment in the 5% & 20% contrast conditions. Here we 
observe significant differences in median values in proximal variance between the top and bottom 
rated 5 participants in the 2AFC proximal variance calibration. Error bars are 25 and 75 percentiles. 
4.5.3. Correlations between proximal variance and Kalman gain in low and high proximal 
observers 
We analysed whether there were differences in the relationship between proximal variance and 
Kalman gain in high and low proximal observers in the 5% contrast condition by using a Spearman 
Rho correlation. In the high proximal observers in the 18.6 ° step there was a moderate but non-
significant negative correlation between proximal variance and their corresponding model fitted 
Kalman gains (rs(4)=-0.56 p=>.05. In the high proximal observers in the 35.7 ° step there was a very 
similar result. In this case we again recorded a non-significant moderate negative relationship between 
proximal variance and their corresponding model fitted Kalman gain (rs (4) =-0.53 p=>.05. 
Interestingly, while we did not observe significant results there is a different pattern in the correlations 
between Kalman gain and proximal variance in the low proximal observers and high proximal 
observers. In the low proximal observers in the 18.6 ° step there was no relationship between 
proximal variance and model fitted Kalman gains with (rs(4)=0.00 p=<.05 while in the 35.7 ° step we 
recorded a moderate negative correlation with (rs(4)=-0.30 p=<.05. In summary, we observe moderate 
negative correlations between Kalman gains and proximal variance in the high proximal variance 
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observers in both step sizes indicating to some degree that when participant proximal variance goes up 
Kalman gain goes down.  
Another aspect of the high versus low proximal observer’s analysis we conducted was to simply 
compare step response plots for our sets of low and high proximal sets of participants. On this 
occasion, we included the 20% contrast condition as this aspect of the analysis is again designed to be 
a more graphical qualitative type comparison. Here, we observe differences in the rate of correction to 
the step in stimulus values between high and low proximal observers then in our previous individual 
plots of a similar nature which we illustrate in figures 15, 16, 17 & 18 below. In figure 15, we observe 
the step responses of all 5 low proximal observers. We can see a quite fast rate of correction in 
participants. In condition one (5%, 18.6° step), we do see a slight lag to but the effect is quite slight. 
In the lower proximal variance condition 2, (20%, 18.6 ° step) responses correct instantly and in fact 
overshoot by quite a large amount in a similar way we observed in some individual participants who 
exhibited low proximal variance that we illustrated previously in individual plots 10, 11, & 12. 
Responses in condition 3 (5%, 35.7 ° step), also exhibits some lag in correction to the step but it is 
quite small, while condition 4 (20%%, 35.7 ° step) responses correct instantly and in fact overshoot 
again, consistent with condition 2 which also had 20% contrast carrying low distal variance (see 
figure 15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15; group step response plot for the low proximal variance participant set.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Group step response plot for the low proximal variance observer participant set. 
Here we note slightly slower correction in conditions with higher proximal variance (1 & 3), with 
some overshoot in lower proximal variance conditions (2 & 4). 
A further graphical illustration that plots the same data displayed in figure 15 but shown in a different 
way is in figure 15 below. Here, we collapsed all step and stabilization phases into one step response 
comprising 15 trials (as they all are in the experiment). The aim of these plots is to focus on the 
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transition from step to stable phases in a number of important trials. The key trials are as follows; trial 
one, which is the first trial in the run of 15, trial 5 which is the trial just before the stimulus values 
steps before values actually step up on trial 6 and then stabilize post step on trial 7, trial 10 is the last 
trial in the post step stabilization phase, with trial 11 the first trial after the step changes back to its 
original pre step values with trial 15 the last trial in the run of 15. In sub figure A, we observe a lag in 
correction in condition one between trials 5 and 6. Sub figure B shows condition two, in which we see 
a fast correction to all presented orientation and some persistent overshoot between trials 6 and 10. 
Sub figure C illustrates responses in condition 3, which exhibit fast correction between transitions 
between step and stable phases and again some overshoot while lastly we have condition four in sub 
figure D. Interestingly in condition 4 responses also appear to show some slight lag between trials 5 
and six but it is quite small and does not persist. In general, the picture is that in low variance 
proximal observers we do observe some slight lag but it is small and short in duration and a quite 
subtle effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Bar graph showing the step response during key step to stabilization transitions trials 
in low proximal observers.  
In figures 16 & 17, we illustrate the group step response functions for the high proximal variance 
observer group. In figure 17, we note a more pronounced lag in the way error is corrected in 
comparison to the low proximal observer participants. This is especially evident in condition one (5%, 
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18.6° step) in which the rate of correction is much lagged and does not correct until the end of the step 
phase. A smaller lag is also observed in condition three (5%, 35.7 ° step) in which error is nearly 
always present during the step phase although not as large as in conditions one. In conditions in which 
stimuli are presented at 20% (2 and 4) the overall outcome is that there seems to be a noisy response 
and some over shoot in both conditions and a faster correction to the step in stimulus values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Group level step response plot for the high proximal variance observer participant 
set  
Figure 17 again focusses on the transitions between step and stabilization trials in the high proximal 
observer’s participants. Sub figure A, clearly shows the lag in error correction in condition one. The 
effect is especially clear on trial 6 and persists over time. As condition one has both the highest 
proximal variance and lowest distal variance meaning it would have the lowest Kalman gain of any 
condition this result strongly supports the Kalman filter and given we observe a much stronger result 
than in the same condition in the high proximal observers does suggest a role for proximal variance in 
error weighting. Sub figure B, shows condition two, here we have lower proximal variance than in 
condition 1 resulting in a faster correction over transitions from step to stable phases in trials 5 and 6. 
Sub figures C shows condition 3 which has 5% contrast (high proximal variance) again as in the other 
5% contrast condition we observe a lag between trials 5 and 6 but admittedly it is small and short 
lasting. Lastly, sub figure D provides transition plots for condition 4. Here, we have a very large 
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overshoot on trial 6 and no lag visible at all, consistent with what we might expect for a low 
proximal/high distal variance stimuli in the Kalman filter and our simulation for a high Kalman gain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Bar graph showing the step response during key step to stabilization transitions 
trials-high proximal observers. 
4.5.4. Main analysis. 
The main analysis of the current chapter tested the existence of differences in model fitted Kalman 
gains between our experimental conditions in all participants. This analysis comprised a repeated 
measures ANOVA and post hoc tests in the shape of pairwise comparisons corrected for multiple 
comparisons and reported some interesting results consistent with the Kalman filter model of response 
error updating. However, before reporting our main analyses we again examine the general pattern of 
responses between our experimental conditions using our step response plots and bar graph summary 
of responses on key transition trials. 
Figure 18(below) shows the group step response function for all conditions and all participants. 
Cleary visible and consistent with the Kalman filter we have a pattern of results that could be 
considered to be the levels of Kalman gain we might generally expect for each condition. While 
conditions 2 and 3 might provide quite close Kalman gains figures, as condition one has high 
proximal variance and low distal variance, we would definitely expect this condition to have the 
lowest Kalman gain and condition four with low proximal and high distal to have the highest Kalman 
gain. This means that condition one should be slowest to correct and condition four to be fastest to 
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correct. This is exactly what we see and supports the adaptive error weighting strategy outlined in 
predictive coding and the Kalman filter a result again well illustrated in our key transitions plots (see 
figures 19 and 20 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Group step response plot for all participants in all conditions. Note the lag in 
correction and absence of overshoot in the high proximal variance conditions 1 and 3 in comparison 
to the low proximal variance conditions 2 and 4. 
Figure 19, plots participant’s responses on key transitions and complements the pattern of results we 
see in figure 19 above. Condition one, exhibits the slowest correction to the step in values on trials 5 
and 6, and interestingly shows a small amount of overshot on trial 10. The step response in condition 
2, corrects instantly to the change in values on trial 6 and actually remains slightly above the true 
stimulus values consistent with previous individual results reporting overshoot in conditions with high 
distal variance (20% contrast condition). Condition 3, representing the second high proximal variance 
condition (5% contrast) with condition 1, also exhibits a slight lag between trials 5 and 6 but is 
smaller than that in condition 1, while condition 4 with low proximal but high distal variance shows 
an instant correction to steps in orientations with quite a large and persistent overshoot.  
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Figure 19. Bar graph showing the step response to selected orientations for all participants. In 
this figure we observe pre step responses on trials 1 and 5 at around 0 in all conditions. Conditions 2, 
& 4 are relatively fast to correct to the step in values at trial 6 and with condition 4 displaying some 
initial overshoot. However, the above plot show the lag in correction to the step in values at trial 6 in 
condition one and the small lag in condition 3 in condition one and a slight lag in condition 3. 
Main effects. 
A repeated measures ANOVA tested the effects of our four proximal/distal variance conditions on 
model fitted Kalman gains. Analysis reported a significant effect of condition on model fitted Kalman 
gain F(1, 10) = 5.969, p=0.002. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni adjusted) were conducted to see 
where differences in mean model fitted Kalman gains existed between conditions. Results reported 
that mean model fitted Kalman gains in condition 1 (M=0.78, SD=0.63) were significantly different 
from condition 2 (M=1.04, SD=0.34), p=0.010 and condition 4 (M=1.01, SD=0.27), p=0.012 but not 
condition 3 (M=0.85, SD=0.56). Comparisons also reported that mean model fitted Kalman gains in 
condition 2 were significantly different from condition 1, p=0.010 and condition 3, p=0.016 but not 
condition 4. They also reported that mean model fitted Kalman gains in condition 3 were significantly 
different from condition 2, p=0.016 and condition 4, p=0.015 but not condition 1. Finally, our last 
pairwise comparison also reported that mean model fitted Kalman gains in condition 4 were 
significantly different from condition 1, p=0.012 and condition 3, p=0.015 but not 2. Overall, results  
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Figure 20 Bar graph showing the pattern of significant differences in Kalman between 
conditions. Here we summarise the pattern of significant differences in model fitted Kalman gains 
between our four conditions. Here, we show that the level of Kalman gain in condition one was 
significantly different from conditions two and three. The level of Kalman gain in condition two was 
significantly different to that in condition one and there. The level of Kalman gain in condition three 
was significantly different from conditions one and four and finally the level of Kalman gain in 
condition four was significantly different from conditions one and three 
 
4.6 Discussion  
The current chapter aimed to build on and extend findings from chapter 3 in regard to testing the 
adaptive weighting of prediction errors outlined in predictive coding against the fixed weighting of 
stimulus values implied in perceptual averaging. While results from chapter 3 supported predictive 
coding our use of serial dependence, while effective for the aims of the experiment was not an ideal 
behavioural measure of how error on current trials is reduced directly. This was because serial 
dependence is more of measure of the effects of past values on perception as opposed concentrating 
on current values. Furthermore, serial dependence experiments usually present stimuli that changes on 
every trial making it hard to ascertain the time frames over which error is reduced to zero or which 
factors might affect such reduction. To provide a means for us to better assess such issues we used a 
stimulus design inspired by the use of step response functions in control theory. By presenting 
stimulus orientations that remained stable for a fixed time period and then stepping in values for the 
same amount of time under different experimental condition based on Kalman filter theory we were 
able to formulate clear experimental hypotheses to test the predictive coding account of error 
correction against the perceptual averaging account of perceptual updating. Results showed that the 
way participants adapted to the step in stimulus orientations were consistent with the predictive 
coding account of error weighting and as in chapter 3 again well predicted by Kalman filter theory. 
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Furthermore, aside from what can be considered a novel overall finding our methods also provide 
techniques that could be used in future studies that examine predictive coding. However, the study 
does raise some interesting issues that require further explanation. Not least, the consistent overshoot 
we observed especially in conditions in which stimuli were clearly visible. We now discuss our study 
beginning with the validity of the two keys aspects of our methods-the proximal variance calibration 
and the step response stimulus design.  
General validity of experimental methods.  
An important aspect of our analyses at both an individual and group level was the influence of 
proximal variance on the way participants corrected to steps in stimulus values. For us to quantify this 
relationship we needed an accurate measure of this source of variance. The level of distal variance 
was a known quantity as we knew our step sizes but the level of proximal variance is very much 
participant specific. To provide such a measure, we used the same proximal variance calibration 
experiment we utilised in chapter 3. Results recorded large and highly significant differences in 
median values between 5% and 20% contrast conditions, indicating that contrast had a substantial 
effect on the perception of our stimuli further supported by a large effect size. Such a result is in line 
with previous findings indicating factors such as blur (Kayargadde & Martens, 1996), luminance 
(Waugh & Levi, 1993) and most importantly contrast (Waugh & Levi, 1993) affect perceptual 
measurement variability. Our results also provide a direct replication of our findings from chapter 3 in 
a totally new participant set and indicate our proximal variance calibration paradigm is a reliable 
means to ascertain levels of proximal variance both within and crucially across participants. There are 
though, however, questions of our interpretation of these results in terms of purely visual proximal 
variability. 
One potential problem in the interpretation of findings from our proximal variance calibration 
experiment as purely visual variability stems from the way we presented our stimuli. Our 
experimental design used a 2 alternative forced choice paradigm. We presented an initial Gabor at a 
certain orientation and then presented a noise screen for 500ms, then a fixation cross for 250ms, then 
a second noise screen and following that the second Gabor orientation about which participant’s had 
to make a judgment about. This meant that there was a time gap between from the first Gabor 
orientation and the second orientation and subsequent judgment of approximately 3 seconds. This 
delay raises an issue because there is inevitably some level of working memory required by 
participants to make the judgment of orientation as the task involves a judgment involving a past 
stimuli orientation no longer on the screen. As with all neural computations, working memory is 
subject to some level of variability both within (Fougnie, Suchow, & Alvarez, 2012) and across 
participants (Fougnie et al., 2012) which may be at quite different levels for the same participant’s 
perceptual variability levels. Due to the use of working memory and the input of variability from this 
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cognitive system it is open to question whether it is entirely accurate to consider our data for proximal 
variance as only arising from perceptual systems. Of course, one could argue that there is not really a 
distinction between perceptual and visual working systems and if there is where does perception end 
and working memory begin. This is perhaps something to consider, not only here, but perhaps in all 2 
alternative forced choice type experiments. However, while recognising this limitation we contend 
that as our proximal variance calibration experiment involved the same time delays in stimulus 
presentation as our main experiment we could still make a valid comparison for ‘total’ proximal 
variability and its effect on adaptation rate to our changes in stimuli in our main experiment at an 
individual level and group regardless of its source. 
The second key aspect of methods for discussion here is the novel use of a step response type 
experimental design in conjunction with Fischer & Whitney’s (2014) basic design in purely visual 
terms. On the whole we found this to be a successful experimental paradigm. While the step design 
has been effectively applied in visou motor research to examine how errors reduce over time 
(Baddeley et al., 2003; Burge et al., 2008) it had not been widely used in vision outside of the smooth 
pursuit literature (Brostek et al., 2017), representing much different types of experiment using smaller 
time scales. Given that visuomotor studies deal with two sources of variance (motor and visual 
system) meaning that more uncertainty is present in estimates it may have been possible that as 
orientations repeated a number of times it would have been too easy a stimulus to look at the way 
error corrects over time in a meaningful way and participants would simply have responded at the 
current orientation in all conditions. This was not the case and our experimental design was able to 
show how proximal and distal variance modulated error correction extremely well. However, there are 
some minor critiques in its use in the current chapter specifically and in more general use. In the 
current chapter we use the Kalman filter to model and explain participant step responses. Technically, 
the optimal use of the Kalman filter requires stimulus values to have a normal distribution which the 
step response does not have. This though it could be contended is not really an important in the 
current chapter as we were really only using the Kalman gain to model general response patterns and 
not to estimate actual values. Also, a common critique of the use of step response functions in control 
systems applicable to human experimentation is that they are an artificial stimuli. In the real world 
stimuli or the signals they emit do not behave in such a manner but nonetheless they are excellent for 
comparing the outputs of different systems on an equal footing. Overall, the step experimental design 
worked well and provided some excellent results in our main experiment.  
The key manipulation in the current chapter was the way we altered proximal and distal variance 
across our conditions (condition 1, 18.6 °step/5% contrast, condition 2 18.6° step/ 20% contrast, 
condition 3, and 35.7 ° step/5% contrast and condition four 35.7 ° step 20%) While we could be 
certain that we had increased the level of distal variance in conditions 3 and 4 which had a 35.7° step 
which will inevitably carry more variability than the smaller 18.6 degree step we had to be certain that 
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we had significantly different levels of proximal variance between the 5 and 20% contrast conditions 
to validate our manipulations. While we had achieved such results using identical methods in chapter 
3, in this chapter we had a totally new participant set and as we had observed quite large inter 
individual differences in proximal variance in chapter 3 we could not be certain about what we might 
observe on this occasion. Furthermore, as we intended to look in greater depth at the role of individual 
differences in proximal variance and the way error was corrected over time.  
Our individual comparisons of proximal variance psychometric fits from our calibration procedure 
and the way participants responded to changes in stimulus orientations had two purposes. The first 
was of course to compare the way distal and proximal variance affected how participants’ integrated 
information and corrected error but the second was to build on findings from experiment three which 
indicated that when participant’s exhibited a more noisy response they appeared to become more 
‘serially dependent’ with responses closer to previous values. While chapter 3’s main experiment 
tested different participants to its proximal variance experiment, here we tested the same participants. 
This method allowed a clearer individual level comparison. 
Individual comparisons of proximal variance psychometric fits from our proximal variance calibration 
experiment and the way participants corrected to steps in stimulus orientations in our main experiment 
provided some interesting if inconclusive results. In participants who recorded low levels of proximal 
variance there appeared to be an almost instant correction to the step in stimulus orientations across 
all four experimental conditions (a result consistent with a Kalman filter like responses (Harris & 
Wolpert, 1998; Todorov, 2004) as opposed to a fixed weighted average response (Choo & Franconeri, 
2010; Corbett, Wurnitsch, Schwartz, & Whitney, 2012; Fischer & Whitney, 2014). However, without 
a comparison to low proximal observers such a response pattern may simply be attributed to inter-
individual noise in responses as we did observe a large range of response variability across 
participants. Comparison with a limited number of high proximal observers, did though, again give 
credence to an adaptive, Kalman filter explanation of participant’s correction to the step in stimulus 
orientations again consistent with findings from visou motor adaptation research (Burge, Girshick, & 
Banks, 2010; Wolpert, 2007; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). In high proximal observers, there did 
appear to be more of a lag in correction to the step in stimulus orientations in all conditions. However, 
the lag seemed to be also present in conditions which presented Gabors at 20% contrast which we 
might not have expected to find. Furthermore, the level of difference in correction between conditions 
in individual participants was small and while this aspect of our analysis was only intended as a 
qualitative comparison and while still worthwhile lacked statistical comparisons making interpretation 
difficult.  
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Comparison of high and low proximal observer sets 
The next analysis in our study provided a more statistically based analysis of the effects of proximal 
variance and the rate of error correction. In this analysis, we split participants into two groups (high 
and low proximal variance observer sets), quantified model fitted Kalman gain as a measure of the 
rate of error correction and formulated experimental hypotheses to test the strength of the relationship 
between proximal variance and Kalman gain. Here, hypotheses were based on a theoretical inverse 
correlational relationship between proximal variance and Kalman gain. In the Kalman filter, if distal 
variance is relatively constant, when proximal variance goes up Kalman gain should come down and 
when proximal variance goes down, Kalman should go up. This means that if a set of participants 
have high proximal variance we could have expected to record lower model fitted Kalman gains than 
in participant sets with low proximal variance. Importantly, due to the small range of proximal 
variance across the board in participant’s in the 20% contrast condition, we only analysed the data in 
conditions which presented Gabors at 5% contrast as with such a small range observing any 
differences in correlation between our two participant’s sets in conditions using 20% contrast (3&4) 
was highly unlikely (see results figure 14). We hypothesized that we would find a higher negative 
correlation between Kalman gain and proximal variance in high proximal observers than in low 
proximal observers which is somewhat open to debate.  
The first aspect of our results in our correlational analysis to note is that all of our correlations 
between proximal variance and Kalman gain were non-significant. However, we contend that results 
still provided support for the existence of an inverse relationship between proximal variance and the 
way errors are corrected in line with previous literature in the field (Burge et al., 2008; Denève et al., 
2007; Friston, 2010; Harris & Wolpert, 1998; Knill & Pouget, 2004). In our high proximal observers 
in condition 1 we recorded a moderate negative correlation of -0.56 between proximal variance and 
Kalman gain, while in condition 3 we recorded a similar negative correlation of -0.53. Contrast this 
with our correlations from our low proximal variance observer set who recorded a correlation of 
exactly 0 in condition one and in fact a positive correlation of 0.30 in condition 3 suggesting that at 
least to some degree proximal variance did exert an effect on the way participant’s adapted to the step 
change in stimulus orientations. This interpretation is given extra validity if we further consider our 
response plots and bar graphs (see results figures 15, 16, 17 & 18) and the relationship between 
correlation coefficients and p values and the way Kalman gain is calculated.  
In our analyses we only tested a small number of participants in each of our low and high proximal 
observer sets. If we focus on the correlation coefficients (which is not affected by the sample size) 
between Kalman gain and proximal variance as opposed to p values (which are affected) and consider 
the way Kalman gain is calculated (see chapter 2 ) then we did record perhaps recorded the upper end 
of any correlation we might have observed. This is because Kalman gain is not only calculated based 
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on proximal variance but also includes prediction variance mainly created by distal variance (Zarchan 
& Musoff, 2000). By only looking at proximal variance, we only analysed one part of the causes of 
any changes in Kalman gain meaning that the correlation between Kalman gain and proximal variance 
can never reach one. Indeed, in the calculation for Kalman gain, prediction variance is the dominant 
factor, as this is in fact what the model is trying to ‘keep’ while proximal variance is considered noise 
and to be discarded. If we consider these factors, a correlation of around 0.5 in our high proximal 
observer set between proximal variance and Kalman gain, may in fact, given our small sample size 
been a very good result and give solid support to the Kalman filter model of error correction. 
However, to really test the Kalman filter versus the fixed weighted average account of error correction 
we need to take into account both distal and proximal variance and their relationship to Kalman gain 
analysis which formed the basis of our main experiment. However, we do note that correlations are a 
noisy statistical measure and perhaps providing more detailed and dedicated experiments that look at 
the role of proximal variance would in which proximal variance is manipulated in a number of ways 
and with more participants would provide a fuller picture due to the limitations in our experiment. 
Main experimental findings 
The aim of our main experiment and analyses was to fully test the adaptive account of error correction 
posited in the Kalman filter against the fixed model of error correction outlined in the fixed weighted 
average models. In contrast to our previously discussed analyses here, we included all participants and 
tested Kalman gain directly as a proxy measure of error correction against all four of our experimental 
conditions. As our experimental conditions manipulated both proximal and distal variance in a 
number of permutations we were not limited to looking just at the effects of proximal variance on 
error correction. Our experimental manipulations built on our manipulations of proximal and distal 
variance in chapter 3 and also ideas from Burge, Ernst and Banks (2008) who also tested four 
combinations of what can be considered proximal and distal variance. Again, our theoretical 
framework provided clear and testable experimental hypotheses. Specially, according to the Kalman 
filter that there would be differences in error correction caused by our manipulation between 
experimental conditions and according to the fixed weighted average model responses should not 
adapt. Our analysis reported results strongly in line with the Kalman filter with significant differences 
in the Kalman gain, indicating that error was adaptively corrected between conditions commensurate 
the level of Kalman gain.  
Inspection of our step response plot for all participants (results, figure 19) gives an indication of the 
differences in the pattern of responses and error correction between conditions. In condition one (5% 
contrast) we observed a lag in response to the step in stimulus orientations and the time taken to 
correct error while in condition two while in the condition 2 (20% contrast) which also had an 18.6 
degree step the lag is not present. In condition 2, responses to the step correct instantly and indeed 
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include some overshoot which persists until the end of the stabilization phase. In conditions which 
had a 35.7 degree step (3&4) we observed a similar pattern of error correction. Responses in the 5% 
contrast condition 3 also appear to lag behind the step in stimulus while in the 20% contrast condition 
4 again we see an instant correction and again some persistent over shoot. Results from all four 
conditions are consistent with Kalman gain figures for the commensurate conditions and give general 
support for the Kalman filter model of error correction as opposed to the fixed weighted average 
account. However, before discussing our statistical analysis of Kalman gain we discuss a prevalent 
factor in many of our response plots namely the overshoot in responses seen to some extent in all 
conditions in our response plots and bar graphs at the group level (see figures 19 & 20) 
Overshoot is often observed in many signal processing applications which test the response properties 
of a system using a step response function. One common reason for overshoot, especially in filters 
which employ a model of the stimulus behaviour, such as the Kalman filter, is that the model of the 
stimulus given to the system is incorrect. One function of the stimulus model is to constrain the next 
estimate within a set of known parameters. If these parameters are too ‘wide’ then estimates can 
increase over the true value of the stimulus. This could be the same cause of the overshoot observed in 
our participant responses, as unlike a signal processing system, we cannot simply programme in the 
model of the distal stimulus and it must be learnt. While it may be considered that the step in stimulus 
orientations is a simple model of behaviour to learn, in nature stimuli do not generally occur in steps 
and tend to change in a more correlated way over time which may make learning more difficult. This 
explanation is given validity by results from chapter 3’s main experiment two, in which participant’s 
did appear to learn the random walk (Pearson, 1905) of stimuli in some instances, possibly due to the 
fact that a random walk is a model closer to how stimuli generally behave in the world (Einstein & 
Cowper, 1926).  
Analysis of Kalman gain differences between conditions recorded significant differences between a 
number of conditions (see results figure 21) in a manner almost entirely captured by our Kalman filter 
model predictions and simulations with responses modulated by the level of proximal and distal 
variance. Results reported significant differences in Kalman gain between condition 1 (0.78) and 
conditions 2 (1.03) and 4 (1.01), conditions 2 and conditions 1 and 3 (0.85), condition 3 and 
conditions 2 and 4 and finally between condition 4 and conditions 1 and 3. Furthermore not only did 
we record significant differences between conditions as predicted we also recorded the general 
ordering of Kalman gain level predicted by Kalman filter theory. Specifically, we predicted that 
condition one would have the lowest Kalman gain, with condition 3 next and 2 and 4 having the 
highest levels. This results provided very strong support for the Kalman filter model of correction 
over the fixed weighted average account and are also consistent with results from Burge, Ernst and 
Banks (2008) and a host of visou motor literature that posits an adaptive account of error correction 
(Denève et al., 2007; Harris & Wolpert, 1998; Knill, 2007). However, while we consider our 
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experimental paradigm to be very successful we also note that the study has its limitations especially 
the interpretation our findings in purely visual terms. 
Previously we discussed the limitations of our interpretation of our proximal variance experimental 
data purely in visual terms due to the possible input of variability from working memory. A similar 
critique may also apply to our experimental design in our main experiment and our interpretations of 
our findings which may also have been affected by variability from other sources. One source of 
additional variability in responses in our main experiment could have arisen from the motor system. 
Unlike our proximal variance calibration experiment which used a key press to signal a judgment of 
orientation, in the main experiment participants signalled their judgment of the orientation using a 
mouse which is obviously controlled by the hand. It is well accepted that the motor system is highly 
variable (Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008). Furthermore, as we have discussed in depth it is also well 
reported that the motor responses exhibit Kalman filter like response properties in its responses to 
reconcile noise (Denève et al., 2008; Kwon, Tadin, & Knill, 2015; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001) which 
may have exaggerated the level of bias to previous stimulus values we observed. Indeed, due to the 
level of noise in the motor system it is likely no coincidence that visou motor literature has pioneered 
the use of filter models to explain how sensory systems resolve variability. When we factor in 
variability from the motor system and from working memory we can logically ascertain that some of 
the bias we observed may have been the result if integration processes designed to remove variability 
in non visual systems. However, while the effects of filtering non visual variability may be a potential 
confound perhaps a more important issue comes from recent work that has indicated that the observed 
bias found in a number of types of stimuli (Corbett, Fischer, & Whitney, 2011; Fischer & Whitney, 
2014; Kiyonaga, Scimeca, Bliss, & Whitney, 2017; Kramer et al., 2013; Liberman, Fischer, & 
Whitney, 2014; Taubert et al., 2016) may not be perceptual at all and arise from a post perceptual 
decision making process. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are number of key findings from the current chapter that provide further 
understanding of how visual systems deal with uncertain information. One is that the correction of 
perceptual error is adaptive and adaptive and modulated by the variability of sensory measurements 
(proximal variance) and the behaviour of the stimuli of interest (distal variance). When proximal 
variance was higher relative to distal variance participants estimates corrected faster when stimulus 
values changed and when distal variance was higher relative to proximal variance estimates corrected 
slower to changes in stimulus values. This result is consistent with findings from chapter 3 and with 
findings from Bayesian visou-motor literature (Berniker & Kording, 2011; Burge et al., 2008; Denève 
et al., 2007; Wei & Koerding, 2010) and shows the Kalman filter can also be applied well in vision. 
The way participants integrate information over time exhibits high individual variability. Some of this 
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variability can be explained by the different levels of proximal variability in participant’s observations 
but not all. Interestingly, again we found that temporal integration strongly favours the current 
stimulus input over previous information. Although, we observed significant differences in Kalman 
gain which acted as our proxy measure for error correction, Kalman gains did not drop below the 0.7 
level in any condition indicating a much higher effect of the current stimulus value on estimates. To 
conclude results provide support for the predictive coding account of temporal integration and the use 
of ideas such as the Kalman filter and stimulus step designs to study how the visual system deals with 
uncertainty.  
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Chapter 5. Predictive coding as a dynamic process: the role of conditional 
relationships and sequential information in predictions and behaviour. 
5.1 Abstract.  
Predictive coding suggests that the brain extracts the temporal regularities present in the environment 
over multiple timescales and levels of complexity to optimize the level of prediction error in its 
predictions. One issue with this idea is that in the world there are many different types of temporal 
regularities of differing complexities and it is unclear whether the brain applies more complex 
probabilistic sequential regularities when making predictions. Previous predictive coding studies have 
commonly used cue type relationships to induce predictions or have biased predictions by presenting 
one stimuli much more often reminiscent of priming studies. Furthermore, studies that have used 
conditional sequences of stimuli have often shown that either they do not improve behaviours or that 
people have represented sequences in a non optimal way. Here, to provide further analysis of these 
issues we used an experimental design that presented a sequence of stimulus positions and omission 
trials in which stimulus changed in such a way that made certain changes more or less predictable 
based on two direction switching Markov chain transition probability matrices that manipulated 
predictability between screen positions and omission trials. Participants were asked to respond as 
quickly as possible to the stimulus screen position and that in some cases the stimulus would be very 
hard to see (omission trials) but they should press where they think it should be and recorded reaction 
times on visible and percentages pressed relative to previous trials on omission trials. We formulated 
two theories about what we might find. The first, motivated by predictive coding states that 
participants should always advantage the most probable screen position. If this was the case then 
reaction times would always be faster on predictable trials and when faced with an omissions trials 
they would press to signal the most predictable screen position relative to the previous trial. Our 
second theory was based on findings from priming studies that have indicated that repetition of 
consecutive trials is a more reliable determining factor in behaviours than sequential probabilities. In 
this case reactions times and presses signalling screen position on omission trials would be 
independent of predictability. Results reported a significant effect of predictability on reaction times 
and a significant interaction between reaction time and the directions of our markov chain in support 
of predictive coding. However, analysis of omission trials led to a somewhat confusing picture. 
Analysis suggested that participants had learnt the stimulus sequences but did not apply them in the 
manner suggested by either priming or predictive coding. Results suggest that participant’s responses 
were based on a combination of a non optimal strategy termed probability matching and not 
necessarily applying any explicit prediction on omission trails. Overall, the main conclusion is that we 
can use sequential transition information that is more complex than simple cues or frequencies to 
improve behaviour but the relationship between reaction times, prediction error and decision making 
is unclear and warrants further investigation.  
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5.2 Introduction. 
Visual information received at the cortex contains not only variability from signals emitting from 
stimuli in the world that are important for behaviour but also unwanted variability often termed noise 
(Faisal et al., 2008). External factors such as poor viewing conditions and anatomical factors such as 
saccades (Melcher, 2011) disrupt information bearing light signals coming from stimuli in the world 
with neuronal noise adding further variability making interpretation potentially problematic 
(Kayargadde & Martens, 1996b; Tuzlukov, 2002; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Exactly how the visual 
system counters the effects of unwanted variability is a matter of keen theoretical debate. Two 
strategies implicated in helping to interpret uncertain signals are to average past and current 
information over time (Bauer, 2017; Burge et al., 2008; Corbett & Melcher, 2014; Corbett et al., 
2011; St. John-Saaltink et al., 2016) and adaptively apply prior knowledge to help distinguish 
stimulus variability from unwanted variability or noise (Denève, Duhamel, & Pouget, 2007; Friston, 
2010; Knill & Pouget, 2007). Previously we have shown evidence supporting the idea that visual 
systems do adaptively average information over time consistent with a body of visou-motor work and 
the general principles of predictive coding (Burge et al., 2008 Harris & Wolpert, 1998; Knill & 
Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2010). Here we turn our attention to questions relating to the nature and use of 
past information used in predictive coding more directly. 
Predictive coding as a dynamic process. 
An interesting feature of predictive coding is its portrayal of the visual system as a dynamic engine of 
optimal predictions (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). In predictive coding, the visual system contains a 
series of hierarchical models that contain representations of the statistical regularities of the external 
world (Jun & Chong, 2016). To keep internal representations optimal, sensory systems actively 
extract information from the world over multiple timescales and levels of complexity constantly 
trying to maximise extraction of task relevant information from the world (Aitchison & Lengyel, 
2017; Clark, 2013; de-Wit, Machilsen, & Putzeys, 2010). However, while there is little doubt that 
predictive coding considers the visual system capable of making predictions based on a number of 
different levels of temporal regularities there are a number of outstanding questions and issues related 
to such ideas. One important issue relates to establishing the ability of the visual system to use 
complex conditional and sequential relationships that evolve over time to make predictions. 
The use of sequentially based conditional relationships in making predictions in daily life. 
Sequential and conditional relationships occurring within the world are potentially a rich source of 
information that if applied would offer substantial benefits when making predictions under 
uncertainty (de Lange et al., 2018). Examples of such relationships and how they might be applied are 
very common. If you observe a bird flying across the sky at dusk the visibility of the bird is variable 
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due to decreased light and the way birds behaviour exhibits stochastic elements. Making a prediction 
about where the bird might be in the next few seconds, might therefore be problematic, as potentially 
there are a number of possible outcomes. Fortunately, events in the world do not generally occur 
completely randomly meaning we can apply previous knowledge to solving the problem.  
One way to predict the future position of the bird is by using our previous experience that the position 
of flying birds do not suddenly change from one area of the sky to another. They generally follow a 
trajectory in which its transition from time point n to n+1 is conditional on its previous positions at 
time points n-1, n-2, n-3, n-4… as it flies meaning that we can use this transitional information to 
predict where it will be at a future position. The same principle applies to predicting how events might 
occur over time on our way into work. If you walk through a busy subway station you need to 
negotiate walking through lots of people all going in different directions heading to different exits and 
entrances to subway lines to get onto your required train. Here, there are potentially many different 
paths people could take making predicting where people might be heading uncertain. One way to 
predict the position of other people here though is by combining sequential information about how 
people will transition from the current to a future position based on the transitions between previous 
n-1, n-2, n-3, n-4… time points combined with knowledge of the exits and entrances of the station. By 
using this information we can potentially more reliably predict where people are heading. However, 
while it appears that we have the ability to make predictions about events based on sequential and 
conditional relationships it is also possible that people do not use such relationships and predict based 
on more simple relationships between events and stimuli the world. 
The use of associative or cued relationships in making predictions in daily life. 
Another type of information that can be used to predict the behaviour of stimuli can be considered to 
be simple associative or cued relationships between events and stimuli in our surroundings (Chun, 
2000; Knill, 2007; Kok & Turk-Browne, 2018). For example, if we are sitting watching television and 
the doorbell rings we can make a prediction that someone is at the door. Importantly, this type of 
prediction, while still a good way to make a prediction does not require the integration of sequential 
information and is more of an associative relationship based simply on the cue provided by the 
doorbell. Similar types of associative relationships exist in many other instances such as on our 
commute into work. If you are traveling by train into work and the train begins to slow we can take 
this as a cue that the train is coming into a station and if it is the station we need to get off at can 
prepare to alight thus saving us time in getting off the train. Again, though the prediction that the train 
is coming into a station is in this instance is based on the cue provided by the slowing train and while 
still a good way to make a prediction does not require any knowledge of sequential information of 
how events unfold over time.  
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Using the frequency of events to make predictions. 
A further type of temporal regularity that can be applied when making a prediction is the frequency of 
events (de Lange et al., 2018). If we again think of our commute into work we can picture how we can 
use frequencies of events to make a prediction. If we wish to alight a train we need to know which 
side the door will be relative to the platform. In many situations, the door will be on the same side on 
each stop. Say for instance, that the door facing the platform is on the left on 80% on stops then we 
might use the frequency of times the exit is on the left as a basis for predicting the side of the door on 
the next stop. Also, if we think about how we perform simple day to day tasks such as opening a door 
which we have done many time we know that in the vast majority of occasions a door handle opens 
downwards. This means that the prediction will be that the door handle will indeed open the door if 
we press the door handle down. However, while the frequency of past events to make a prediction can 
be a good way to make a prediction as with the use of cues it does not require any use of conditional 
relationships or sequential information.  
Do we use complex sequential conditional relationships to make predictions or do we simply use 
associative cues or frequencies of events to make predictions. 
We have outlined three sources of predictive information that can potentially be used by the visual 
system to make predictions. However, in many cases current predictive coding experimental designs 
can be considered somewhat limited in testing whether people can use sequential and conditional 
information to make a prediction. In many cases, predictive coding experimental designs test more 
simple cue based predictions or present a stimulus more often in a way that that can be thought of as 
biasing a particular outcome. Furthermore, there is support from a number of studies from outside 
predictive coding literature that has shown when presented with sequences of stimuli that contain 
conditional relationships, participants do not apply them behaviourally when making a decision which 
clouds the understanding of exactly how predictive information is used in perceptual decisions. 
Examples of limited experimental design in predictive coding literature. 
One common experimental paradigm used in predictive coding neuroimaging studies that relies on 
cues to induce predictions is illustrated by Kok, Jehee & de Lange (2012). In this study, the aim was 
to test how predictions about an upcoming stimuli modulated neural activity and the internal sensory 
representation of expected and non expected stimulus. Stimuli consisted of gratings presented at two 
approximate orientations ~45° and ~135° in orientation blocks and at two contrast levels (high and 
low) in contrast blocks of which types were shown in pairs separated by a blank screen for 500 ms. To 
induce expectations, the first of the stimulus pair was preceded by ascending or descending auditory 
tone, which cued the orientation or contrast level of the grating stimulus or the contrast on trials with 
75% accuracy. On presentation of the second grating stimulus, participants judged whether the current 
grating was clock wise or anti clockwise of the first grating stimulus or whether the previous grating 
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stimulus had a higher or lower contrast than the previous. Analysis focussed on neural activity on the 
first trial stimulus pair during validly cued trials and none validly cued trials. Consistent with some 
ideas of predictive coding, imaging analysis showed that neural activity as a whole was reduced 
(repetition suppression, (Summerfield, et al 2008) during validly cued trials but multivariate pattern 
analysis also revealed that the internal stimulus representation itself was actually enhanced. This 
result was interpreted as higher level expectations decreasing neural activity as a whole but also acting 
to improve perceptions by sharpening or boosting the bottom up stimulus representation in early 
visual cortex. While this was an interesting result and theoretical interpretation there are a number of 
issues with the use of cues as in Kok, Jehee & de Lange (2012). Experimental designs, such as in Kok, 
Jehee & de Lange (2012) while ideal for their purpose, do not test the constant changing and updating 
of predictions based on sequential information as they might occur in the environment. Furthermore, 
the use of cues can be also considered to set up more of an associative relationship as opposed to a 
predictive relationship. One could think of this as hearing a doorbell ring. When a doorbell rings we 
do not necessarily need to make a prediction about an event and we may just associate the sound of 
the doorbell with someone being at the door and respond accordingly. The type of cue/prediction 
paradigm in Kok, Jehee & de Lange (2012) is a common type of experiment also used in Kok & Turk 
Browne (2018). 
Kok & Turk Browne (2018), examined the role of the hippocampus in making cross modal (auditory 
and visual) predictions and its potential role with providing predictive information to visual cortex. 
Stimuli consisted of two shape pairs separated by a blank screen for 500 ms. To induce expectations, 
the first of the stimulus shape pair was preceded by ascending or descending auditory tone which cued 
a particular shape with 75% accuracy over trials. Analysis focussed on neural activity and stimulus 
representation in the hippocampus and visual cortex on the first trial pair during validly cued trial and 
none validly cued trials. Results found that the stimulus representation in visual cortex was dominated 
by the current shape regardless of valid or invalid cues but in the hippocampus shape representation 
reflected the validly cued shape. The cued shape representation in the hippocampus should be said is a 
very interesting result indicating support for the predictive coding notion of a hierarchical system of 
learnt regularities with the hippocampus at the top of the hierarchy. However, again this type of 
paradigm, could be considered to set up associative relationship between tone and shape as opposed to 
truly predictive relationship. Furthermore, by making one stimulus much more common by presenting 
it on 75% of trials it leaves open the repetition priming interpretation in which responses are 
modulated by the frequency of a presentation as opposed to any learnt sequential or conditional 
information.  
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Figure 1. Kok, Jehee & de Lange (2012) stimuli. On each trial participants were presented with two 
grating stimuli presented consecutively. The second grating differed in termed of either orientation or 
contrast. In separate blocks, subjects performed either an orientation task (“Was the second grating 
rotated clockwise or anticlockwise with respect to the first?”) or a contrast task (“Was the second 
grating of higher or lower contrast than the first?”). The grating stimuli were preceded by an auditory 
cue, which predicted (with 75% validity) the overall orientation of the gratings (∼45° or ∼135°) 
(taken from Kok & Jehee, 2012 permission from Dr Peter Kok) 
Questions about whether people apply sequential information in perceptual decision making 
A further problem for predictive coding’s ideas about the use of conditional relationships in sequences 
of stimuli, is that in some cases evidence that people apply them in perceptual decision making in a 
way that is contradictory with predictive coding. At the heart of predictive coding is the idea that 
internal models contain a representation of the conditional relationships between stimuli and events in 
the world observed over time to predict future events (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Jun & Chong, 
2016). The use of the most likely stimulus is proposed to reduce prediction error by representing and 
applying what the brain has learnt about the environment to what will happen next which should have 
distinct benefits in terms of reaction times. This is because, according to predictive coding when 
predictions match sensory signals no further processing is required as the previous prediction remains 
valid (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). Under the principles of psychophysical 
theory, when the brain is using less resources reaction times are decreased (Henry, 1980; Klapp, 2010; 
Maslovat, Klapp, Jagacinski, & Franks, 2014). Alternatively, when predictions do not match sensory 
inputs a prediction error is produced using more resources making reaction times slower. Indeed, this 
relationship is central to predictive coding and has led some to state that prediction error and reaction 
time are intimately related (Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). However, there are nonetheless studies 
that have reported that this relationship is not so clear cut in terms of actual predictions in the 
forwards sense.  
Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) classic priming study, assessed the factors influencing pop out in 
visual search tasks. In the paper, they compare number of top down and bottom up factors that could 
influence pop out in a simple visual judgment tasks. Crucially, in terms of predictive coding these 
factors included the conditional probability of the colour of presented stimuli against priming or a 
simple short term visual memory trace tuned to consecutive or more frequency of trials. The task of 
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participants was to detect as fast as possible the odd coloured diamond shape (see figure 2 below). 
Three participants carried out a number of blocks in which the transition probabilities of whether the 
colour of the odd coloured shape would repeat or switch was manipulated. These probabilities were 0, 
0.1 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1. Crucially, these probabilities set up two totally predictable sequences and one 
totally unpredictable sequence.  
The two predictable sequences were found in 0 probability blocks that never switched and probability 
of 1 blocks that always switched while the unpredictable sequence was found in blocks that that had a 
0.5 probability which switched at chance levels. This experiment was subject to two competing 
theoretical predictions. One theory was termed ‘stimulus expectancy’ in which observers perform 
better in proportion to the level of certainty in the sequence and a ‘short term memory’ or priming 
hypothesis in which the number of consecutive trial determines performance as the memory trace 
strengthens over repeated trials. If the stimulus expectancy hypothesis was correct, then reaction times 
should have been faster and roughly equal for 0 and 1 probability stay/switch blocks as both of these 
blocks change in a totally predictable way thus have equal levels of uncertainty (zero) with reaction 
times slowest for the 0.5 probability blocks which had the highest levels of uncertainty as colours 
changed at chance levels. On the other hand, if the priming hypothesis was correct then predictability 
of stay/switch would still have an effect but it would only lead to faster reaction times in the 0 
probability stay/switch blocks. This is because as colours in these blocks always repeated, as opposed 
to always switching as in the probability of one blocks, in which trials always switched.  
Results supported the priming hypothesis. In 0 probability stay/switch blocks reaction times were 
fastest and slowest for one probability stay/switch blocks with 0.5 in the middle. This result supports 
the idea that the brain can use sequential information but is inconsistent with predictive coding. This 
is because while it appears that the conditional probabilities did play a role in responses they only 
improved responses when the conditional probability predicted events staying the same and not for 
when things changed. In predictive coding, the emphasis is on predicting the next event with reaction 
times taken as a measure of prediction error. However, this result supports the idea that sequences 
were not reducing prediction error on the next trial and asks questions about predictive coding’s 
relationships with behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) stimuli. The task of the participant was to judge whether 
the odd coloured diamond was cropped to the left of right with the colour of the stimulus the 
manipulated quantity with the other two shapes fulfilling the role of distractor shapes 
One possible reason relates to the factor the study manipulated. In the study, they manipulate whether 
the colour of the shape will stay the same or switch but not what the next colour would be. While 
there were only two colours, meaning that it might have been quite easy to predict what the next 
colour might have been, this was not what the study tested. It might be that sequential transition 
probabilities are applied more readily when there is an actual prediction of what the next specific 
quantity might be as opposed to whether something will stay the same of switch. Another explanatory 
factor might be due to the way predictive information interacts with decision making. While, it is 
supported that predictive information does influences perception (Bergen & Jehee, 2019; Chopin & 
Mamassian, 2012; den Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012; Jun & Chong, 2016) and neural activity (de 
Lange et al., 2018; Kok & Turk-Browne, 2018; Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 
2008) it is unclear how prior knowledge effects the decision process. It may be that the brain learns 
the sequential probabilities of events but does not apply them in an optimal way all the time (Feher da 
Silva, Victorino, Caticha, & Baldo, 2017; Newell, et al 2013; Unturbe & Corominas, 2007). 
Furthermore, is may also be possible that non rational cognitive biases influences the decision making 
the outcome non optimal (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). One study that perhaps inserted a 
sequence into their stimulus presentation that favoured prediction of what would happen next in 
perhaps a clearer way than the stay/switch paradigm used in Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994 is Jones & 
Pashler (2007). 
Jones & Pashler (2007), set out to test the idea that the mind is tuned for detecting forward 
relationships. In regard to predictive coding this can be considered theoretically important. Predictive 
coding very much paints the brain as a predictive machine constantly trying to anticipate what will 
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happen next (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010, 2018b) and if this is not the case then would invite questions 
about both predictive coding and more general ideas about the idea of predictive brain. To test this 
theory, Jones & Pashler (2007) inserted a specific type of conditional stimulus sequence that favoured 
the detection of forward stimulus relationships called a Markov chain (see figure 3). A Markov chain 
(see Rønn-Nielsen & Hansen, 2014 for an explanation of Markov chain theory) is a stochastic process 
in which the conditional probability of a switch from the current value, often termed state, to another 
state is dependent upon only the present state. In the experiment, Jones & Pashler (2007) first trained 
participants on 600 images to participants comprised of 8 shapes (see figure 3). Participants were 
asked to attend to the shapes but not told the purpose of the study or what task would follow.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Jones & Pashler’s (2007) 8 shapes (Top left is shape 1, bottom right is shape 8) 
Following this training phase, subjects were informed they would be tested on the order the shapes 
were presented and asked two questions-a ‘prediction question’ in which they were asked which 
shape was most often presented immediately after a specific shape and a retrodiction question which 
was which shape was most often presented immediately after a given shape. To clarify, in predictive 
questions participants were asked what the next shape after the current shape would be while 
retrodictive questions asked they were asked what the shape before the current shape was. The study 
hypothesized, that if prediction is a fundamental principle of brain function, then we might expect 
prediction questions to see better performance as forward temporal relationships are preferentially 
detected. Alternately, if backward temporal relationships are preferentially detected then they would 
expect to see greater accuracy in retrodictive questions. Results reported some interesting findings. 
Overall, accuracy (36%) was well above chance (12.5%) meaning participants appeared to be able to 
learn the stimulus sequence. However, there was no significant advantage for prediction over 
retrodiction. Accuracy was 39% for prediction, and 33% for retrodiction. Given that participants were 
not told anything about the nature of the task during training Jones & Pashler (2007) conceded that 
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there was no real task relevance for detection of forward temporal relationships during the training 
phase as participant had not been informed about the nature of the task and may not occur in purely 
incidental learning tasks. To test this possibility they conducted a second experiment in which 
subjects were told to expect either the retrodiction or prediction question. However, again results 
reported no improvement in accuracy and in summary results can be considered at odds with 
predictive brain theories. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the result indicating that forward temporal 
relationships were not favoured. One could be that manifestation of favouring forward directed 
relationships is a more implicit process and lower order phenomena than used during explicit 
judgments as in Jones & Pashler (2007). Evidence suggests that the expression of favouring forward 
relationships becomes more prevalent when people repeat sequences of motor responses as shown in 
studies of implicit sequence learning (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). This might be considered logical as 
motor actions are always forward in time. In this study, the task required an explicit reporting of the 
next and previous stimulus. Another potential explanatory factor is that in tasks that require explicit 
decisions, people often exhibit differing uses of probabilities in sequences of stimulus that are at odds 
with what might considered optimal. For example, one type of suboptimal use of conditional 
probability is where people even if they know the probabilities believe that one event is more likely to 
occur because it has not occurred for a time often termed the gamblers fallacy (Urteaga & Wiggins, 
2018). For example, in roulette if the ball has not landed on red for 5 spins people think it is more 
likely to happen even though the odds of red are always 50%. Another type of non optimal use of 
sequential information is probability matching. Probability matching refers to the phenomena that 
when presented with a stimuli that changes with a higher probability, say 0.7 to one state (A) than 
another state (B) at 0.3 and asked to judge what the next state should be instead of always choosing 
the most probable state, responses match the overall probabilities of the sequence meaning they 
respond with state A, 0.7 of the time and state B, 0.3 of the time (Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; 
Koehler & James, 2010; Newell et al., 2013). Finally, aside from non optimal use of conditional 
information it is perhaps possible that sequences of stimuli work to provide a more simple associative 
relationship, as opposed to a truly predictive relationships in which the direction of events is less 
important than the link between stimuli as seen in association learning studies (Rudin, et al, 2008; 
Schultz, 1998; Wolfensteller & Ruge, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Markov chain and associated transition matrix- Markov chains, named after the Russian 
mathematician Andrey Markov, are a stochastic process that operate by sequentially transitioning 
from one state (some value or situation) to the next. For example, if you made a Markov chain about 
the weather you could include, rain, sun, fog and cloud which would form a ‘state space’ or a list of 
all possible states . A markov chain would tell you the probability of transitioning from one state to 
any other state in the state space e.g. given that the current state is rain the chances of transitioning to 
sun, cloud, fog or remaining in rain. Above we have a Markov chain with two states, A and B where 
there are four possible transitions A-A, A-B, B-A and B-B. Next to the illustration we have a table 
which shows how Markov transitions are normally detailed termed a transition matrix. Both show that 
if we are in state A the probability of transitioning to state B is 0.8 and 0.2 for staying in A, if the 
current state is state B the probability of transitioning to state A is 0.3 with a 0.7 chance of remaining 
is state B. Transition probabilities between states must sum to one. Importantly although the chances 
of transitioning to any state within a state space are totally conditional on the current state they 
represent the outcome of a sequence of events that have provided these probabilities. Here, say the 
Markov chain changed state every two seconds and we observed transitions for an hour. We could 
then think of the Markov chain as a model of these transitions in which all that needs to be known to 
predict the next transition is the value of the current state. This aspect of Markov chains provides a 
‘memoryless’ quality as the state of the system at a future time is decided entirely by the state at the 
current time only. This efficiency has made Markov chains an especially attractive model in a number 
of computational predictive coding models and empirically relates Markov chains to the Kalman filter 
which also makes predictions based only on the current state assuming an underlying Markov process 
in continuous time. 
 
 
 
State transitioning 
from (current trial) 
 A B 
A 0.2 0.8 
B 0.7 0.3 
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5.2.1 The current chapter: theoretical motivations, aims and hypotheses. 
The current chapter aims to assess a number of questions relating to predictive coding’s portrayal of 
the brain as a dynamic system able to produce predictions based on conditional relationships in 
sequences of stimuli. Previous predictive coding work has not fully tested this idea and often used 
simple cue type association paradigms or provided results that can be interpreted as being more 
influenced by frequencies of presentation. Furthermore, other studies that have inserted sequential 
probabilistic relationships found that either they did not improve behaviour or apply them in a strictly 
forward manner. However, the outlined studies we discussed to illustrate some of these points from 
Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) and Jones & Pashler (2007) while not designed for testing these 
aspects of predictive coding (or predictive coding at all) still provide some useful ideas that can be 
used for testing the ability of visual systems to make predictions based on conditional relationships in 
sequences of stimuli. Here we incorporate ideas from Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) and Jones & 
Pashler (2007) and extend their designs. We introduce an experimental design that like Maljkovic & 
Nakayama (1994) manipulates the conditional probabilities of stimulus sequences but inserts a more 
forwards looking relationship by inserting a Markov chain into our stimulus sequence as in Jones & 
Pashler (2007), also applying a reversal of the transition probabilities. To assess whether information 
contained in sequences of information favour forward looking relationships we inserted omission 
trials into our sequence of stimuli and ask participants what the stimulus should be. We measure 
reaction times and also record the percentages of presses made on omission trials relative to previous 
trials to see how people use sequential transition probabilities in these instances. 
To provide theoretically driven analysis, we make experimental hypotheses based on predictive 
coding theory and compare these ideas against those of short term memory or priming/repetition 
effects. In terms of reactions time if people do use the sequential transition probabilities in our 
stimulus sequence in a way consistent with predictive coding then we would expect faster reaction 
times for more predictable stimuli. This is because according to predictive coding theory, when 
predictions are valid to the internally modelled sequence probabilities there should be less prediction 
error leading to a faster response (Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). Alternatively, if the number of 
repetitions is the more important factor, as in Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994), as we held the total 
number of screen positions constant, there should be no preference for predictable transitions and no 
difference in reaction times. In terms of responses on omission trials, we can also make two 
competing predictions. In predictive coding, predictions make optimal use of transition probabilities. 
This means that the response should always be to select the most probable stimulus. If this is the case, 
we would expect that, on omission trials, participants will always select the most probable transition 
given the previous stimuli. On the other hand, if repetition is the more important factor as in priming 
then no preference should be given to the most probable stimulus.  
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5.3 Methods. 
Ethics 
All calibration and experimental procedures were approved by the University of St Andrews Teaching 
and Research Ethics Committee. All participants gave informed consent. 
Participants. 
A total of 10 participants took part in our main experiment (6 female) mean age 33 (range 19-42). All 
participants were recruited as volunteers from St Andrews SONA recruitment database. Participants 
had not taken part in any previous experiments detailed in the current thesis.  
 Stimuli design software and presentation details 
In all experimental and calibration procedures visual stimuli were created in MATLAB (The 
Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA) and presented using PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997).  
Main experiment-inserting and testing the use of conditional transition probabilities  
Our main experiment aimed to manipulate the conditional probabilities of the way our stimulus 
changed position over trials in a more dynamic and sequential way than previous predictive coding 
studies. The aim of this manipulation was twofold with each aim forming the basis of specific 
analyses. The first aim was to analyse whether participants were able to learn the Markov transition 
probabilities and to test whether applying such information would improve behaviour in the shape of 
decreased reaction times. The second aim was to assess whether participants would use the transition 
probabilities in a forward direction by analysing the presses made by the participant on omission trials 
relative to the previous presented state.  
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Experimental stimuli  
Our experimental stimuli were Gabor patches. In most trials Gabors would appear in one of three 
screen positions over trials; centre centrally and slightly towards the top of the screen (X=0 °, Y=5°) 
right slightly above centre (X= -3.53 °, Y=3.53°) and left and slightly above centre (X= 3.53 °, 
Y=3.53°). Gabor stimuli had a radius of 8 visual degrees and had a spatial frequency 0.5 cycles per 
visual degree and were presented at 25% contrast (Michelson (see figure 5 below) but on some 
‘omission’ trials no stimuli would be presented and participants instead viewed a blank screen.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Basic details of experimental stimuli. Trials either presented Gabor stimuli in one of three 
screen positions or did not present a stimulus at all. 
 
Manipulation of transition probabilities-Markov chains 
Our experimental blocks contained two Markov chains sequences. One Markov chain we term 
‘forward matrix’ (see table 1) and one we call ‘backwards matrix’ which was the exact mirror of the 
forward matrix (see table 2). Blocks consisted of 100 trials. Importantly in all blocks, during the first 
80 trials Gabors changed between screen positions and omissions transitioned between trials in a way 
determined by the forward matrix transition probabilities with switches between screen positions now 
defined as states A, B, C and D. State A relates to the left sided Gabor, state B the centrally positioned 
Gabor, state C the right sided Gabor and state D which were omission trials. In the other 20 trials 
within a block, Gabors changed between screen position based on the backward matrix transition 
probabilities to states we term E, F, G and H (state E relates to the left sided Gabor, state F, the 
centrally positioned Gabor, state G the right sided Gabor and state H which was a blank screen) (see 
figure 7 below). Importantly, within blocks transition probabilities between states were structured in 
such a way that all screen positions were presented an equal number of times (see table 3 below). This 
was to make each screen position equally likely which was crucial to testing the priming explanation 
of reaction time. Here we emphasize that on both forward and reverse matrix phases within blocks the 
same screen positions were always used. To clarify this means that states A and E both correspond to 
Gabors presented at the left of the screen, states B and F to Gabors presented centrally, states C and G 
to Gabors presented at the left of the screen and states D and H presented blank screens (see figure 6 
below). The reason why we give the same screen positions different ‘states’ is because we need to 
differentiate trial states for analysis purposes.  
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Figure 6. States relative to screen position in the forward and backward matrix phases of 
blocks. In the forward matrix phase (top) we assigned the following screen positions to the following 
states. State A left and slightly above centre, state B slightly above the centre of the screen, state C to 
the right and slightly above centre and D no stimuli presented. In the backward matrix phase of clock 
(bottom) we assigned the following screen positions to the following states. State E left and slightly 
above centre, state F slightly above the centre of the screen and state G to the right and slightly above 
centre and state H no stimuli presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Trial structure in each block-here we illustrates the trial structure of our block. For 80 
trials, states switched in a way determined by our forwards matrix and then on trial 80 trials switched 
in a way determined by our backward matrix.  
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State Transition matrices. 
The transition probabilities between states were determined by our forward and backward matrices 
which are what are known as Markov chains. Markov chains are defined as a stochastic process in 
which the transition to the next state is determined entirely on or is conditioned by only the current 
state. Within Markov chains, each state is associated with a set of probabilities for switching to any of 
the other possible states. By building in and altering transition probabilities which are which are 
presented below in tables 1 and 2, we made certain transitions between states more probable than 
others over trials and therefore define these transitions as predictable. 
Table 1 State transition probabilities ‘forward’ matrix 
 
State transitioning to (next trial) 
State transitioning 
from (current trial) 
 A B C D 
A 1/9 6/9* 1/9 1/9 
B 1/9 1/9 6/9* 1/9 
C 6/9* 1/9 1/9 1/9 
D 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 
*denotes predictable transition pairing 
  
Our forward and reverse matrix tables (table 1 above) show exactly where the predictable state pairs 
exist (denoted by a star). In forwards matrices, if the current state is state A the predictable transition 
on the next trial is to state B which occurs 6/9’s of the time as opposed to remaining in state A or 
changing to states C or D (omissions) which all occur with equal probability (1/9). If the current state 
is B, then the predictable transition on the next trial is to state C, which again occurs 6/9’s of the time 
with an equal probability of 1/9 to states A, staying in B or switching to D. Lastly when the current 
state is D (blank) there is a zero probability of staying in state D (so blanks are never repeated) and a 
1/3 chance of transitioning to any other state. In the backward matrix phase of blocks the state 
transition probabilities are the reverse from the forward matrix as shown below in table 2.  
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Table 2 State transition probabilities ‘backward’ matrix 
State transitioning to 
State transitioning 
from 
 E F G H 
E 1/9 1/9 6/9* 1/9 
F 6/9* 1/9 1/9 1/9 
G 1/9 6/9* 1/9 1/9 
H 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 
*denotes predictable transition pairing 
 
In the backward matrix phase of blocks if the current state is state E the predictable transition on the 
next trial is to state G which occurs 6/9’s of the time as opposed to remaining in state E or changing to 
states F or H which all occur with equal probability (1/9). If the current state is F then the predictable 
transition on the next trial is to state E which again occurs 6/9’s of the time with an equal probability 
of 1/9 states, staying in F or switching to G or H. When the current state is G the predictable transition 
is to state F which happens on 6/9’s of the time and a 1/9 chance of switching to states E, F or H. 
Finally, if the current state is H (blank) there is a zero probability of staying in state H and a 1/3 
chance of transitioning to any other state. Crucially, although some state transitions occurred more 
often than others, transition probabilities were designed in such a way that they controlled for 
frequency of presentations. In all blocks, the frequency of screen positions presented over the 100 
trials was always the same. This meant that stimuli were presented approximately 30 times in each 
screen location with 10 blanks or omission trials also always being presented (see table 3 blow).  
Table 3 approximate number of screen positions presented per block 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stimulus presented Total number of 
presentations 
Right 30 
Centre 30 
Left 30 
Blank 10 
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Procedure. 
Participants were seated 57cm from a computer monitor. Participants were told that they would be 
presented with a round grating stimuli that would appear in three screen locations, left, middle and 
right and that during trials they should try to focus on the fixation cross in the middle of the screen. 
We asked participants to press a button on a button box that pertained to the one of each of the screen 
positions as fast as possible when they saw the stimulus i.e. press the left button if the stimulus was on 
the left and the centre button if the stimulus was in the centre. Importantly, we also informed them 
that although most of the time stimuli would be clearly visible, on occasion this would not be the case 
and on some trials the stimulus would be very difficult to see and during these trials they should press 
the button they think applies to where the stimulus should be as fast as possible. For clarity, on these 
trials stimuli were not presented, forming our omission trials. Each stimulus that was presented 
appeared for 200ms seconds with the gap between trials drawn from an exponential distribution of 
between 100-500ms to prevent participants from learning the time gap between trials which could 
potentially have confounded our reaction time data. In the forward matrix phase of blocks 80 trials 
were presented. On the 80th trial the Markov chain was then reversed and trials followed the backward 
matrix transition probabilities. Initial states were randomly selected. Prior to the start of experiments 
participants practiced the task until they felt comfortable and the researcher felt they understood the 
task. 
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Figure 8. Stimulus design and event sequence. On each trial either a stimulus at one of three 
orientations or a blank screen termed ‘omission trial’ was presented for 500ms.Stimuli were presented 
immediately after one another with a small inter trial interval drawn from an exponential distribution 
of between 0.1 and 0.5 seconds. The task of participants was to signal a judgment as quickly as 
possible about the perceived position of the Gabor stimulus. To allow for a response on omission 
trials we told participants that on some occasions stimuli would be very difficult to see and they 
should simply press where they think the stimuli should be.  
Trial numbers and blocking. 
Each block contained 100 trials. Within each block 80 trials were in the forward matrix phase and 20 
in the backward matrix phase. Each subject completed 9 blocks over two one hour sessions. This gave 
2700 trials in total. Blocks always began with forward matrix phases 
Reaction time analysis: influence of transition probabilities 
We analysed reaction times for all visible state transition pairings (all non omission trials) in both 
forward and backward matrix phases of blocks. Here we isolated three key independent variables that 
could have potentially have an effect on reaction time which represented the dependent variable. 
These independent variables were ‘predictability’ as defined by probability of transition between 
states, stimulus screen position/state and forward and reverse transitions phases (except for transitions 
to omission trials which form the basis of analysis two). We analysed the effects of these independent 
variables on reaction times in the following way. Analysis of the effects of our dependent variables on 
reaction times is performed using a three way repeated measures ANOVA to test for both main effects 
of predictability on reaction times and interaction effects between predictability and both current state 
and forward and reverse transitions phases. For post hoc analysis of any significant differences in 
reaction times between transition pairings we use paired samples t tests (Bonferroni corrected) and 
report 95% confidence intervals.  
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Omission trial analysis-influence of previous trial on omission trial response. 
Here we analysed if omission trials were influenced by our transition probabilities. This is performed 
by analysing responses on an omission trials in relation to the previous trial state. For example, during 
forwards matrix phases of blocks if an omission trial was preceded by state A would participants more 
often press to signal based on most probable transition from A which would have been B more often 
than other states. Alternatively, in the reverse matrix phase if state E preceded an omission trial would 
participants signal the most probable which would have been state G. The same principle was applied 
for all omission trials. Here our dependent variable is the percentage of times a screen position was 
selected with the independent variable the preceding state. We analysed percentages pressed on 
omission trials relative to the previously presented state using a repeated measures ANOVA. For post 
hoc tests on any significant results we use paired samples t tests (Bonferroni corrected) and report 
95% confidence intervals. Here we do also report reaction times but this is for general comparison 
with reaction times with non omission trials.  
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State transitioning to (next trial) 
State transitioning 
from (current trial) 
 A B C D 
B 1/9 1/9 6/9* 1/9 
 
Figure 9. Clarification of omission trial analysis-Here we provide a hypothetical trial sequence 
during a forward matrix phase of a block. In this sequence the states presented begin with state A, 
then state C and then state B. On the fourth trial an omission trial (state D) is presented. If participants 
use the transition probabilities to make a judgment on the omission trial then because the previous 
trial was state B then they should signal the current state as being the most probable position which 
would be state C (6/9) and signal this by pressing the button that corresponds with that state. Over 
trials this would be represented in the overall percentages for omission trials preceded by state B 
which would be higher than the percentages for the other possible states. However, if participants’ do 
not integrate the transition probabilities when judging on omission trials then percentages for all 
possible states would be the approximately equal  
 
 
 
151 
 
5.4 Results. 
5.4.1. Influence of predictability, transition matrix direction and screen position on reaction 
time. 
A repeated measures ANOVA tested the effects of predictability, current screen position and the 
direction of our transition matrices on reaction time. Analysis reported a main effect of predictability 
between transition pairs on reaction time F (1, 9) = 6.171, p=0.035 and a significant interaction effect 
of transition matrix direction F (1, 9) = 5.48, p=0.039 (see figure 10 below) No significant effects of 
current screen position on reaction times were recorded. Mean reaction time for predictable transition 
pairings were 469.3 ms (SD=639.1, CI [440.7, 498.1]) and non predictable transition pairings 501.7 
ms (SD=0.089.1, [475.5, 527.9]). Mean reaction times for forwards matrix transition pairings were 
496.3 ms (SD=8331, CI [476.4, 516.1] and for forwards matrix transition pairings 4896 ms (SD= 
819.4, CI [470.0, 509.1].  
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Figure 10. Interaction effects of predictability in transitions pairings and direction of transition 
matrix on reaction times and 95% CI’s. Crossed lines in our interaction effect plot indicates that 
changes in reaction times depended upon the both the level of predictability and the direction of the 
transition matrices One of the most interesting aspects of our reaction time data is the significant 
interaction effect between predictability and the direction of the transition matrix on reaction times. 
The crossed lines in our interaction effect plot indicates that changes in reaction times depended upon 
the both the level of predictability and the direction of the transition matrices. This interaction can be 
interpreted as behaviour having changed due to the switch in the most likely transitions pairings. 
Conceivably this change in behaviour perhaps indicates dynamic updating of the transition 
probabilities had occurred even over a small number of trials consistent with predictive coding 
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Figure 11. Bar graph showing mean reaction times and 95% CI’s for predictable and non 
predictable transition pairings. Here we observe faster reaction times for predictable transition 
pairings with a slower and more variable response for non predictable pairings 
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Figure 12. Bar graph showing mean reaction times and 95% CI’s for forwards and backward 
transition pairings. Here we observe that there is no difference between forwards and backwards 
matrix transition paring indicating that predictability is the most important factor on reaction times. 
 
Post hoc tests on forwards Matrix transition pairings. 
We conducted t tests after our ANOVA on reaction times between predictable state transitions (star 
denotes predictable transition pairings) and non predictable state transition pairings. Results reported 
there were no significant A-B* (M=0.46, SD=0.06) and A-A (M=0.50, SD=0.10) reported no 
significant differences in reaction times=0.61 however, paired samples t tests between state transitions 
A-B* (M=0.46, SD=0.06) and A-C (M=0.50, SD=0.08) did report significant differences with t(9)= -
3.513, p=0.12. Here we also note that the p values for the A-B* and A-A was very close to 
significance at p=0.055. Results for state B transitions were consistent with those from state A 
transitions. Here we recorded very strong significant differences in reaction times between state 
transitions B-C* (M=0.46, SD=0.08) and B-B (M=0.50, SD=0.85) with t(9)=-6.813, p<0.00, non-
significant results were recorded between B-C* (M=0.46, SD=0.08) and B-A (M=0.48, SD=0.07) but 
again were close to significance for this pair with a p value of 0.059. Results from C state transitions 
were again consistent with those of A and B with significant differences recorded in reaction times. 
Paired samples t tests of reaction times between state transitions between C-A*(M=0.47, SD=0.08 and 
C-C (M= recorded significant differences with t (9) =-2.87, p=0.18 again though we only recorded 
significant differences in one of our comparison as the t test of reaction time differences between C-A 
and C-B reported non significant differences (see table 6 for means reaction times and 95% 
confidence intervals for all transition pairings). 
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Post hoc tests provide added interpretation of our significant ANOVAs results and are consistent with 
the idea the extraction and use of conditional probabilities can enhance behaviour in a measurable 
way. Our data also provides support that participants were using the transition probabilities rather than 
being influenced frequencies of transitions as might be the case with priming effects. If we look at 
where our significant differences between states lie, although we did not record significant differences 
for every possible comparison there are significant comparison for all of the possible switches 
between actual screen positions. For example we recorded significant differences between states A-B. 
Translating this transition to screen positions this means that participants were faster pressing when 
the switch was from left to centre. However, we did not record significant differences when the switch 
was from right to centre (C-B) instead on C transitions the fastest reaction times were from right to 
left (C-A). Also, on the B transitions (centre to right/left) the fastest reaction times were found when 
the stimuli transitioned from the centre of the screen to the left of the screen (B-C). This means that 
we recorded a faster reaction time involving transitions to all possible screen positions and all possible 
button positions. 
Table 4-Mean reaction times(ms) and 95% confidence intervals-forward matrix transition pairings 
Transition pairing  Mean reaction time 95% Confidence interval 
(lower and upper bound) 
 A-A  500.1  421.2, 571.5 
 A-B*   465.2  418.1, 515.5 
 A-C  500.1  446.2, 567.4 
 B-A   481.2  431.2, 546.1 
 B-B 
 B-C*  
 502.1  443.1, 569.8 
 C-A*  471.2  417.7, 532.1 
 C-B  498.3  448.1, 552.1 
 C-C  510.9  441.2, 582.1 
   
*Denotes predictable transition paring  
In contrast to forward matrix transition pairings, backwards matrix transition pairings reported no 
effects of predictability between transition pairings on reaction times. While in hindsight this might 
have been expected due to the smaller number of trials presented during the backwards matrix phases 
this is not to say that reversing our transition matrix had no effect on behaviour. Indeed the fact the we 
did not record significant effects despite the fact that the same screen positions were presented and 
task buttons remained the same indicated that something related to the switch in transition 
probabilities did modulate participants reaction times. For example, in the forward matrix transition 
pairings we recorded significant differences between left to right stimulus transitions (A-B) which we 
468.1  401.2, 521.2 
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did not observe in the equivalent screen stimulus positions in the backwards matrix transitions (E-F). 
This change in patterns of reaction times is supported by our significant interaction effect between 
predictability in transition pairs and the direction of our transition matrices.  
 
Table 5 Mean reaction times (ms) and 95% (CI’s)-backwards matrix transition pairings 
Transition pairing  Mean reaction time 95% Confidence interval 
(lower and upper bound 
 E-E  501.1  442.3, 576.5 
 E-F   482.4  436.6, 531.2 
 E-G*  483.4  432.3, 534.4 
 F-E*   472.3  413.6, 546.3 
 F-F 
 F-G  
 496.7  432.6, 552.3 
 G-E  489.8  421.2, 535.5 
 G-F*  492.3  446.3, 538.3 
 G-G  513.4  442.3, 582.1 
   
*Denotes predictable transition paring  
5.4.2 Omission trials: influence of previous trial on omission trial responses. 
A repeated measures ANOVA tested the effects of the previously presented trial state on the 
percentages of states signalled on all omission trials and reported a significant effect of previous trial 
state on percentage of screen positions signalled on omission trials F (1, 17) = 0.30 p=0.034 (see table 
8 for results summary). Interestingly though, while we recorded a significant effect of the previous 
trial on participants responses on omission trials indicating which taken in conjunction with reaction 
time data indicates that patterns were detected in sequences of stimuli they did not appear to use the 
transition probabilities in the way that predictive coding would predict. Instead of signalling the most 
likely state on each omission trial (optimal use), what participants actually seem to do could be 
explained by some combination of probability matching or pressing to signal the same screen position 
on each trial which could mean they might not have had an explicit prediction of the stimulus on 
omission trials. If we examine table 5, we can see evidence that supports this interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
491.2 421.1, 571.2 
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Table 6. Mean percentages of states signalled on omission trials relative to the previous state and 
95% confidence intervals (lower and upper bound)-forwards and backwards transition matrices  
 
State prior to 
omission trial 
(states D&H)  
% Pressed 
‘A/E’ 
% Pressed 
‘B/F’ 
% Pressed 
‘C/G’ 
CI ‘A/E’ CI ‘B/F’ CI ‘C/G’ 
A 22 48* 26 9, 34 38, 59 17, 35 
B 19 35 41* 9, 29 21, 47 24, 58 
C 33* 37 26 18, 46 27, 46 15, 36 
E   27 29 32* 11, 42 11, 48 20, 47 
F 30* 40 28  27, 49 19,61 24, 54 
G 37 39* 21  17, 45 11, 41 10, 32 
*Denotes predictable transition pairing  
Table 5 above shows the percentage of presses for each screen position/state on omission trials. While 
we do see some evidence that participants are picking up the transition sequence probabilities they do 
not signal the most likely all the time. What appears to be occurring is that they either match the 
overall sequence of probabilities to some extent or some other perhaps some other strategy. If we look 
at A-omission trials the probabilities of state A staying in A was 11%, switching to B was 66% and to 
C also 11%, on B-omission trials the probabilities of staying in B are 11%, switching to A, 11% and 
to C 66% while in C-omission trials the probabilities of staying in C are 11%, switching to A, 66% 
and staying into C 11%. The same percentages exists in reverse matrix trials with the star indicating 
the transitions which have a 66% chance of occurring. Given these overall probabilities we can see 
that it appears that participants appear to be matching probabilities but it must be said not entirely. In 
forwards matrix omission trials participants generally press to signal the most likely state with presses 
distributed around the overall transition probabilities. For example in A-omission trials they press to 
signal the predictable B transition 48% of the time but also press to signal the other two possible 
states 22%(A) and 26% (B) of the time. This might be considered a closer result to probability 
matching than the optimal prescribed in predictive coding but still it is not entirely a match. Similar 
patterns exist in B-omission trials and C-omission trials with a noisier picture in backwards omission 
trails. In order to look at the where any significant differences lay in percentages pressed relative to 
previous trials in trial pairings we performed pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) on all 
transition pairings 
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Post hoc tests Forwards matrix transitions. 
A-D (omission trials) 
Analysis of percentages on A-omission trials reported significant differences between the predictable 
state B (M=48%, SD=15) and state A (M=22%, SD=18) with t (10) =-2.85, p=0.17. Significant 
differences were also recorded in percentages signalled between the predictable state B and state C 
(M=26, SD=13) with t (10) =3.26, p=0.08. No significant differences were recorded between states C 
and A with t (10) =4.90, p=6.34. This pattern of differences between states is not consistent with 
predictive coding in which percentages would have been nearly at 100% for the predictable pairing. 
Here we perhaps observe a somewhat noisy account of probability matching in which participants 
match the overall probabilities of transitions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Percentage of states signalled during A-D (omission trials). Here participants did signal 
a significantly higher number of presses for the predictable state B transition in comparison to states 
A and C.  
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B-D (omission trials) 
Paired samples t tests of percentages of states signalled on B-omission trials between state transitions 
reported no differences between the predictable state C (M=41%, SD=25) and state A (M=19%, 
SD=14) with t (10) =-1.97, p=0.76. No differences were recorded in percentages signalled between 
the predictable state C and state B (M=34, SD=19) with t (10) =0.51, p=0.621. No differences were 
recorded between states B and A with t (10) =2.16, p=0.55. Interestingly while post hoc tests did not 
detect significant differences between the percentages for the predicted state C and states A and B, 
state C had a higher mean percentage of presses than the other two states. Again, perhaps the best 
explanation is perhaps observe a somewhat noisy account of probability matching in which the most 
probable transition is selected more often but also that less predictable transitions also selected in a 
way quite close to the overall transition probabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Percentage of states signalled during B-D (omission trials). Here participants again 
signalled a higher number of presses for the predictable state B transition although the difference was 
not significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
C-D (omission trials). 
Paired samples t tests of percentages of states signalled on C-omission trials between state transitions 
reported non significant differences between the predictable state A (M=32%, SD=21) and state B 
(M=0.36, SD=0.14) t(10)-0.43, p=0.67, state A and state C (M=26, SD .15), t(10)=0.61, p=0.552 and 
states B and C, t(10)=-1.54, p=0.154. This result is at odds with A and B to omission trials and there 
does not appear to be any explicit prediction on omission trials on this occasion. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Percentage of states signalled during C-D (omission trials). On C-omission trials the 
overall picture was unclear and data noisy. Participants did not appear influenced by transition 
probabilities or the previous state.  
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Post hoc tests-Backwards matrix. 
E-H (omission trials) 
Paired samples t tests of percentages of states signalled on E-omission trials between state transitions 
reported non significant differences between the predictable state G (M=33, SD=20) and state E 
(M=27%, SD=23) with t(10)=-0.70, p=0.499, states G and F (M=29%, SD=27%), t(10)=0.68, 
p=0.509 and states E and F with t(10)=-0.24, p=0.814. One again, the data appears noisy. Participants 
did press to signal the predicted state more often but not by enough to draw any real conclusions and 
the result is not consistent with the optimal use of transition probabilities.  
 
Figure 16 Percentage of states signalled during E-H (omission trials).  
On E-omission trials the overall picture was again unclear and data noisy. Participants did press to 
signal the predicted G state more often but not by a significant amount.  
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F-H omissions 
Paired samples t tests of percentages of states signalled on F-omission trials between state transitions 
reported non significant differences between the predictable state E (M=38%, SD=16) and state F 
(M=30%, SD=27) with t(10)=-1.35, p=0.207, states E and G (M=28%, SD=27%), t(10)=0.68, 
p=0.509 and states E and F (M=40%, SD-0.30) with t(10)=-0.38, p=0.707. The pattern of result here 
is again noisy and participants do not appear to be following the transition probabilities and respond 
approximately the same number of times to each screen position indicating no clear prediction,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Percentage of states signalled during F-H (omission trials). On F-omission trials 
participants signalled roughly the same amount of times to each potential state. 
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G-H omissions 
Paired samples t tests of percentages of states signalled on G-omission trials between state transitions 
reported non significant differences between the predictable state F (M=37%, SD=21) and state E 
(M=38%, SD=14) with t(10)=-0.13, p=0.897, states F and G (M=23%, SD=12%), t(10)=1.91, 
p=0.085 and interestedly we recorded significant differences between the non predictable states E and 
G with t(10)=-2.34, p=0.041. However, again here participants do not appear to be influenced by 
transition probabilities and it is unclear why they signal the unpredictable stimulus F state more often 
and may be somewhat of a random effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Percentage of states signalled during G-H (omission trials). On F-omission trials results 
indicated a significant differences between a non predictable  
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Reaction times-omission trials versus visible trials. 
Reaction times were recorded in omission trials mainly to make a comparison with non omission, 
visible trials. Results reported a mean reaction time of 0.8651 (SD=0.19, CI [0.7851, 0.9242] contrast 
this with results from visible trials which over all reported mean reaction times of 0.4867 (SD=0.03, 
CI [0.4612, 0.5012]. This means that reaction times are approximately 50% faster in visible trials 
while this might have been expected it may provide some insight into the different strategies applied 
in omission trials as the longer reaction times may hint at the involvement of higher level decision 
making processes than used in visible transitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Reaction times-omission trials versus visible trials-Here as expected we observe faster 
reaction times in visible trials to our omission trials  
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5.12 Discussion and conclusion. 
Visual information is variable and uncertain presenting a complex problem for perceptual systems. In 
order to deal with uncertainty it is proposed the brain attempts to model and predict its incoming 
inputs (Garrido, Kilner, Stephan, & Friston, 2009; Kirchhoff, Parr, Palacios, Friston, & Kiverstein, 
2018; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). In predictive coding, this ability rests on the existence of a 
series of hierarchical models containing representations of the statistical regularities of the external 
world that the brain constantly refines and updates (Friston, 2010; Parr et al., 2018; Rao & Ballard, 
1999). Perhaps the richest source of temporal regularity available to the brain are the conditionally 
probabilistic relationships that exist in sequences of information created by the interactions and 
behaviours of stimuli in the world. By extracting and applying this sequential information, it can in 
theory provide a rich source of predictive information that can be used to improve the effectiveness of 
behaviours. However, while sequential regularities are replete with predictive information, on 
occasion they are quite subtle in comparison to other types of temporal regularities and it is unclear 
what type of temporal regularities and relationships the brain actually uses to make predictions.  
It is possible that the brain uses more simple and explicit types of temporal regularities to make 
predictions. These type of regularities include cues or repetitions of events offering a simpler if less 
rich source of predictive information. Furthermore, it is also unclear as to how any potential top down 
input predictive information based on sequences effects how people actually respond or make 
decisions in a way that makes behaviour more effective. Previous predictive coding literature has 
seldom insert complex sequences into their stimulus sequences and are not able to test such ideas 
(Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012b; Kok & Turk-Browne, 2018; Summerfield et al., 2008) and a number 
of studies that have used conditional sequences of stimuli have shown that they do not manifest in the 
decision making process in a way that optimises behaviour (Jones & Pashler, 2007; Maljkovic & 
Nakayama, 1994) counter to predictive coding and that repetition or other sources of temporal 
information may be applied.  
In the current chapter, we set out with a clear theoretical motivation that aimed to compare two 
competing accounts of how the brain uses temporal regularities. One was the predictive coding 
account (Friston, 2010) and one based on findings from Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) was the short 
term memory or priming account. Predictive coding states that the brain is constantly making and 
changing its predictions as event and sequences unfold in the world, On the other hand, in priming, 
the only thing that matters is that events occur more often (Goolsby & Suzuki, 2001; Henson, 2003; 
Kristjánsson, 2006; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; Olivers & Meeter, 2008; Wiggs & Martin, 1998). 
The key manipulation in the current chapter was inserting a sequence of stimuli in our experiment that 
manipulated conditional predictability but key to the priming account held constant the total number 
of screen positions. This can be thought of as a similar type of experiment to Maljkovic & Nakayama 
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(1994) in which they also manipulated the probability or expectancy of stimulus change but held the 
actual number of switches between colours constant but here instead of just manipulating change or 
switch we inserted a sequence that made specific stimuli positions more or less predictable. This was 
achieved by using two Markov chains into our stimulus blocks we called forwards and backwards 
matrix. Here, we found a different outcome to Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) who had reported 
slower reaction times to more predictable stimuli. Reaction times strongly supported the idea that 
sequences of information can be used by the brain to improve behaviour with a significant effect of 
predictability on reaction times.  
 Reaction times support predictive coding  
Faster reaction time for predictable screen positions can be interpreted as the brain using the most 
likely stimulus transitions to reduce overall prediction error thus leading to faster response times as in 
predictive coding (Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). Further validity to the predictive coding account 
of the brains ability to apply complex sequential information when making predictions comes from 
the significant interaction effect we found between transitions matrix direction and reaction times. 
This result can also be interpreted within the predictive coding account of integration as that the brain 
had learned the transition probabilities during the forwards matrix trials and had begun to relearn them 
during the backwards matrix trials. However, while the results from reaction time data are consistent 
with the predictive coding account integration and show that conditional relationships can improve 
behaviour one must question why our results were so different from Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) 
which it must be said was a very well controlled and rigorous study . 
One explanation might be the idea that when there is a specific predictable outcome people do use 
sequential information to predict and that in such occasions the frequency of transitions is less 
informative. Another potential explanation is that Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) task could be 
thought of as more of a slightly higher level explicit decision making task as opposed to an implicit 
faster visual task judgment. If we look at stimulus timings our stimulus was presented for 200 ms 
while Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) stimulus remained on the screen for 2.5 seconds. It may have 
been possible that under situations that require an explicit decision the brain cannot access the 
transition probabilities so readily as a faster view-respond experiment which may be learned on a 
more implicit basis. This idea would be worthy of future experimentation that presents our stimulus at 
different time lengths to see if stimulus exposure time is a factor. Another, possibility is that 
Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) stimulus expectancy versus priming experiment part of the paper only 
tested three participants (two of those were Maljkovic & Nakayama). As we have found previously 
how people use past information exhibits high inter-individual variability potentially subject to 
individual task goals (Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Parr et al., 2018) and variances in learning the behaviour 
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of the distal stimulus that makes them non optimal in predictive coding terms. It would therefore, be 
interesting to replicate Maljkovic & Nakayama (1994) with a larger and more naïve participant set 
and change stimulus presentation timings. However, it is possible that participants displayed a non 
optimal decision making strategy linked to exploring changes in stimulus sequences that may have 
been more evident in our omission trial data.  
Potential non predictive coding decision strategies employed on omission trials. 
While reaction time data supported the predictive coding account our omission trial data somewhat 
muddies the waters in terms of how the use of conditional relationships and sequences of stimuli 
translate into making a decision. Furthermore, omission trial data also asks questions about the 
optimal use of information in sequences of stimuli or more specifically what is optimal. Here, there is 
little doubt that participants were able to learn the transition probabilities but as in Jones & Pashler 
(2007) it asks question as to how people use them in terms of decisions. As we have seen reaction 
time data shows that participants had learnt the transition probabilities and had even been able to re 
learn the transitions when we changed the direction of the transition matrices. Furthermore, not only 
were participants able to learn the transitions they could actively use them to increase the 
effectiveness of behaviours in faster reaction times. This made our result on omission trials all the 
more intriguing. Here, although it looks as though there is a response pattern supporting that 
participants were using the transition probabilities to some extent on omission trials but not in a way 
consistent with reaction time data or predictive coding theory. What actually seems to have happened 
is that we observed some evidence for probability matching and other signs suggesting that people did 
not apply them as an explicit prediction. 
Looking at percentages signalled on omission trial relative to previous trials it can be considered that 
on some occasions participants exhibited probability matching in their responses. Probability 
matching is when instead of choosing the optimal response in a stochastic context in terms of 
error/reward on the current response which should always be the most probable choice, instead match 
the overall probabilities of the observed sequence (Newell et al., 2013). Interestingly, this strategy is 
also found in non-humans species (Li & Dudman, 2013; Niv, Joel, Meilijson, & Ruppin, 2002; 
Robbins & Warner, 1973) and is actually found in nature more commonly than what might be 
considered optimal strategies (Koehler & James, 2010). We found that, to some degree, participants 
when faced with stimulus transitions that had percentages of switching to another state of 66%, 11% 
and 11% (with omission trials making up the other 11%) responses did match these probabilities in 
their decisions albeit less than perfectly. Such a phenomena is well recorded in decision making 
literature (Koehler & James, 2010) and raises questions about the overall goals of the use of 
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sequential information and in fact what is optimal in terms of reducing error which may still tie in 
with predictive coding but in a more complex way than simply optimizing error on current trials. 
If we think about the probabilities of how events occur in the world it is true to say that while some 
events are more probable given a previous event but also that these probabilities can change. Now, if 
we think how we might learn about changes in probabilistic relationships a possible reason for 
probability matching becomes apparent. If we always make the same most probable decision we 
would not explore how events in world might be changing and potentially miss some important new 
predictive relationship. It may be that in order to maximise rewards in the long term people apply 
some focus to learning about how events might be changing to maximize reward in the longer term by 
experimenting with different choices to see if things are changing. This idea might be given credence 
given that in our experimental blocks probabilities were changing during blocks as the matrices 
reversed meaning that the brain might have detected an unstable series of sequence probabilities and 
investigated this change further by matching probabilities. Considering that predictive coding states 
that the brain is actively seeking out information from the world this may in fact be an extension of 
that process and lead to reduced prediction error in decision making over longer time scales. 
However, it must also be said that this does not appear to be the only influencing factor and it may be 
that internalising sequential information does not favour forward relationships as seen in Jones & 
Pashler (2007)  
In Jones & Pashler (2007), they found that even though their stimulus sequence technically favoured 
relationships this did not manifest in participants explicit decisions. This can in some ways be 
considered similar to our results. We also found that participants could learn the transition 
probabilities and could apply them in a reaction time task but this did not seem to carry over how 
when participants were faced with a situation in which they had to make a more explicit prediction 
about the next trial. This may be explained by the idea that temporal regularities simply form 
associations like in cue or priming experiments that need not necessarily be forwards in direction and 
that prediction, is not as Jones & Pashler (2007) state, the overriding goal of the brain and it simply 
associates temporally adjacent events.  
Study limitations. 
There are also a number of explanations for our somewhat inconsistent results that may be explained 
by the limitations in our study. One is that task had no real value to correctly predicting the stimulus 
on omission trials. It has been previously suggested that dopamine and reward pathways may 
modulate how we form judgments and make decisions (Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 2004). It may 
have been possible that by providing some monetary or other reward for ‘correct choices’ we may 
have encouraged participants to apply the transition probabilities on omission trials in a more 
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traditionally optimal way. Another potential factor that may have been caused by limitations in our 
analysis techniques is that we did not analyse how responses altered over the course of trials. This 
critique while still applying to reaction time data is more strongly directed to omission trial analysis. It 
is possible that decision strategies changed over the course of trials. By only analysing the overall 
strategy we may have missed switches in how the brain applied the transition probabilities by only 
looking at overall responses. It may have been that participants had no explicit prediction at the start 
of blocks but did form predictions over the course of trials or matched probabilities and then changed 
strategy. Predictive coding states that the brain constantly updates its internal models as new 
information becomes available but we did not assess this aspect of the theory aside from assessing 
that behaviour had changed during backwards matrix trials as opposed to the time course of 
responses. In future experiments this analysis might provide further explanations of our data.  
Conclusion. 
There are a number of key aspects presents in results from chapter 5 that provide insight into the 
predictive strategies used by the brain. One is that the brain can learn and apply conditional 
relationships present in sequences of stimuli behaviourally and is not restricted to learning cues or 
frequencies when making predictions. We found that reaction times for predictable stimuli were faster 
than those for non predictable stimuli. This is consistent with the ideas of predictive coding, in which 
favouring predictable stimuli decreases prediction error making behavioural responses more effective 
and inconsistent with ideas of priming or memory effects. However, our omission trial analysis raised 
questions about the simple interpretation of reaction times from predictive coding experiments. In this 
analysis we found that the relationship between improved reaction times and more explicit decisions 
was not straightforward. According to predictive coding, sequence based predictions arising from top 
down inputs should always advantage the predictable stimulus in an attempt to reduce prediction 
error. We did not find this outcome. Instead we found a mixed picture that reflected a combination of 
non optimal decision making strategies in which participants appeared to either match the overall 
transition probabilities or did not have an explicit prediction. It may be possible that the matching 
probabilities is still consistent with the overall aim of predictive coding but aims to optimise 
prediction error on a longer term by exploring how new decisions match with incoming information 
that could have changed. However, it is also possible that sequential relationships do not form 
explicitly forward temporal predictions and may simply link together temporally adjacent events. In 
summary we have support for predictive coding in terms of reaction times but like other studies we 
cannot draw a firm conclusion of how decreased reaction times based on learnt sequential information 
translate into the decision making process. 
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Chapter 6. General discussion, contribution and concluding remarks 
The aim of this PhD was to assess the validity of the application of predictive coding in time and 
provide new theoretical and experimental ideas to guide research in this area. To deal with variable 
inputs in isolation from the world a number of current predictive coding models assume that the brain 
contains models of the environment and adapts the representation of the world within its models based 
on precision weighted prediction errors (Friston, 2010; Spratling, 2015). These ideas include,  the 
learning of conditional probabilities present in the relationships in events and the behaviour of stimuli 
in the environment and weighting prediction errors based on the reliability of sensory information and 
previous predictions (Friston, 2017; Thornton, 2014). In particular, we aimed to examine the factors 
which examine the precision weighting of prediction errors and the ability of the visual system to 
extract and the ability of the brain to use complex conditional relationships present in sequences of 
stimuli. Using a number of computational and mathematical frameworks to provide clear and testable 
hypotheses, we conducted a number of experiments detailed in chapters 3, 4 & 5 and obtained the 
following key experimental results, methodological and theoretical advances.  
6.1 Key experimental findings. 
Chapter three 
 To minimize the effects of uncertainty, the visual system integrates past and current sensory 
information adaptively. Integration is tuned to the variability of sensory measurements 
(proximal variance) and the behaviour of the stimuli of interest (distal variance). When 
proximal variance was higher relative to distal variance participants perceptual estimates were 
closer to previous stimulus values and when distal variance was higher relative to proximal 
variance estimates were closer to current stimulus values.  
 The related integrative visual phenomena termed serial dependence is adaptive. In contrast to 
previous characterizations of the phenomena (Jennifer E Corbett et al., 2011; Kiyonaga et al., 
2017; Liberman et al., 2014, 2016), it is not pervasive functioning at a fixed level and instead 
adapts to level of variability in the behaviour of stimuli (distal variance) and the reliability of 
the observation of the stimulus in question (proximal variance) more consistent with ideas 
from Bayesian visou-motor literature (Denève, Duhamel, & Pouget, 2007; Knill & Pouget, 
2007; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; D. M. Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001)  
 Temporal integration strongly favours the current stimulus input over previous information. 
Despite designing a stimulus that was extremely hard to see it was very difficult to observe 
the effects of past stimulus history in participants estimates until we greatly reduced distal  
variance.  
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Chapter 4. 
 Correction of perceptual error is adaptively modulated by the variability of sensory 
measurements (proximal variance) and the behaviour of the stimuli of interest (distal 
variance). When proximal variance was higher relative to distal variance, participants 
estimates corrected faster when stimulus values changed and when distal variance was higher 
relative to proximal variance estimates corrected slower to changes in stimulus values. Again, 
a result consistent with from Bayesian visou-motor literature (Burge et al., 2008, 2010) 
 The way participants integrate information over time exhibits high individual variability. 
Some of this variability can be explained by the different levels of proximal variability in 
participant’s observations but not all. 
 Again, we found that temporal integration strongly favours the current stimulus input over 
previous information. Although, we observed significant differences in Kalman gain which 
acted as our proxy measure for error correction, Kalman gains did not drop below the 0.7 
level in any condition indicating a much higher effect of the current stimulus value on 
estimates than past stimulus values. 
 
Chapter 5. 
 The visual system can extract and use conditional probabilities in the way stimuli 
sequentially change over time to improve behaviour consistent with current predictive coding 
theory  (Friston, 2010; Spratling, 2015). We found that most probable or predictable 
transitions, elicited faster reaction times than less probable transitions.  
 When the sequence of stimuli is broken by omitted stimulus values, participants appear not to 
use the probabilities in the optimal way prescribed by predictive coding. 
 Our experiment showed that participant’s responses on current trials were the result of a 
combination of a non optimal decision making strategy, termed probability matching, or not 
applying a clear prediction to the omitted trial. This finding raises questions about the 
translation of predictive coding to decision making.  
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6.2 Important methodological advancements.  
Chapter 3. 
 Our proximal variance calibration experiment generally provides a reliable means to quantify 
visual variability. While data from this experiment may include variability from other neural 
systems, overall this method provided an accurate means to assess individual levels of visual 
variability and figures to provide a group level. Given that sensory uncertainty is a prominent 
area of vision science (Aitchison & Lengyel, 2017; Albright, 2012; Clark, 2013; Friston, 
2010; Kok, De Lange, Kok, & De Lange, 2014; Kwisthout & Van Rooij, 2017) this technique 
provides a simple but effective way to ascertain the levels of uncertainty in visual perception 
for computational purposes. 
 The Kalman filter is an excellent theoretical framework for guiding future temporal predictive 
coding experimental designs. Its concepts of proximal and distal variance, touch on 
something often missed in predictive coding studies and are simple to manipulate with 
existing experimental designs. 
 Kalman gain is an excellent predictor of the relative influences of past and current 
information of current estimates. In both experiments in chapter 3, Kalman gain predicted the 
level of serial dependency we would observe almost perfectly. 
Chapter 4 
 Here, we draw attention to the replication of results from the proximal variance calibration 
experiment performed in chapter 3. Results in chapter 4 showed that the method is robust 
and reliable in a totally new participant set.  
 The step response function provides an effective means to assess how perceptual error is 
reduced over time. Most experimental designs that examine temporal integration change 
stimulus values at random over trials. Changing values on every trial makes it hard to assess 
how error reduces over time to zero. As this is a key aspect of predictive coding (i.e. the 
actual aim of predictive coding) this step based design, which steps then stabilizes, is ideal 
for analysing this aspect of predictive coding. 
 Kalman gain is a reliable and easy to conceptualize proxy measure of perceptual error 
correction. Kalman filter theory states that higher Kalman gains lead to faster correction of 
estimation and lower Kalman gains lead to slower correction. We found this model to be 
very accurate and as Kalman gain is represented in one single number is straightforward to 
understand 
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Chapter 5 
 Markov chains are an effective means to introduce predictability into sequences of stimuli 
that change over time in predictive coding experiments.  Previous studies in the field have 
often not contained any real level of predictability but this is something that the insertion of 
Markov transition probabilities into trial sequences can rectify. 
6.4 General comment on the use of ideas from control theory  
 We also mention the general success in incorporating ideas from control theory and signal 
processing into predictive coding studies. These areas are increasingly turned to by 
Neuroscientists (Burge et al., 2010; Cicchini, Anobile, & Burr,2008; Faisal, Selen, & 
Wolpert, 2008; Todorov, 2004; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995) as they provide huge 
expertise in many problems which are in essence the same as in vision science and motor 
control. This is especially true if one wants to understand issues that have been studied for 
many years in signal processing such as error weighting and correction as shown in the 
current thesis. 
6.5 Theoretical implications. 
At the heart of predictive coding lies the notion of a predictive system of models in probabilistic form 
that updates predictions based on precision weighed prediction errors (Clark, 2013;Friston, 2010). 
While there have long existed models which explain how this system might actually work in other 
areas of visual processing (Huang & Rao, 2008; Rao & Ballard, 1999), previously no model dedicated 
to predictive coding in time existed. However, based on our findings the Kalman filter is a at some 
levels, a suitable candidate with support for the models account of the weighting precision weighting 
of prediction errors and indirectly the internal modelling of conditional probabilities albeit with a 
number of limitations. 
6.6 Precision weighting of prediction errors. 
Our results show strong behavioural correlates of the Kalman filter account of precision weighting 
consistent with an existing body of existing Bayesian visou-motor work (Burge, Ernst, & Banks, 
2008; Burge et al., 2010; Knill, 2007; Kwon, Tadin, & Knill, 2015; Todorov, 2004) and predictive 
coding (Friston, 2010). In our view, this is an important step on the path to establishing the ability of 
the visual system to interpret information taking into account the estimated reliability of sensory 
information and uniting findings from distinct if related research areas. Importantly, while we could 
not study the neural signatures of prediction error we were limited to examining behavioural 
signatures. However, all of our results were consistent with the predictive coding account of precision 
weighting. Our results support the idea that less weight is attached to less reliable information and 
more weight to more reliable information. In computational terms this weighting strategy represents a 
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method for the brain to optimally balance past and current information to account for variability in its 
inputs (Denève et al., 2007b). Our experiments in establishing support for this balance shows the need 
for more experimental designs that test the way the reliability of sensory information affects the way 
errors are weighted. This would be especially interesting in terms of Neuroimaging studies that have 
studied prediction errors which generally present clearly visible stimuli with the aim of eliciting the 
strongest possible imaging signal to observe any changes to such signals. Basing experiments of the 
principles of the Kalman filter and manipulating proximal and distal variance and observing neural 
activity could be a productive means of advancement for such studies. 
6.7 The extraction and use of sequential information in making predictions.  
Results from chapter 5 provide a mixed picture about the use of conditional probabilities present in 
the sequences of stimuli in making predictions. On one hand we show that such information can be 
integrated to improve behaviours in terms of reaction times but exactly the relationship between 
predictive coding and decision making is unclear it appears that in our experiment participants did not 
use the transition probabilities in decision in the way predictive coding would predict and warrants 
further investigation. In terms of methods though our study was very successful.  
The use of Markov chains is also a key aspect of our study that we take from other areas of the 
literature and apply to predictive coding. Markov chains and related concepts that we have previously 
not discussed such as Markov blankets are used in a number of computational predictive models (see 
Kirchhoff, Parr, Palacios, Friston, & Kiverstein, 2018 for an introduction ). However, such models are 
extremely complex and difficult to test in simple terms. Here, we show that Markov chains can be a 
productive model for providing behavioural support for such ideas. The most obvious area of support 
was by explicitly inserting Markov transition probabilities in chapter 5 and the second was more 
indirect which provided more support the idea that the Kalman filter is a useful predictive coding 
model in the temporal domain.  
In chapter 3’s experiment two we inserted a one dimensional random walk into the stimulus sequence 
with the primary aim of reducing distal variance. A one dimensional Gaussian random walk will 
inevitably reduce variability in comparison to a random stimuli but importantly they are considered a 
special category of a Markov processes which the Kalman filter requires the underlying stimulus 
behaviour in question to follow. Because in this experiment participants only integrated past 
information under conditions of uncertainty when we inserted the Gaussian random walk this result 
also provided additional indirect support for both the idea that the brain relies on conditional 
probabilities in conditions of uncertainty and the use of the Kalman filter as a predictive coding model 
in the temporal domain.  
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6.8 Limitations of the thesis. 
Overall the theory and experimental designs contained with the current thesis were successful but of 
course this does not mean that they are not without their limitations. One potential limitation relates to 
exactly how much of our measured quantities, be they proximal variance or serial dependence, came 
from the activity of the visual system alone. For example, in our proximal variance calibration the 
task involved judging the change in two stimulus orientations separated in time. While the delay in 
presentation was short this still involved some working memory component. Like any neural function 
working memory will collect variability from factors such as neural noise meaning that our proximal 
variance data may be inflated.  
The same critique can also be applied to our serial dependence data and the way we have interpreted 
our findings. Serial dependence has in the main been considered to be a visual phenomenon (Fischer 
& Whitney, 2014; Kiyonaga et al., 2017; Liberman et al., 2014). However, recently this view has been 
challenged. Some very recent studies have stated that at the early stages of visual processing serial 
dependence is not present and in fact that results from post perceptual memory processes This 
standpoint is based on findings that behavioural responses made immediately observing a stimulus in 
fact exhibit a repulsion effect as opposed to an attractive bias as in serial dependence (Bliss, Sun, & D' 
Esposito, 2017; Fritsche, Mostert, & de Lange, 2017). Only when the time delay between stimulus 
and response were lengthened was any serial dependence observed. The interpretation applied to these 
findings is that the first function of visual processing is to differentiate stimuli which would provide 
more accurate perceptions and only later is it beneficial to apply serial dependence because working 
memory is vulnerable to distraction and more noisy making smoothing information a good strategy 
(Fritsche, Mostert, & de Lange, 2017. It is fair to say that our stimuli and judgment responses were 
separate in time by 3-4 seconds meaning that we may also have recorded post perceptual serial 
dependence. Furthermore, we also observed a repulsion effect in our serial dependence experiment 
and an overshoot in our step design experiments in some instance that may be consistent with this 
idea. We surmised this was down to an incorrect model of the behaviour of stimuli but timing 
between stimulus and judgment may have played some role. Indeed further experiments involving a 
number of time spans between stimulus and judgment this would be an interesting follow up 
experiment given the debate between the two serial dependence camps. 
A further limitation of the current thesis was highlighted by the individual differences in integration 
strategy we observed in our experiments. In some cases, participants appeared to nearly always 
integrate past information in current estimates while in other cases the opposite was found. One 
reason was the level of proximal variance in individual participants. We did find a moderate negative 
correlation between proximal variance and Kalman gain indicating that proximal variance could 
explain some individual variability. However, it appears that proximal variance could not account for 
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individual differences entirely. One possible explanatory factor is the task prior that participants 
applied. In some predictive coding model there exists within the internal models not only a 
probabilistic model of the behaviour of the external stimulus but also a model of task structure (K. 
Friston, 2010). In more simple terms what the brain considers the goal of the task to be. If individual 
participants had different models of task structure then this could explain some of the individual 
variability we observed. For example, for some the task structure might have been to reduced noise by 
temporally smoothing over values. These participants would therefore be more serially dependent and 
slower to correct to change. Alternatively, some participant’s task structure might have been to 
differentiate between stimulus values. If this was the case, then this might explain the repulsion 
effects we observed. Importantly, this highlights a large flaw in the Kalman filter. The Kalman filter is 
a model from signal processing that frankly does not care about task demands. All it does is optimize 
mean squared error under certain assumptions. In humans, the aims could be much different in certain 
people and the Kalman filter is not capable of testing this idea. Future experiments could further 
investigate the role of task demands by manipulating the instructions to participants and attempt to 
model outcomes under models such as free energy (Friston, 2002) which does include task priors in 
its calculations. However, by doing you would remove the one of the main attractions of using the 
Kalman filter as a temporal predictive coding model-its simplicity and ease of testing. 
Our last limitation, although relating to our study directly also provides a thought provoking limitation 
of predictive coding in general. Predictive coding, in whatever its guise places a very strong emphasis 
on perception as a prediction based on previous experience. If one was to read the literature, you 
could be forgiven for thinking that what we observe at any moment is nearly entirely the ‘prediction’ 
generated by the brains internal models. However, generally we found this was not strictly the case. In 
our experiments that modelled responses with the Kalman filter, we found the dominant factor to be 
the current stimulus. In reality, we found that it was very hard to induce the visual system to integrate 
past information. Only in very uncertain circumstances was the influence of past information 
observable. Of course, you could interpret this as the success and speed of the predictive coding 
system in which internal models are nearly almost entirely accurate to the world at all times. 
Alternatively, you could interpret this as the visual perception being a more bottom up process only 
requiring predictive information in times of great uncertainty. Furthermore, in experiment 5, we found 
that the participants did not apply the use of probabilistic information in the optimal, predictive 
coding way and instead applied other strategies. Both sets of findings ask questions about the way the 
brain uses past information and the way we make predictions.  
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6.9 Concluding remarks. 
To conclude, this thesis aimed at establishing the validity of the predictive coding account of temporal 
integration. To do this, we used a variety of behavioural measures including serial dependence and 
analysing participants step responses and reaction times in conjunction with the computational and 
mathematical frameworks provided the Kalman filter and Markov chains. Our findings relating to 
serial dependence and the way participants corrected error, both largely support the predictive coding 
account of temporal integration. Also, the Kalman filter framework provided a useful model of 
predictive coding in time and provided solid explanations of predictive coding’s ideas about the 
precision weighting of prediction errors. In terms of testing how people use probabilistic sequential 
information, our use of Markov chains proved suitable for testing how people integrate sequential 
information to make predictions over time. Overall, we support the predictive coding account but 
raise questions about the application of predictive information in such an all explaining manner as in 
some accounts of predictive coding and also question how predictive coding translates into decision 
making processes.  
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8.2 Work related to this thesis  
Title: Adaptive serial dependencies in visual perception. Venue/date: European conference of 
visual perception. Frei Universitat, Berlin, German, Aug 2017  
 
Title: Quantifying sensory noise in serial dependence experiments, Venue: Vision sciences 
society conference. Trade winds resort, Florida, USA , May 2018 
The following paper is currently under way. 
Title-Adaptive serial dependence in visual perception.  
 
8.3 Analysis and stimulus code can be found at  
https://github.com/aleslab/analysis 
 
 
